Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS reference is from the Additional Sessions Judge, Kishangarh, who recommends that the order of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kishangarh for proceedings under sec. 145 Cr. P. C. be quashed. The facts briefly stated are as follows: -
(2.) AN application was made by Ganesh Jat of Ralawata on the 12th June, 1950 in the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Kishangarh with the allegations that he had been cultivating as tenant the land of Devi Singh and Narain Singh for a number of years. When he went to water the land on the 10th June, 1950, Devi Singh and Narain Singh came to the spot with axes in their hands and forcibly prevented him from watering the field. They also threatened him that he would be put to death if he persisted in watering the fields. It was prayed that action be taken under sec. 107 Cr. P. C. against Devi Singh and Narain Sigh. For the sake of convenience, Devi Singh and Narain Singh will hereinafter be referred as the applicants and Ganesh as the opposite party. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate forwarded this application to the Sub-Inspector, Kishangarh Kotwali in whose circle the land in dispute lay, The Sub-Inspector after investigation made a report to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that the opposite party had stated that the applicants had threatened him with axes and forcibly prevented him from watering his field and that there was likelihood of the breach of peace. The applicants were summoned several times but they did not appear. Action be consequently taken under sec. 145. It appears that the learned Magistrate was not satisfied merely with this police repot and therefore he recorded the statement of the Sub-Inspector on the nth July, 1950. The Sub-Inspector stated that there was a dispute between the parties about watering a certain field and there was likelihood of the breach of peace. An action under sec. 145 was, therefore, necessary. After the above statement of the Sub-Inspector the Magistrate issued the following order under sec. 145 (i) :- "from the report dated 6th July, 1950, and the statement dated nth July, 1950 of the Sub-Inspector, Ram Kishore of Kotwali, Kishangarh, it is evident that there was likelihood of the breach of peace between Ganesh on one side and Narain Singh and Devi Singh on another, as there was a dispute between them with respect to a land called Bera Gora-wala situated in Ralawata. Therefore, I attach the land and call upon the parties to file their written statements upto 20th July, 1950, regarding their possession of the land in dispute. " After this the parties put in their written statements and produced their evidence. The learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that the applicants were disturbing the possession of the land in dispute for little over a month. He consequently made an order that the opposite party do remain in possession till he was evicted by a competent court. Against the above order of the Magistrate, the applicants went in revision to the Court of Additional Sessions Judge, Kishangarh. He has recommended that the order of the Magistrate be set aside as there was no material on the record to show that there was a likelihood of the breach of peace at present. I have heard the learned counsels for both the parties. The Government Advocate supports the reference. The counsel for the opposite party opposes it. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the opposite party that it is for the Magistrate to be satisfied whether there was likelihood of the breach of peace or not. The Magistrate may be satisfied about the likelihood of breach of peace upon a police report or other information. In the present case the Magistrate was satisfied from the police report as well as the evidence of the Sub-Inspector that there was likelihood of breach of peace and consequently he made preliminary order under sec. 145 (1) in which he has stated that he was satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of peace. Under these circumstances, the learned Additional Sessions Judge was not justified in holding that there was no likelihood of the breach of peace and referring the case to this Court on that ground. The learned counsel appearing for the applicants has argued that unless there is sufficient material on the record to prove that there was likelihood of breach of peace action under sec. 145 cannot be taken. He has relied upon Lakhpat vs. Meharana, A. I. R. 1947 Oudh page 159 Mst. Ram Pyari and others vs. Dankuwa A. I. R. 1949 Allahabad page 402 and Dude Chand vs. Manakmal, (1951 Rajasthan Law Weekly p. 129 ). It also argued that the evidence which was produced after the preliminary order could not be of any help to show that there was likelihood of breach of peace. I have considered the arguments of both the learned counsels. It cannot be disputed that a criminal court has jurisdiction under sec. 145 only when there is a likelihood of breach of peace. Criminal Courts cannot invest themselves with the powers of Civil Courts so as to decide the rights of the parties. Unless, therefore, the Magistrate is satisfied that there is likelihood of breach of peace he has no jurisdiction to proceed under sec. 145. If, however, the Magistrate is satisfied either from the police report or other information that a dispute is likely to cause a breach of peace because it is concerning any land or water or the boundary thereof, he is justified in proceeding under sec. 145. On a perusal of the record it is quite clear that the Magistrate was satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of peace when order under sec. 145 (1) was made. The order dated nth July, 1950 shows clearly that he was so satisfied. The only question that has got to be seen is whether there was any material as contemplated by sec. 145 (1) upon which the Magistrate could be satisfied about the likelihood of breach of peace,. This material exists in the shape of the statement of the Sub-Inspector, Ram Kishore of Kotwali, Kishangarh. This statement is dated 11th July, 1950. It is not for the court of revision to see whether if it were sitting as a Magistrate, it would have issued an order under sec. 145 (1) on that material. If there is any material contemplated by sec. 145 (1) from which the Magistrate could be satisfied about the likelihood of breach of peace and issue an order under sec. 145 (1), it is not for the Revisional Court to say that the order of Magistrate was improper as another court would have considered that material insufficient. The rulings relied upon by the learned counsel for the applicants are clearly distinguishable. In A. I. R. 1949 Allahabad page 403, the Magistrate had made no preliminary Order under sec. 145 (1) that he was satisfied about likelihood of breach of peace. A notice was issued from his office under his signatures mentioning that there was likelihood of breach of peace and there was no material except the application filed by the applicant in order to show that there was likelihood of breach of peace. It was held by Seth J. that there was nothing to show that the Magistrate had applied his mind as to whether there was likelihood of the breach of peace. The notice issued was a routine one and there was nothing to show that the Magistrate had applied his mind. It was also observed that the application made by the applicant contained only allegations and could not be said to be material which is requisite under sec. 145 (1) for making preliminary order. Under these circumstances the order of the Magistrate was set aside. It was, however, observed in this very ruling that if there is any material before the Magistrate upon which he feels satisfied that there is likelihood of the breach of peace an omission to record a formal order as required by sec. 145 (1) may be treated as a mere irregularity which can be cured under sec. 537. In this case a formal order is present, it is in the terms of sec. 145 (1) and there is some material besides the application of the opposite party from which the Magistrate could make his satisfaction about the likelihood of breach of peace. The ruling reported in 1951 Rajasthan Law Weekly page 129 also does not help the opposite party. In that case too, the Magistrate had not said in his preliminary order that he was satisfied that there was likelihood of breach of peace. Nawalkishore J. held that under the circumstances the order could not be said to have been passed under sec. 145 (1) and therefore the very foundation for proceedings under sec. 145 was wanting He also found that there was no material what-so-ever to show that there was any likelihood of the breach of peace, at least for a considerable time. It was, therefore, held that order under sec. 145 was improper. In A. I. R. 1947 Oudh page 159, it was held that it was mandatory upon the Magistrate to record the grounds of this belief that there was likelihood of the breach of peace. If without giving any reasons and without stating that he was satisfied that there is an apprehension of the breach of peace, the Magistrate passes an order under sec. 145 (1), the order is without jurisdiction. In the present case the Magistrate has said in his order that he was satisfied that there was likelihood of the breach of peace and he has also given his grounds for belief. The ruling, therefore, does not apply. I do not find that the order of the reference was justified under the circumstances of the case. Reference is rejected. . ;