WANCHOO, C. J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal by Rajrana Khumansingh against the judgment and decree of the District Judge, Udaipur, by which he upheld the judgment of the Civil Judge of Udaipur district, and dismissed the appeal filed before him by the present appellant.
(2.) IT is not necessary for present purposes to give in detail the case put forward by the plaintiffs respondents, or the defence taken by the defendant appellant. Suffice it to say that the suit was brought by the plaintiffs respondents for recovery of possession of certain agricultural land in village Dankela. The plaintiffs claimed that they were in possession of the land by virtue of a Bapi Patta granted to them in Svt. 1943 by the Thikana Dilwara, and had been dispossessed by force by the present appellant. The main defence of the appellant was that no Patta had been granted to the plaintiffs, and as the land belonged to him, he had taken possession of it. In the alternative, the authority of the person granting the Patta was challenged. The suit was decided in favour of the plaintiffs by the Civil Judge on the 31st of January, 1951. There was an appeal to the District Judge, which was dismissed on 30th November, 1951. As it happens, the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, came into force on the 31st January, 1951. Sec. 6 (3) of that Act provides that any suit, application, case or proceeding, pending before a civil court when this Act comes into force, which has been declared by sec. 7 to be exclusively triable by a revenue court, shall be transferred by such civil court to the revenue court competent under sec. 12 to deal with and dispose of the same, It is not in dispute before us that the case is of the nature specified in sec. 7 of the Act, and that if it were to be filed after the coming into force of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, it would be filed in the revenue court. Once that is admitted, we are of opinion that the Civil Judge had no jurisdiction left in him on the 31st of January, 1951, to deliver judgment in the case, and he had to act as provided in sec. 6 (3), and transfer this suit for decision to the revenue court having jurisdiction. The point was raised before the first appellant court by the appellant but was not accepted by that court. The view it took was that the evidence had finished on the 15th November, 1950, and the case was reserved for judgment thereafter, and therefore, the Civil Judge had practically finished the case and could deliver judgment on the 31st January. Reliance was placed by analogy on cases relating to delivery of judgment after the death of a party, which takes place after the arguments are over, and the case is closed. We are of opinion that that analogy does not apply. O. 22, r. 6 specifically provides for pronouncement of judgment after the conclusion of the hearing even though a party may die after the conclusion of the hearing and before the date fixed for judgment. The law, before that rule was inserted, was differently interpreted by different courts, and this rule was provided to settle the controversy once for all. In any case, the death of a party, after the conclusion of the hearing, does not divest the court of its inherent jurisdiction to hear the case. But coming into of an enactment like the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, 1951, which defines what cases would he heard by revenue courts exclusively, takes away completely the jurisdiction of the court, particularly when it was also provided that such cases, pending before the civil court on the date Act comes into force shall be transferred to the proper revenue court. Sec. 6 (3) of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act is a clear mandate to the civil courts to transfer such cases to the proper revenue courts, and thus takes away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide such a case. It is not open to the civil court to say that it will overlook this provision and decide the case of the nature specified in sec. 7 in spite of the clear provision of sec. 6 (3 ). The lower Appellate Court was, therefore, wrong in applying the analogy of O. 22, r. 6 to the circumstances of this case. The next point, that is urged, is that as the Act came into force on the 31st January, 1951, and, in all probability, the court had no knowledge of it on that date, it could proceed to deliver judgment. We are of opinion that this argument has no force. As the Act came into force, on the 31st January, and took away the jurisdiction of the civil court to decide the suit, a judgment given by a civil court even in ignorance of that Act will not be within its jurisdiction. That the Act came into force on the 31st January, in this case is quite clear. Sec. 1 (3) of the Act says that it shall come into force on the date of its publication in the Rajasthan Gazette. The Act was published in the Rajasthan Gazette Extra-ordinary No 123 on the 31st January, 1951. It may be that the Gazette could not reach all courts on the 31st of January, but it must be held to have come into force on the 31st January, 1951, on which date it was published, and the only course open to civil courts, where suits of the nature specified in sec. 7 were pending, was to transfer them to the proper revenue courts. The fact that the judgment had been reserved would make no difference. Similarly, the fact that the Act came into force on the very day the judgment was pronounced would also not make any difference. Suppose that a case was concluded on 20th of a month, and was fixed for judgment on the 30th, and in between the law was changed and the jurisdiction of the court was taken away on the 25th. It could hardly be argued in these circumstances that as the hearing was concluded, and only judgment was reserved, the court could proceed to pass judgment. Therefore, in spite of the circumstances that the judgment had been reserved in this case for two months and a half, and that the Act came into force on the very date the judgment was pronounced, the court would have no jurisdiction to proceed to deliver judgment, and should have acted under sec. 6 (3 ). Lastly, it was urged that sec. 41 provides that no objection as to institution of the suit in the wrong court can be raised in the appellate court if it is not raised in the trial court, and that as the objection was not raised in trial court in this case, it could not be raised in the appellate court. We are of opinion that this argument has no force. As sec. 6 (3) contains a direction to the court to act in a particular manner, the court is bound to act in that manner whether there is an objection before it or not. Sec. 6 (3) applies only to cases pending on the 31st January, 1951, and gives a clear direction to the court to act in a particular manner. Sec. 41 has no application in these circumstances, and it only applies to those cases which are not covered by the mandatory provisions of sec. 6 (3 ). Therefore, sec. 41 cannot come to the help of the plaintiffs respondents in this case. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs respondents urges that in this case a question of proprietary title arises, and the case would have to be referred to the civil court under sec. 36, It is not necessary for us to decide at this stage whether such a question arises. If it does, the revenue court, to which this case will be sent, will no doubt act under sec. 36. It is regrettable that this case should have to be remanded after evidence was all complete; but the fault lies with the Civil Judges who withheld judgment for more than two months. We, therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the decrees of the Civil Judge and the District Judge, and send the case back to the Civil Judge with the direction that he will transfer it, under sec. 6 (3) of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts (Procedure and Jurisdiction) Act, No. I of 1951, to the revenue court having jurisdiction under sec. 12 of that Act. Costs incurred so far in all the three courts will abide the final result. . ;