Wanchoo, C. J. - (1.) THIS is a revision by Bherun Lal against the order of the Sessions Judge, Udaipur, by which the Sessions Judge refused to interfere in an order of discharge by a Magistrate of Udaipur in a case which was triable by a Court of Sessions.
(2.) THE prosecution story is briefly this. Bherun Lal, applicant had gone to village Godana on some private business. While he was there, he was sent for by the opposite party, Kuber Singh, who is the Jagirdar of Jharol. He and three of his friends went to Jharol. THE Jagirdar then told him that a complaint had been made against him by his father-in-law for beating his brother-in-law, Dola. Bherun Lal asked for permission to appear later, as he had to go out on that day. THEreupon, it is said that somebody stood surety for him, and he promised to appear before the Jagirdar on some other day. He and his friends went to the Jagirdar on the 19th of September, 1946. It is said that the Jagirdar repeated the complaint that had been made against Bherun Lal, and asked him to pay up Rs. 101/-, or otherwise he would be beaten. Bherun Lal eventually paid up Rs. 51/-, and was then allowed to go away. THEreafter, he returned to Udaipur. It is said that after he had come back to Udaipur, he made some complaint to the Mehkma Khas against the Jagirdar. He was thereupon directed to approach the court, and he filed the present complaint on the 15th of January, 1947, almost four months after the incident. Four witnesses were produced in support of this complaint, namely, Bherun Lal himself, his brother-in-law, Prem Ram, and two others namely one Ganesh Bhat and one Bhera Ram, a caste fellow of Bherun Lal. The evidence of these four witnesses has been real over to me. The Magistrate did not commit the case to the Court of Sessions, because he was of the view that no conviction was possible on such evidence. That order of his was confirmed by the learned Sessions Judge. Learned counsel for the applicant urges that it is no part of the duty of the Committing Magistrate to weigh the evidence and if there is sufficient evidence to warrant a commitment, he should do so. In this connection he relies on Bilas Singh and another vs. Emperor (A. I. R. 1942 Allahabad 334 ). The law as to what should be the procedure of Magistrate in commitment proceedings has been, if I may say so with great respect, very well put in that case at page 335 in these words: - "a Magistrate can discharge an accused after recording bis reasons, only if he finds that there are not sufficient grounds for committing the accused person. The same phraseology occurs in sec. 210 and the words have been interpreted by all the High Courts in India as meaning that in committing proceedings what the Magistrate has to see is whether there are sufficient grounds for commitment and not whether there are sufficient grounds for conviction. Where there is a good prima facie case for commitment the Magistrate is bound to commit the accused and is not empowered to enter into nice questions of the probabilities of the case and discharge the accused on the ground that in his opinion the evidence was not sufficient to sustain a conviction. In making these observations we are not unmindful of the fact that in certain cases the time of the Sessions Court is wasted and the accused are put to unnecessary harassment because of the omission of the Magistrate to scrutinise the evidence with a view to finding whether a good prima facie case has been made out against the accused or not. This Court on numerous occasions has pointed out that the Magistrates should not, as a general rule, play the role of a post office only and commit an accused to the Court of Sessions when there is not even a remote probability of the case ending in a conviction. At the same time the Magistrate cannot assume the functions of a Sessions Judge and take upon themselves the duty of sifting the evidence in cases which are on the border line. " I have already pointed out that there were four witnesses in this case. Of these, the evidence of two, namely, Ganesh and Bhera Ram, is, in my opinion, completely incredible, and the Magistrate was right in rejecting their testimony. That only leaves the statements of the complainant, Bheru Lal, and his brother-in-law, Prem Ram. If the Magistrate had decided to commit the accused on the testimony of these two witnesses, there would have been case or interference; but as the Magistrate decided not to commit them, the question arises whether now I should order that the accused should be committed on the statement of these two witnesses. I feel that the case having come to this Court, I should not order the commitment of the accused Kuber Singh, merely on the ground that the complainant and his brother-in-law have given sworn testimony against him. As - has been pointed out in the Allahabad case, referred to above, if there is not even a remote probability of conviction, the accused should not be put to harassment by being ordered to be committed- In this case I feel that on the evidence of the complainant and his brother-in-law alone, there is no chance of conviction by the Sessions Judge, and, therefore, it is not necessary now to interfere with the order of discharge. The revision is hereby dismissed. . ;