- (1.) THE petitioner is aggrieved by the order dated 27.04.2011 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge, Sambhar Lake, District Jaipur, whereby the learned Judge has framed charges for offences under Section 307 read with Section 34 IPC, and for offence under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act against the petitioner.
(2.) THE brief facts of the case are that one Dhanna Lal lodged a report at Police Station Phulera, District Jaipur narrating that when he was going on his vehicle, suddenly accused petitioner along with certain other persons opened fire on him. In pursuance of the said report, a FIR was chalked out. Subsequently, charge-sheet was filed for offences under Section 307 IPC, and under Section 3/25 of the Arms Act, against the accused petitioner and co-accused Gajendra Yadav. THE learned trial court framed charges in the said case for offence under Sections 307/34 IPC and 3/25 of the Arms Act vide order dated 27.04.2011. Hence, this petition before this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that according to the complainant himself five persons had come armed with firearms. Yet according to him, it is only the petitioner who had shot a single bullet at him. Moreover, according to the complainant, the petitioner had missed his shot. Therefore, the complainant had survived. According to the learned counsel, the fact that five persons had come with firearms, coupled with the fact that other four persons did not use their firearms against the complainant, clearly shows that the accused petitioner along with co-accused persons did not have the intention to cause the death of the complainant. Moreover, the fact that the petitioner missed the shot clearly shows that he did not have the intention to kill the complainant. In fact, his intention was merely to intimidate the complainant. Heard the learned counsel and perused the impugned order along with the charge-sheet submitted before this Court. Section 307 IPC reads as under :- 307. Attempt to murder.- Whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and under such circumstances, that if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liable either [imprisonment for life], or to such punishment as is hereinbefore mentioned. Attempts by life convicts. - [When any person offending under this section is under sentence of [imprisonment for life], he may, if hurt is caused, be punished with death.] Illustrations (a) ...... (b) ...... (c) A, intending to murder Z, buys a gun and loads it. A has not yet committed the offence. A fires the gun at Z. He has committed the offence defined in this section, and if by such firing he wounds Z, he is liable to the punishment provided by the latter part of [the first paragraph] of this section. (d) ..... A bare perusal of Section 307 IPC clearly reveals that the section states that the intention or knowledge coupled with certain action is punishable. Illustration ?C? further lays down that in case A, intends to murder Z and fires at him. Even if he misses the shot, even then the offence under Section 307 IPC is said to be committed. In the present case, according to the complainant, the petitioner had shot at the complainant, but he had missed the shot. Therefore, prima facie, the case is similar to illustration ?C?. Hence, the case is covered under Section 307 IPC. Although the learned counsel had contended that intention of the petitioner was merely to criminally intimidate the complainant, yet the intention of the petitioner can only be disciphered after assessing the evidence, marshaled out by the prosecution and countered by the defence. It is, in fact, too early in the day to extricate the intention from the evidence produced by the prosecution in the form of a charge-sheet. It is, indeed, a settled principle that at the time of framing of the charges, the learned Judge cannot meticulously and microscopically examine the evidence so as to cull out the intention of the accused. Therefore the contention raised by the learned counsel is unacceptable.
(3.) FOR the reasons stated, this Court does not find any illegality or perversity in the impugned order. Hence, this petition is devoid of any merit; it is, hereby, dismissed.;