- (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the parties finally.
(2.) THE intra-Court appeal has been preferred questioning increase in license fees from Rs. 20/- to Rs. 35/- vide notification dated 12.8.2002 issued by the State Government. THE same has been held to be regulatory by the single Bench and not compensatory and it cannot be termed as tax. THE amendment made vide notification dated 12.8.2002 has been held to be constitutionally valid. The petitioner filed writ application assailing increase of the license fees on the hoardings/signboards installed on private buildings/lands. It was submitted that in Jaipur Advertising Service vs. Municipal Council & Ors. (C.W.P. No. 346/1978), this Court on 10.8.1989 held that increase in the license fees was nothing, but in a form of tax and the same is not only illegal, but is unjustified and thereby increase of the rate was declared to be illegal. The Dy. Secretary, Local Self Department, Jaipur issued an order on 30.3.2000 directing the Municipal Corporation to fix the license fee for putting up hoardings/ signboards on private buildings, which should not be less than Rs. 30/- per sq. feet per annum. A writ petition was filed by the petitioner being CWP No. 1406/2000, which was pending. The petitioner has installed hoardings/ signboards against the provisions of Municipal Corporation, Jaipur (Advertisement) Bye-Laws, 1974 (hereinafter referred to as the 'bye-laws of 1974' for short). The case of the respondent was that the license fees was rightly increased by amending the bye-laws of 1974. No legal right of the petitioner has been infringed. The Corporation has to take care of the cleanliness of the city including sewerage and proper lighting on the streets, it has to incur expenditure for various services rendered by it. Thus, a reasonable fees has been levied, which cannot be said to be tax. The Single Bench has held that the license fees realized is regulatory in nature. There need not be any element of quid pro quo. In such circumstances, reliance has been placed on the various Supreme Court decisions by the Single Bench. Writ application has been dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the intra-court appeal has been preferred. Shri M.S. Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant along with Shri Vinay Kothari submitted that this is a compensatory fees, which is recovered. There has to be quid pro quo. The Division Bench of this Court held that license fees recovered is compensatory one. Subsequently, increase from Rs. 20/- in the year 1984 to Rs. 35/- in the year 2002 could not be said to be permissible in the absence of quid pro quo. Learned counsel has further submitted that in Jindal Stainless Ltd, & Anr. vs. State of Haryana & Ors. ((2006) 7 SCC 241), it was held that it is necessary to establish the quid pro quo, which has not been established in the instant case. The Single Bench has illegally held that it was not necessary to establish the aforesaid aspect. The fees could not be said to be regulatory one. Shri R.L. Jangid, Addl. Advocate General - Sr. Advocate appearing for the respondent - State along with Shri H.S. Singh submitted that the decision rendered by the Single Bench is appropriate and is in accordance with the Bye-law of 1974. Therefore, no case is made out for interference in the intra-court appeal.
(3.) THE main question for consideration is as to whether the fees can be said to be regulatory or compensatory? It is not in dispute that it is open for the Municipal Corporation to impose fees. Its enhancement has been questioned on the ground that it is compensatory. Thus it was necessary to establish quid pro quo. It was also submitted that enhancement made was illegal and in contravention of the decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Jaipur Advertising Service (supra). The fees of Rs. 20/- were prescribed in the year 1984. Pursuant to the directions issued by the State Government to enhance the fees on the hoardings put on private buildings and lands, the decision was taken to enhance the fees in 2002. The bye-laws of 1974 issued by the Municipal Corporation, Jaipur provides for issuance of license for putting up the hoardings. Advertisement has also been defined, which may be put up including on any house or wall. Meaning thereby, it covers the advertisement or hoardings put on private building, land and wall as provided by bye-law No. 2 (Chha). Certain bye-laws have been provided for advertisements/hoardings, which cannot be displayed. Licensing system has also been provided in bye-law No.5. The constitution of committee has also been provided therein. The method of considering the applications and appeal is also provided. The bye-law No.13 provides that in case any owner of the house, which is visible from the public road, want to put up advertisement or hoardings, has to file an application and has to deposit the fees as prescribed i.e., Rs. 35/- by way of enhancement made in the year 2002. Other formalities have also to be completed. The written permission of the owner has also to be submitted by the applicant. The size, colour etc. of hoardings/advertisements have also to be ensured. The advertisement has to be maintained in proper manner as provided in bye-law No.13. The other restrictions have also been provided the distances etc. have also been ensured under bye-law No.14. Thus, the bye-laws in substance provides for various measures under which hoardings can be displayed even on the private house/land, compliance of which is to be regulated and controlled by the Corporation. Since it is not dispute before us that it is a fees, which is realized, in P. Kannadasan & Ors. vs. State of T.N. & Ors. ((1996) 5 SCC 670) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that what is levied under the impugned enactment is a tax/cess and not a fee. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that even in the matter of fees, it is not necessary that element of quid pro quo should be established in each and every case, for it is well settled that fees can be both regulatory and compensatory and that in the case of regulatory fees, the element of quid pro quo is totally irrelevant. The Hon'ble Apex Court held thus: "36. The Sixth contention of the learned counsel for appellants-petitioners is premised upon the supposition that Parliament is bound to utilize the taxes realized under the impugned Act only for the purpose of regulation of mines and mineral development. It is on this suppositions, it is argued that inasmuch as the Union has not established that the impugned levy is required for the purpose of the said regulation and developments, the imposition is incompetent. In our opinion, the very supposition is misplaced what is levied under the impugned enactment is a tax/cess and not a fee. Even in the matter of fees, it is not necessary that element of quid pro quo should be established in each and every case, for it is well-settled that fees can be both regulatory and compensatory and that in the case of regulatory fees, the element of quid pro quo is totally irrelevant. (See Corpn. of Calcutta vs. Liberty Cinema). Taxes are raised for augmenting the general revenues of the State and not for any particular purpose - much less for rendering a particular service." ;