Gopal Krishan Vyas, J. - (1.) At the threshold, learned counsel for the parties appeared along with their respective parties and submitted that both the parties have compromised the dispute but in view of the fact that offence under Section 498A, I.P.C. cannot be compounded under Section 320, Cr.P.C., therefore, the trial Court refused to compound the offences. But, as per judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana, reported in (2003) 4 SCC 675 this Court can quash the proceedings pending before the trial Court in exercise of power under Section, 482 Cr.P.C. It is, therefore submitted by both the parties that in view of the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of B.S. Joshi & Ors. v. State of Haryana , while compounding the offence, the proceedings pending in the trial Court maybe quashed.
(2.) I have gone through the judgment of the Apex Court rendered in the case of B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675 . Their Lordships of the Supreme Court held in that case as under: "There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quashed the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of Indian Penal Code. In view of 'the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of, its inherent powers can quashed criminal proceedings or F.I.R. or complaint and Section 320 of the Code dose not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code."
(3.) In the light of the afore-quoted judgment, the compromise arrived at in between the parties, duly verified by the Deputy Registrar (Judl.) of this Court today in presence of their respective counsel is hereby accepted and taken on record.;