MADAN, J. - (1.) THE petitioner Rajasthan Chamber of Commerce and Industry (for short `rcci') which is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956, has moved this Court by way of the present writ petition challenging the order dated 11. 1. 1984 of the Prescribed Authority constituted under the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958 (for short `respondent No. 2') on the ground inter alia that respondent No. 1 Shri K. S. Ramji (since deceased) was engaged by the petitioner as Public Relations Officer (PRO) and he was worked as such for some time i. e. from 1974 to 14. 07. 1978 when the said post was abolished.
(2.) IT has been contended that it had become necessary to abolish the post of PRO in accordance with the recommendations and resolution of the Finance Sub Committee held on 12. 07. 1978. Thereafter on 15. 07. 1978, a complaint was filed by respondent No. 1 u/sec. 28a of the Rajasthan Shops and Commercial Establishments Act, 1958, by which the impugned order passed by the petitioner challenging his termination from the post of PRO by the Prescribed Authority. As per the petitioner's case, abolition of the post had become necessary on account of financial stringency and for which a resolution had also been drawn up by the Finance Sub Committee on the basis of the recommendations dated 12. 07. 1978 as aforesaid. It is also the petitioner's case that with a view to save the petitioner-Organisation from financial stringency, a decision had been taken to abolish the said post and the decision was conveyed to respondent No. 1, who had challenged the same by way of a complaint before the Authority. The proceeding before the Authority were duly contested by the petitioner. It was contended inter-alia that the petitioner does not fall within the purview of the Act of 1958 but the said finding did not find favour with the Prescribed Authority. It repelled the petitioner's contention that the post of PRO falls within the purview of the Act of 1958. Thereafter issues were framed and parties' evidence were recorded. One of the objections, which were raised is regarding maintainability of the complaint on the ground that it has not been filed within the prescribed period of limitation and it was time barred, hence the said complaint deserves to be dismissed. On this issue, the learned Authority held that since the complaint having been filed after the expiry of period of limitation, no plausible or reasonable explanation has been furnished on the delay in filing the complaint, which did not deserve to be condoned. This fact is evident from the order of the Prescribed Authority dated 11. 1. 84. Aggrieved by the above order, respondent No. 1 earlier came to this court by another writ petition and the learned Single Judge vide Judgment dated 22. 10. 1992 remanded the matter after quashing the impugned order of the Authority dated 11. 1. 1984 with a direction to decide the complaint on merits within a period of three months. Therefore the learned Prescribed Authority heard the parties on merit and allowed the petitioner's complaint on 11. 1. 93.
(3.) AGGRIEVED by the said order dated 11. 1. 93, the present writ petitions were filed, which are now being decided finally by this order. It is pertinent to mention that during the pendency of the writ petition, Shri K. S. Ramji (respondent No. 1) died survived by his widow Smt. Shashi Prabha and son and daughter namely; Kailash Khatri and Sharmila Khatri as legal heirs of the deceased. The application for substitution of the legal heirs was also allowed by this Court's order dated 19. 11. 1998. It is also significant to mention that it has become settled law that if on account of financial stringencies or on account of some reasonable cause the Authority had decided to abolish the post of PRO, which in its opinion has become redundant, then the Courts would not ordinarily direct for creation of a new post only with a view to accommodate the person whose post has been abolished. However, if due to some exceptional circumstances, this course has been adopted towards and employee, the principle of natural justice demands that the dues as admissible should be paid to the legal heirs of the concerned employee who is respondent No. 1 duly represented by them. This contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is controverted by the learned counsel for the petitioner on the ground that respondent No. 1 was not a workman within the definition of Sec. 2 (s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short `the I. D. Act') as the said respondent was working in a supervisory/managerial capacity and hence nature of duties which he was performing are not attracted by the definition of `workman' as defined u/sec. 2 (s) of the ID Act. It is solely on this ground that the learned counsel for the petitioner has assailed the impugned order of the Prescribed Authority notwithstanding the fact that the nature and duties which were being discharged by the respondent No. 1 though continued even after abolition of the post would not make any difference since such an approach of the Prescribed Authority is based on incorrect assumption of facts and misreading of evidence and therefore, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. The impugned order has also been assailed on the ground that the learned Authority had misconstrued the meaning of the term `appointing Authority'. As a matter of fact, the same Authority which took a decision to appoint respondent No. 1, decided to terminate the services to which order was only required to be conveyed under the signatures of any office bearer, and hence on illegality can be said to have been committed and therefore also, the impugned order deserves to be quashed and set aside. it has also been contended that respondent No. 1 has also invoked the provisions of the I. D. Act by filing an application before the Conciliation Officer but the said application was not pressed for the reason that he was not a workman and the petitioner Company was not an industry. In this context the petitioner has specifically contended in one of the grounds in support of the petition that the Prescribed Authority had also misdirected itself as an industry within the ambit of the Act for the purpose of granting relief to respondent No. 1 and in this view of the matter also, the impugned order of the Authority does not deserve to be sustained. ;