SHARMA, J. - (1.) THE Jaipur Development Authority in all these four revision petitions, has impugned the order dated June 1, 1990 of the learned District Judge Jaipur City whereby learned Judge rejected the objections raised by the petitioner in execution cases No. 24/84, 19/84, 20/84 and 23/84 and directed the respondents in accordance with the decree dated August 17, 1971 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan that if they deposit entire amount with the Jaipur Development Authority within two months, the possession of the respondents over the land in question shall be deemed to be regularised.
(2.) THE material facts may now be briefly stated. In exercise of the powers under Sec. 4 (1) of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act, 1953 (for short 1953 Act) the Government of Rajasthan on June 9, 1960 published a Notification to acquire 552 bighas and 8 biswas of land at village Bhojpura, Chak Sudershanpura and Rampura Roopa, which is now the part of Jaipur City, for the development of `lal Kothi Scheme'. On May 12, 1961 the declaration u/sec. 6 of 1953 Act came to be published and on January 9, 1964 award was passed after following the due procedure. THErein, apart from awarding compensation to the owners, the Land Acquisition Officer granted plots ranging between 1000 square yards to 2000 square yards to the owners, sub-awardees or nominees in the scheme itself. THE learned District Judge Jaipur City on reference thereafter enhanced the compensation vide decree dated March 15, 1967. Aggrieved by the order of the District Judge the Urban Improvement Trust and the State Government preferred appeal before the High Court. When the appeal came up for hearing a compromise was arrived at on August 17, 1971 in the following terms- "according to the terms of the compromise the decree of the lower court is modified and it is ordered that the respondent shall be paid the amount of compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer in his award on the condition that the State of Rajasthan and the Urban Improvement Trust allot to the respondent a plot of land measuring 2000 square yards under the award at the rate of Rs. 8/- per square yard in terms of the said award and that the State of Rajasthan and the Urban Improvement Trust have already allotted such plot to the respondent at the aforesaid price. THE respondent shall pay the said price, that is at the rate of Rs. 8/- per square yard to the Urban Improvement Trust less the amount of compensation which was awarded by the land Acquisition Officer to him by the ward. Both the parties shall bear their own costs of both the courts. " On August 17, 1983 the respondents made execution application before the learned District Judge Jaipur City who on May 17, 1984 directed that the delivery of possession be given to the decree holders. The revision petition preferred by the petitioner against the said order was dismissed by the High Court on April 4, 1986. The petitioner Jaipur Development Authority and the State of Rajasthan assailed the order of the High Court by filing Special Leave petition before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Their lordships of the Supreme Court vide order dated February 15, 1998 allowed the Special Leave petition and directed as under- "special leave granted. Heard both the sides. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the view that the appellants should have been accorded the opportunity of being heard before the Executing Court. Under These circumstances the order under appeal is set aside. So also the order of the Executing Court rejecting the contentions raised by the appellants is set aside. The matter will go back to the Executing Court for affording a hearing to the appellants. After hearing the appellants, the Executing Court may pass an appropriate order in accordance with law. The matter may be disposed of as early as possible preferably within six months. The appeals shall stand disposed of accordingly. No costs. " The objections filed by the JDA thereafter were heard and rejected by the learned District Judge as indicted hereinabove. Mr. G. L. Pareek, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents raised preliminary objection in respect of maintainability of the revision petitions and contended that all the four revision petitions appear to be out of time and are barred by limitation. According to learned counsel, the petitioner JDA was not diligent in obtaining the copies of the impugned order. Reliance was placed on Pramatha Nath Roy vs. W. M. Arthur (1 ). Alternatively it was urged that even if the time in obtaining the certified copy is excluded under Sec. 12 of the Limitation act, then also the revision petitions were submitted one day after the expiry of the limitation and the Registry of the High Court committed error in calculating the days consumed in obtaining the copy. A close scrutiny of record demonstrates that the petitioner made applications for obtaining certified copies of the impugned order on June 2, 1990. Copies were drawn on July 5, 1990 and delivered to the petitioner on the same day. The revision petitions were filed on October 4, 1990 and the Registry of the High Court entertained the petitions by making endorsement that they were field within limitation. The respondents did not raise any objection in regard to endorsement made by the Registry for a period of then years and six months and now for the first time urged that the revision petitions are barred by the limitation. Calculation of the respondents appears to be correct and I find that that there was a delay of one day in filing the revision petitions but at the same time it appears that the petitioner was misled by the endorsement of the Registry. Explanation appended to Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act provides thus- "explanation - The fact that the appellant or the appellant was misled by any order, practice or judgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing the prescribed period may be sufficient cause within the meaning of this section. " The principles on which this explanation is based is that an act of the court or its officers shall prejudice no man the maxim being, ACTUS CURIAE NEMINEM GRAVA BIT. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not required to file written applications u/sec. 5 of the Limitation Act and I condone the delay in filing the revision petitions by accepting the oral prayer made by the petitioner in this regard.
(3.) BEFORE adverting to the rival contentions I deem it appropriate to refer to some judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in regard to the land which is the subject matter of dispute in the instant revision petitions. Jaipur Development Authority vs. Radhey Shyam (2), was the case related to land in dispute. In the award the Land Acquisition Officer deducted the value of Rs. 2131. 68 towards the value of 266. 6 sq. yards of land allotted to the awardees /nominees in lieu of compensation awardable to them. The possession of the acquired land was handed over to Jaipur Development Authority (for short the JDA ). In reference made under Sec. 18, the civil Court confirmed the award but corrected double deduction of certain amount made therein. Thereafter some persons filed writ petitions for grant of land in lieu of compensation and the awardees filed an execution the enforce the award passed by the civil court on the reference u/sec. 18. The JDA raised objection as to the executability of the award for allotment of sites made in lieu of compensation. The executing court party upheld that objection but on revision by the awardees the Division bench of the Rajasthan High Court held that it was not permissible for the JDA to raise the objection in execution of the award and accordingly allowed the revision. In the appeals by Special Leave, preferred by the JDA, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in paras 7 and 8 of the judgment indicated thus- "7. A reading of sub-sec. (4) of the Sec. 31, in our considered, view indicates that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power or jurisdiction to give any land under acquisition or any other land in lieu of compensation. sub-Sec. (4) though gives power to him in the matter of payment of compensation, it does not empower him to give any land in lieu of compensation, Sub- section (3) expressly gives power "only to allot any other land in exchange". In other words the land under acquisition is not liable to be allotted in lieu of compensation except u/sec. 31 (3) that too only to a person having limited interest. If the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that while awarding compensation the Collector (Land Acquisition Officer) has a higher power than the limited power given under sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 31, it would run counter to the scheme envisaged thereunder and would result in defeating the public purpose. The problem could be looked at from a different angle, Under Sec. 4 (1), the appropriate Government notifies a particular land needed for public purpose. On publication of the declaration under Sec. 6, the extent of the land with specified demarcation gets crystallised as the land needed for a public purpose. If the enquiry u/sec. 5 A was dispensed with, exercising the power u/sec. 17 (1), the Collector on issuance of notice under sections 17,9 and 10 is entitled to take possession of the acquired land for use of public purpose. Even otherwise on making the award and offering to pay compensation he is empowered u/sec. 16 to take possession of the land. Such land vests in the Government free from all encumbrances. The only power for the Government u/sec. 48 is to denotify the lands before possession is taken. Thus, in the scheme of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer has no power to create an encumbrance or right in the erstwhile owner to claim possession of a part of the acquired land in lieu of compensation. Such power of the Land Acquisition officer if is exercised would be self defeating and subversive to public purpose. The question then is, whether it is open to the appellant to raise the objections on the execution side as to allotment of acquired land under the award. We have already said that what is executable is only an award under Sec. 26 (2), namely, the amount awarded or the claims of the interests determined of the respective persons in the acquired lands. Therefore, the decree cannot incorporate any matter other than the matters determined under Sec. 11 or those referred to and determined u/sec. 18 and not other. Since we have already held that the Land Acquisition Officer has no power of jurisdiction to allot land in lieu of compensation, the decree even. , if any, under sec. 18 to the extent of any recognition of the directions in the award for the allotment of the land given under Sec. 11 is a nullity. It is open to the appellant to raise the invalidity nullity of the decree in execution in that behalf. Accordingly we hold that the execution proceedings directing delivery of possession of the land as contained in the award is, invalid void and inexecutable. Accordingly it is set aside. " ;