TATIA, J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal against the order dated 23. 2. 2001 passed by the Addl. District Judge, Anoopgarh, District Sriganganagar whereby the injunction application and the application under Order 39 Rule 1, 2 CPC were dismissed.
(2.) BRIEF facts of the case are that the suit for specific performance of the contract was filed by the appellants- plaintiffs on the basis of an agreement dated 1. 5. 82 with the respondent-defendant. The consideration for sale was Rs. 1,75000/- and the plaintiff paid Rs. 1,55,000/- to the vendors and Rs. 20,000/- were payable at the time of registration. According to plaintiffs, in pursuance of the agreement to sell, the possession was handed over to the plaintiffs on 22. 06. 1983 and Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the defendant. According to plaint allegation that it was the duty of the defendant to obtain permission for sale from the District Collector, Sriganganagar and, thereafter, he was to serve a notice of one month upon the plaintiffs but the defendant did not apply for permission till 1990 and in the year 1991 the provision for seeking permission came to an end and at that time the plaintiffs requested to the defendant to get the sale deed registered in their favour but at that time the defendant added by saying that some suit is pending and he will execute the sale deed after the decision of the suit. In the year 1995 on 15. 10. 1995 the defendant totally refused to execute the sale deed, therefore the present suit was filed. The defendants in their reply submitted that the father of the plaintiffs Amar Singh was the servant of the defendant in the year 1991-92 and in the end of 2. 10. 1995 the defendant asked for the account of the crop but Amar Singh refused and stated that he became the owner of the property. Thereafter suit was filed by the defendant in the court of SDO, Anoopgarh on 3. 10. 1995 for seeking injunction against Amar Singh. During the pendency of that suit Amar Singh, father of the plaintiffs forcibly encroached upon the land in dispute. Upon which the relief of possession was included in the suit No. 129/95. It is also stated in the reply that Amar Singh himself submitted reply in another case No. 71/86 and admitted that he is in possession of the land only as a servant, therefore, the plaintiffs are not entitle for any of the relief. The defendant also denied the execution of the agreement to sell and receipt of the money. The trial court after hearing the arguments held that there is no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiffs. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently submitted that this is an admitted case of the possession of the appellants and the reply of Amar Singh dated 2nd Aug. , 1986 shows that he admitted himself as a tenant to avoid some serious conse- quences of cancellation of the allotment of the land and therefore, that admission cannot be used against the plaintiffs. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the suit filed by the defendant in the revenue court, the possession of the plaintiffs were found and therefore, the plaintiff has strong prima facie case. Learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that since they entered into the field in pursuance of an agreement to sell, therefore, plaintiffs cannot be termed as a trespasser because of the fact that her initial entry was lawful and simply because the sale deed was not executed in her favour they cannot be treated as trespasser. Plaintiffs may not have valid title, but there is no reason to hold them as trespasser and once plaintiffs entry is lawful then their possession is required to be protected. I have considered the submissions made by both the parties and perused the order also. The facts which are not in dispute are that allegation of the agreement to sell is of the year 1982 particularly of the 1. 05. 1982. The case of the plaintiff itself shows that defendant was required to obtain the permission from the District Collector, Sriganganagar for sale of the land and it is also admitted by the plaintiffs that defendant did not obtain the permission till 1990 from the District Collector, Sriganganagar but nothing has been shown what the plaintiff was doing since 1982 to 1990 and if it was the duty of the defendant to take the permission for sale from the District Collector then because of this reason only plaintiff cannot say that he can wait for indefinite period. According to plaintiff, the provision of seeking permission came to an end in the year 1991 even then thereafter what efforts were made by the plaintiff for getting the execution of the sale deed are vague and the explanation given by the plaintiff that, after the deletion of provision of seeking permission the plaintiff requested the defendant to execute the sale deed shows that no serious efforts were made by the plaintiff. The defendant merely said that there is a suit pending and that is why he cannot execute the sale deed. The explanation deserve to be rejected on the fact of it. It view of the fact that the plaintiff without enquiring about the fact that whether the suit was filed or not or whether in view of the pendency of any of the suit there is a prohibition of execution of sale deed or not he remained silent for another four years when the plaintiff stated that on 15th Oct. 1995 that the defendant refused to execute the sale deed.
(3.) THE facts narrated even by plaintiff prima facie show that plaintiff was not very much serious about getting the execution of sale deed in his favour. If the agreement was executed in his favour whether there was sufficient reason for plaintiff to remain silent for such a long period will be gone into after evidence of the parties, but at this stage there appears to be no satisfactory reason for filing the suit for specific performance of contract at belated stage. While granting injunction the courts are required to see prima facie case, a due diligence of the parties particularly who is seeking relief from the court of law. Even if some permission was required under law for execution of the sale deed, even then according to the plaintiff himself that requirement came to end in the year 1991, but the plaintiff did not chose to persue his remedy by approaching to the defendant in a manner to persuade him to execute the sale deed or in case of not doing so by the defendant then to approach the court of law, therefore there appears to be no prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that in view of the decision of the SDO, Anoopgarh dated 12. 10. 2000 the respondent may eject the appellants and it is also submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the decision dated 12. 10. 2000 is absolutely illegal and contrary to the law laid down by this Court and against that order of the SDO dated 12th October 2000 an appeal has already been preferred, in which there is a stay order in favour of the appellant. When there is a stay order in favour of the appellant against the order in favour of the appellant against the order dated 12. 10. 2000 then again the apprehension of the appellant of forcibly dispossession looses its ground. So far as illegality of the order dated 12. 05. 2000 is concerned, in the appeal against the interim order, it could not be enquired into particularly in view of the fact that the order dated 12. 10. 2000 has not attained the finality and its illegality to be examined by the appellate court. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that respondent is availing the lawful remedy and will evict the appellant only by following the due process of law, therefore the apprehension of the learned counsel for the appellant with regard to illegal dispossession has no basis. ;