KESHOTE, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the petitioner. Relying on the decisions of the Apex Court in cases of New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Smt. Sita Bai & ors. (1); New India Assurance Company Ltd. vs. Bhagwati Devi & Ors. (2); National Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Jikubhai Nathuji Dabhi (Smt.) & Ors. (3); and, Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Sunita Rathi & Ors. (4), learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the Assurance Company in the claim petition filed by the claimants for the compensation for the death of their bread earner was not necessary party.
(2.) IT has next been contended that when the Company was riot necessary party, the Tribunal has committed a serious error of jurisdiction to order for payment of Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants u/s. 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on the principle of no fault liability by the Company. I have given my thoughtful considerations to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The Tribunal has noticed that the amount of the premium for the policy of the offending vehicle was received by the Company on 8. 5. 2000 at 12. 30 P. M. and this cover note has been issued. The accident has been taken place at 9. 25 P. M. The Assurance Company is considered to be a necessary party to the claim petition. Accordingly the Tribunal is also ordered for the payment of this amount of Rs. 50,000/- by the Assurance Company. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that cover note also mentions the date of the commencement of the risk from 9. 5. 2000 and as such the matter is covered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court decisions. It is not the stage where we have to go on these contentions raised by the learned counsel for the Assurance Company at this stage. The deceased was a third party so far as the insurance of this vehicle is concerned. The Tribunal has considered this aspect and held that the Assurance Company is a necessary party to the claim petition. This is an interlocutory order against which this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution is difficult to entertain. The order passed by the Tribunal under which it directed the Assurance Company to pay Rs. 50,000/- on the principle of no fault liability u/s. 140 of the M. V. Act to the claimants is an interlocutory order in which no interference is called for of this Court under Article 227 of the Constitution. The legislature in its wisdom has not provided any appeal or revision against the interlocutory orders passed by the Tribunal or more precisely the order/interim award made by the Tribunal u/s. 140 of the M. V. Act, 1988.
(3.) WE have to go by the substance of the matter the challenge is made by the petitioner to the order of the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jaipur City, Jaipur under which it given direction to the company to pay Rs. 50,000/- to the claimants. So far as the first part of this order is concerned there cannot be any grievance by the petitioner. The grievance has been raised by the petitioner to the second part of this order where it put liability of Rs. 50,000/- upon the Assurance Company. The legislature with some purpose and object has not provided any appeal or revision against the interlocutory orders passed by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under- the Motor Vehicles Act in the claim application for compensation filed by the claimants. The purpose is very obvious to give the finality to that order. So far as final award is concerned, it is appealable but the appeal is provided on a condition of depositing of 25% of the awarded amount. When the legislature thought of providing the appeal against the final award only after deposit of 25% of the awarded amount how for it is justified for the court to interfere against the interlocutory order against which no appeal or revision is provided and that too without a single penny has been paid by the Company to the claimants or deposited with the Tribunal or this Court. The law is also well settled that under Article 227 of the Constitution, the Court cannot assume Unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. ;