SHARMA, J. - (1.) THIS second appeal instituted by the defendant arises out of a suit for eviction from a shop with corridor situated at Munshi Bazar Alwar. The plaintiff sought for the decree of eviction on the grounds of default in payment of rent and reasonable and bonafide necessity of the premises. Out of the five issues that were framed by the learned trial court issues No. 2 and 3 as regards to reasonable and bonafide necessity of the shop and comparative hardship of the parties were the core issues. After appreciating the evidence adduced by the parties the learned trial court decreed the suit. Thereafter the appellate court framed yet another issue as regard to `partial eviction' of the premises and remanded the matter with a direction to the trial court to decide the issue within six months. The trial court decided the issue against the defendant. Learned appellate court vide its decree and judgment dated August 13, 1998 confirmed the findings of the learned trial court and dismissed the appeal. After unsuccessful first appeal the defendant has now preferred the instant second appeal.
(2.) IN the plaint filed by the plaintiff on April 22, 1982 it was averred that the shop was required reasonable and bonafide for the business of plaintiff's son Pradeep Kumar. The decree was sought in view of cl. (h) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 13 of the Rajas- than Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short 1950 Act ). Both the courts below appreciated the evidence adduced by the parties and observed that the shop was required reasonably and bonafide by the plaintiff. The issues as regards to comparative hardship and partial eviction were considered at length and decided agai- nst the defendant. Finding in regard to reasonable and bonafide necessity of the shop is essentially a finding of fact. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kondiba Dagadu Kadam's case (1), propounded that concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous cannot be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers u/s. 100 CPC. The defendant Dharam Chand has filed two applications under Order 6 Rule 17 and Section 151 CPC seeking amendment of plaint in view of subsequent events. The defendants averred in the applications that plaintiff Karam Chand was doing the business in the shop with his son Pradeep Kumar and after the death of Karam Chand on January 21, 2000 the shop has become available to Pradeep Kumar and the necessity of Pradeep Kumar was satisfied. In view of this amendment in the written statement was necessary. In the application under Section 151 CPC the defendant has prayed that Pradeep Kumar be directed to file affidavit in view of subsequent events and the defendant be permitted to cross examine Pradeep Kumar. I have heard learned counsel for the defendant and perused the material on record and case law cited in support of the submissions. Admittedly, the plaintiff instituted the suit for eviction on April 22, 1982. The plaintiff could not see the final result of he litigation in his life time and died on January 21, 2000 during the pendency of this second appeal. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad vs. Pradeep Srivastava (2) had occasion to consider the similar situation. It was urged on behalf of the tenant before the Hon'ble Supreme Court to take into account the subsequent events. Dismissing the appeal the Hon'ble Supreme Court indicated that he crucial date for deciding the bona fides of the requirement of the land lord is the date of his application for eviction. The antecedent days may perhaps have utility for him to reach he said crucial date of consideration. If every subsequent development during the post petition period is to be taken into account for judging the bonafides of the requirement pleaded by the land lord there would perhaps be no end so long as he unfortunate situation in the litigative slow process system subsisto. During 23 years, after the land lord moved for eviction on the ground that this son needed the building, neither the land lord nor his son is expected to remain idle without doing any work, lest joining any new assignment or starting any new work would be at the perils of forfeiting his requirement to occupy the building. It is a stark reality that the longer is the life of the litigation the more would be the number of developments sprouting up during the long interregnum. It would be pernicious and unjust to shut the door before an applicant just on the eve of his reaching the finale, after passing through all the previous levels of the litigation merely on the ground that certain developments occurred pendente lite, because the opposite party succeeded in prolonging the matter for such unduly long period. Having considered the material on record carefully I am of the view that sub- sequent events in the instant case do not overshadow the genuineness of the bonafide need of the plaintiff concurrently found by the two fact finding courts. I do not find any merit in the applications of the defendant and they are accordingly dismissed.
(3.) I am satisfied that no substantial question of law is involved in the instant second appeal, it stands dismissed summarily. .;