SOBHAGMAL JAIN, J. - (1.) BOTH these petitions are directed against the order of the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Bar, dated January 16, 1989, directing charges to be framed against the petitoners Ramjan Khan and Laxmi Chand. Ramjan Khan has been charged for the offences under secs. 120-B, 466, 468 and 471, I. P. C. and accused Laxmi Chand under secs. 120-B, 167, 467, 468. and 471, I. P. C. The petitioners want that the order of the learned Magistrate dated January 16, 1989, as also the charges framed against them, be quashed.
(2.) FIRST, the facts; Accused Ramjan Khan was named as an accused in F. I. R. case No. 94 dated Nov. 7, 1975 for the offence under sec. 376 and 342, I. P. C. In that case, a final report was submitted by the police and the same was accepted by the learned Magistrate. We are not concerned with that case except to the extent that in support of the application moved in that case for anticipa-tory bail of accused Ramjan Khan, reliance was placed on two certificates issued by Sukh Lal Sencha, the then M. L. A. , and Dr. Suraj Prakash Vyas, to support the alibi of the accused. However, these certificates are not the subject matter of trial in the present case. The allegations of the prosecution in the present case are that the accused Ramjan Khan, Laxmi Chand and Dr. Suraj Prakash Vyas entered into a conspiracy to create evidence to support the alibi of Ramjan Khan and in that connection, some sheets of papers were removed from the Indoor Patients Register of the Primary Health Centre, Peepaliya, and a false entry at Serial Number 154 was prepared, showing Ramjan Khan as an indoor patient from October 21, 1975 to October 23, 1975. During this period Dr. Suraj Prakas Vyas was the Incharge of the Centre, while Laxmi Chand was a Compounder These documents also were not used by any of the accused in any proceedings. However, the matter was brought to light by one Ganga Singh of Peepaliya Kalan. There upon a report was lodged by the Chief Medical & Health Officer, Pali, at the Police Station, Raipur, on August 23,1977. The case was investigated at several hands and finally by the C. I. D. (C. B.), Jodhpur. On April 8,1981, the police Inspector C. I. D. (C. B.) after investigation, submitted a final report to the Judicial Magistrate, stating that the prosecution of the accused was not desir-able, inasmuch as the main plank of the prosecution case was the filing of the false certificates in the Court of Sessions Judge Ajmer, and cognizance could, therefore, be taken, only on the complaint of that Court as required by section 195 (b) (ii), Cr. P. C. , but the learned Sessions Judge, Ajmer who was moved for making the complaint, had declined the request as the documents had already been weeded out. In the report, it was further stated that the occurrence took place as back as 1975 and a period of six years had expired and for this reason, also, the prosecution was not desirable. However, the Judicial Magistrate, Jai-taran, by the order dated October 20,1981, did not accept the final report and took cognizance of the offence against the accused-petitioners and Dr. Suraj Prakash Vyas. Against this, a revision was filed by Dr. Suraj Prakash Vyas before the Sessions Judge, Pali. By the order dated May6, 1983 the Sessions Judge accepted the revision, holding inter alia that Dr. Suraj Prakash Vyas could not be tried in the absence of a sanction of the Govt. as required by sec. 1. 97, Cr. P. C. Thereafter, a period of Five years passed without anything substantial being done. It was on January 16, 1989 that the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate Bar, by the impugned order, directed framing of charges against the accused. Aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present petitions in this Court under sec. 482, Cr. P. C. I have heard Shri M. M. Singhvi and Shri Gautam Mal Bhandari, counsel for the petitioners and Smt. Sumitra, Public Prosecutor for the State. Shri Singhvi, counsel for the petitioners, has contended that no useful purpose will be served in continuing the prosecution against the accused on the charges levelled against them. There is not even a remotest chance of their being convicted. The gravamen of the charge is the entry No. 154 in the Indoor Patients Register. It is not the case of the prosecution that this entry was produced or used in any of the proceedings by the accused. Apparently, therefore, argues Mr. Singhvi, the offences under sections 420 and 471, I. P. C. are not disclosed even prima facie against the accused. Further, the said entry is not a document envisaged by section 467, I. P. C. and there are no allegations that the present accused forged the same intending it to be used for the purpose of cheating. The provisions of sections 467 and 468 are not at all attracted. By inviting attention to the original record of this case, which was called in this Court, Shri Singhvi submitted that neither the torn sheets of papers nor the entry No. 154, which is alleged to have been forged, are available on the file. This primary evidence being not on record, argues learned counsel, the prosecution has no foundation to lay the charges against the accused for the offences under sections 167, 466, 467 or 468, I. P. C. Shri Singhvi has also argued that the first information report, which gives rise to the present case, does not contain definite allegations against the accused that they forged the aforesaid entry and, therefore on the similar of State of Uttar Pradesh through C. B. I. Vs. R. K. Srivasta (1) the present proceedings against the accused amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and is liable to be quashed. Learned counsel has further urged that while filing the Final Report, the police itself submitted that on account of the delay of six years, it was not desirable to launch the prosecution. Now, a period of eight years more has passed since then and it would be a sheer waste of courts' time to continue with the prosecution of the present case. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has cited a number of cases, a reference to which needs to be made here as under. In R. K. Srivastava's case (supra), the Supreme Court approved the quashing of the criminal proceedings by the High Court on the grounds that the F. I. R. did not contain definite accusations. It was said: "the High Court has rightly held that as the criminal proceedings have been started against the respondent on the basis of an F. I. R. which does not contain any definite accusation; it amounts to an abuse of process of the court and, as such, is liable to be quashed. We entirely agree with the view expressed by the High Court. " In Hussainara Khatoon (I) vs. The State of Bihar (2), it was held:- "there is also other infirmity of the legal and judicial system which is responsible for this gross denial of justice to the under trial prisoners and that is the notorious delay in disposal of cases. It is a sad reflation on the legal and judicial system that the trial of an accused should not even commence for a long number of years. Even a delay of one year in the commencement of the trial is bad enough; how much worse could it be when the delay is as long as 3 or 5 or 7 or even 10 years. Speedy trial is of the essence of criminal justice and there can be no doubt that delay in trial by itself constitutes denial of justice. " xx xx xx "we think that even under our Constitution, though speedy trial is not specifically enumerated as a fundamental right, it is implicit in the broad sweep and content of Article 12 as interpreted by this Court in Meneka Gandhi Versus Union of India. We have held in that case that Article 21 confers a fundamental right on every person not to be deprived of his life or liberty except in. accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and it is not enough to constitute compliance with the requirement of that Article that some semblance of a procedure should be prescribed by law, but that the procedure should be 'reasonble, fair and just'. If a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure, which is not 'reasonable, fair or just' such depri-vation would be violative of his fundamental right under Art. 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair and just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such penson. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonable quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair and just' and it would fall foul of Art. 21. There can, therefore, be on doubt that speedy trial, and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trail, is an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21"
(3.) IN Guin Versus Grindlays Bank, (3) the Supreme Court directed termination of the proceedings as there was a delay of 7 years. It was said : "we are of the view that having regard to the nature of the acts alleged to have been committed by the appellants and other attendant circumstances, this was a case in which the High Court should have directed the dropping of the proceedings in exercise of its inherent powers under section 482, Criminal Procedure Code even if for some reason it came to the conclusion that the acquittal was wrong. A fresh trial nearly seven years after the alleged incident is bound to result in harassment and abuse of judicial process. " In Rakesh Saxena Versus State (4) there was a delay of 6 years from the date of occurrence. The Supreme Court quashed the charges and said:- "we have carefully considered the various aspects of the case and we are of the view that having regard to the nature of the dispute and the fact that the offences, if any, are alleged to have been committed more than six years ago and the appellant was merely a trader at the lowest rung of the hierarchy in the foreign Exchange Division of the Bank and not a highly placed officer and the trial is bound to occupy the time of the court of first instance for not less than two or three years in view of the complicated nature of the case and even then, it is extremely doubtful whether it will at all result in conviction, no useful purpose will be served by allowing the prosecutions to continue. Hence, we allow the appeals and quash the charges against the appellant. We may, however, make it clear that if the Bank has any legitimate claim against the appellant, it will be open to the Bank to pursue any civil remedies which may be available to it. " In Mr. Jiwaji Rao Sciendia Versus Chandroj Rao Angre (5), the Supreme Court has laid down;- "the legal position is well-settled that when a prosecution at the initial stage is asked to be quashed, the test to be applied by the court is as to whether the uncontroverted allegations as made prima facie establish the offence. It is also for the court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue. This is so on the basis that the Court cannot be utilised for any oblique purpose and where in the opinion of the Court chances of an ultimate conviction is bleak and, therefore, no useful purpose is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the court may while taking into consideration the special facts of the case also quash the proceedings even though it may be at a preliminary stage. " ;