- (1.) THIS complaint under sec. 12 of the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 ("the Act" herein) has been filed on 24. 4. 89 by the complainant Jaheed Hussain against (1) M/s. Shah and Lohia Auto Pvt. Ltd. (2) M/s Rajesh Motors, Jaipur, and (3) M/s. Ashok Leyland Limited Co. (opposite parties no 1,2 and 3 respectively), for compensation to the tune of Rs. 6,38,944/- It was alleged by the complainant that he had purchased Ashok Leyland Truck 13-C-42-166 Tusker (Second) on 25. 12. 82 from opposite-party no. 1 for Rs. 2,29,740/. The truck was financed by the State Bank of India, Kota Cantonement. During those days, the complainant was granted the mining lease in respect of mine in Lamba Kho area in 1981. The complainant stood in need of a truck for carrying the stones from the mines site to a place of sale. The authorised dealer of opposite-party no. 3 was opposite-party no.
(2.) IT is said that certain advertisements were issued by it in regard to Ashok Leyland Tusker. IT is stated that after the erection of the body, the truck was put on road on 7. 3. 83. Soon thereafter, there was crack in the chassis in June, 1983. The complainant has alleged that there were various defcts in the truck. IT is said that the repairs were effected from time to time. We do not consider it necessary to state the details of the repairs. The case of the complainant is that despite repairs, the truck remained out of order and, therefore, the complainant, informed by letter dated 13. 9. 86 that he is not using the truck. As nothing was done, despite the letter, the truck was surrendered by the complainant on September 30, 1986. A surrender certificate has been submitted by the complainant. The complainant has stated that there were manufacturing defects in the truck which could not be rectified by repairs, though an amount ranging from 70 to 80 thousand was spent by him on repairs. The truck could not be used by him. The complainant has claimed a sum of Rs. 6. 58,944/- from the opposite-parties, as detailed in para 6 of the complaint. The complainant has submitted various documents with the complaint including the manufacturer's guarantee. Opposite party no. 2 filed preliminary objections regarding the maintainability of the complaint on 4. 7. 89. Thereafter, on behalf of opposite-parties no. 1 and 2, a detailed version of the case was filed. Opposite-party no. 3 also filed version of the case on 6. 7. 89. Inspection report of Tusker Mark II Chassis belonging to the complainant dated 3. 1. 7. 89, prepared in the presence of the parties has also been filed. The complainant has submitted affidavit of himself as well as of Vazir Mohammad. They were cross-examined by the learned counsel for the opposite-parties. On behalf of opposite-party no. 3, affidavit of Jey Gopu was submitted. He was also cross-examined on the affidavit. There was further cross-examination of Vazir Mohd. on 8. 1. 90. Written submissions were filed on behalf of the oppostie-parties, copies whereof were delivered to the learned counsel for the complainant. Oral arguments were heard on 8. 1. 90. Mr. Ashok Sharma, learned counsel for opposite parties no. 1 and 2 argued that the complainant is not a 'consumer' within the meaning of sec. 2 (1 ). (d) (i) of the Act and, so, he cannot invoke the provisions of the Act. In other words, the complaint is not maintainable. He also raised a contention that the complaint relates to a stale claim and so, it is barred by limitation and as such, it should be dismissed. We propose to examine these points first. 2. The following facts have been stated in the complaint: (1) that the truck purchased by the complainant was financed by the State Bank of India, Kota-Cantonement; (2) that the truck was purchased for carrying stones from mines site to the place of sale " ******* (3) that the complainant was deprived of the profit for the period-Sept. 30, 1986 to the date of the filing of the complaint @ Rs. 300/- per day, to the tune of Rs. 2,70,000/- ******* Public carrier's permit was issued in respect of the truck in favour of the complainant. IT is mentioned in that that the route/area for which the permit is valid is whole of Rajasthan. The complainant, in his affidavit, dated 18-7-89 has deposed about the same facts. In para 8 of the affidavit, he has stated ******* In the further cross examination of Vazir Ahmed dated 8. 12. 89, on the questions being asked by the State Commission, he deposed that the truck was purchased for carrying stones from mine-site and that the income per day was more than Rs. 300/ -. He has, however, deposed that the truck was purchased for his personal work, but soon thereafter, he stated that ******* IT was submitted by the learned counsel for the opposite-parties that the truck was purchased for commercial purpose and, therefore, the complainant is not a consumer within the meaning of sec. 2 (1) (d) (i) of the Act. IT does not include a person, who obtains goods for any commercial purpose. In M/s. Oswal Fine Arts Vs. M/s. H. M. T. , Madras (1), it was held that a person, who obtains goods for commercial purpose, is specifically excluded from the scope of the expression "consumer" by the definition contained in sec. 2 (l) (d) (i) of the Act. IT was observed in Western India Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Sobhag Mal Meena (2) that as per the definition of the expression "consumer" contained in sec. 2 (1) (d) (i)of the Act, it would not include a person, who obtains goods for re-sale or for any commercial purpose. IT was further observed that there cannot be any doubt that plying a taxi for hire is clearly a commercial purpose and the purchase of the vehicle, made specifically for being used as a taxi, is a purchase made for commercial purpose. The expression "commercial purpose" was examined by us in Smt. Pushpa Meena Vs. Shah Enterprises (3 ). After considering the definition, authorities and dictionaries, the position was summed up as under: " IT is well settled that when the expression "commercial purpose" has not been defined in the Act, its common parlance meaning should be given and according to that a commercial purpose is that purpose, the object or aim of which is to make profit. "commercial" encompasses all business activities. IT means occupied with commerce". From the facts stated in the complaint, coupled with the fact that the truck was registered as a public carrier and not for personal use, it is clear that the complainant has purchased the truck for commercial purpose. IT may be added that under the Sales-tax law, such vehicles are commercial vehicles. We, therefore hold that the complainant is not a 'consumer' within the meaning of sec. 2 (l) (d) (i) of the Act as he has purchased the truck for commercial purpose and, so, cannot invoke the provisions of the Act. The matter does not rest at that. The claim for damages/compensation had become time barred under the Law of Limitation prior to the coming into force of the Act. We may notice the relevant facts emerging from the record. The truck was purchased on 25. 12. 82. The guarantee was for a period of six months from the date on which the chassis was first registered or put into commercial use or 32,000 kilometers which ever is earlier. The guarantee period expired on 25. 6. 83. According to the complainant, there were various manufacturing defects in the truck. Under the general law of Limitation, he should have initiated proceedings by filing a suit or making an application within a period of three years from the date of the expiry of the period of guarantee. According to that, the limitation expired on 25. 6. 86. Even otherwise, the complainant has stated in para 3 of the complaint, that the truck was put on the road after registration on 7. 3. 83. According to that, the guarantee period expired on 6. 9. 83. Even if we reckon three years from 6. 9. 83, the limitation expires on 6. 9. 86. Chapters I, II and IV of the Act came into force from 15. 4. 87 and Chapter III came into force from 1. 7. 87. The period of limitation had expired before coming into force of the Act. The Act does not make any provision for limitation. The Limitation Act, 1963 (Act No. XXXVI of 1963) has not been made applicable to the complaints filed under the Act. The question whether the provisions of the said Act of 1963 are applicable to the complaints filed under the Act came up before the National Commission, New Delhi in M/s. Oswal Fine Art's case (supra ). It was observed therein as under: " First and the foremost, the complaint is highly belated one inasmuch as the purchase of the machine took place in the year 1979. Any claim for damages or compensation arising out of the said contract had become time barred under the law of limitation long prior to the coming into force of the Consumer Protection Act. In such-case, this Commission will not entertain such stale-claim. " According to this decision, if any claim for compensation/damages has become barred by limitation under the provisions of the Limitation Act, it cannot be entertained and decided, though it is within limitation from the date, Chapter III came into force. The claim that had become time barred long before the coming into force of the Act, would not stand revived simple because it has been filed within the time prescribed under the Limitation Act after the Act had come into force. This view was taken by the State Commission in Narpat Singh Parihar Vs. M/s. Simpson and Co. (4 ). In that case, Arts. 113 and 137 of the Limitation Act were also taken into consideration. Learned counsel for complainant argued that there is continuous cause of action and every day fresh period of limitation starts and, so, the claim made in the complaint is within limitation. This argument was also examined by the State Commission in Narpat Singh's case (supra ). It was held that sec. 22 of the Limitation Act deals with continuing breaches and torts and that the present case is not of continuing breach of contract or continuing tort. It was also held that ordinarily the cause of action for suit for breach of contract arises only when the contract is broken or (when there are successive breaches) when the breach in respect of which the suit instituted occurs or (where the breach is continuing) when it ceases. In the case on hand, there is no question of continuous cause of action. A perusal of the complaint filed by the complainant shows that he has claimed quantified compensation. Nothing has been stated in the complaint about the limitation in respect of the various amounts claimed under different heads. The complainant has claimed refund of the price of the chassis (Rs. 2,29,740/-) and also the cost of the body (Rs. 37, 029/-) built by him and also the expenses incurred on its repairs. The question of continuing breaches does not arise. The facts of this case are almost similar with those of Narpat Singh's case (supra) and we would be justified in adopting the reasons given therein. The above discussion clearly shows that the claim for compensation filed by the complainant on the basis of the purchase of the truck made by him on 25. 12. 82 is beyond the period of limitation. It is a stale claim and cannot be entertained. The claim for compensation made by the complainant is barred by limitation. In view of the conclusions, to which we have arrived at, viz. (1) that the complainant is not a 'consumer' within the meaning of sec. 2 (1) (d) (i) of the Act, and (2) that the claim as filed by the complainant is barred by the Law of Limitation, we do not consider it necessary to go into the other questions which arise from the complaint. 5. The complaint is, accordingly, dismissed. The parties shall bear their respective costs. Order pronounced on 24. 1. 90. .;