- (1.) THIS appeal has been filed under section 19, Family Courts- Act, 1984 against the order of Shri Amarnath Purohit, Judge, Family Court, Jodhpur dated March 31,1990 by which he dismissed the application of the appellant praying that the respondent be directed to pay Rs. 200/- to his witness Yashpal Singh in compliance with the order dated September 16,1989 directing her to pay same. The facts of the case giving rise to this appeal may be summarised thus.
(2.) THE respondent Radheyshyam has filed a petition for divorce against his wife Smt. Vijay Kumar (appellant ). An application under sec. 24, Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (herein-after to be referred to as 'the Act') was moved the appellant for the grant of maintenance pendent-lite and necessary expenses of the proceedings. By order dated January 31,1989, maintenance @ Rs. 300/- and Rs. 100/- per month was granted to the appellant and each child respectively. On September 16,1989, examination-in-chief of the respondent's witness Yashpal Singh was recorded. THE appellant sought adjournment for his cross-examination,it was seriously opposed by the respondent on the ground that the witness had come from Bikaner. THE appellant was granted adjournment and the cross-examination of the witness Yashpal Singh was deferred on payment of Rs. 200/- by her to the witness. On the adjourned date, the witness Yashpal Singh was cross-examined by the appellant but she did not pay the said amount of Rs. 200/- to the witness. On September 29, she moved an application under section 24 of the Act praying that the respondent be directed to make payment of the said amount of Rs. 200/-to the witness Yashpal Singh and also to pay Rs. 140/- which she has incurred in obtaining the certified copies of document and getting matters typed. After taking its reply and hearing the parties, the learned trial Court dismissed the application by its order under appeal. It has been contented by the learned Counsel for the appellant that the order under appeal is contrary to law and facts, the learned lower court has seriously erred in rejecting the application without giving any reason and the appellant is confixed to get expenses of the proceeding including the amount which she has been required to pay to the witness by order dated September 16,1989. He further contended that the learned lower court has it self observed in the order under appeal that if the appellant would have moved her application on September 16,1989. the position would have been different. He relied upon Mrs. Priti Parihar V. Kailash Singh Parihar (1) In support of his contention that she impugned order is not an interlocutory order he relied upon S. K. Pareek V. Smt. Subhlaxmi Pareek. (2) Section 19 (1) of the Act runs as under :- 19. Appeal. Save as provided in sub-section (2) and notwithstanding anything contained, in the code of Civil procedure, 1988 (5 of 1988) or she code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ). or in any other law, an appeal shall lis from every judgment or order, not being and interlocutory order, of a Family Court to the high Court both on Facts and on law. " It is clear that an appeal against an interlocutory order does not lie. It has been observed in S. K. Pareek Vs. Smt. Subhlaxmi Pareek, (Supra) para 7 as under :- In my view, as order passed under Section 24 of the Hindu marriage Act cannot be termed as interlocutory order. The Hindu Marriage Act, which deals with the problems or spouse clearly provides,for the grant if interim maintenance under Section 24 of the Act. So far as the controversy ? regarding interim maintenance and litigation expenses is concerned, it if finally determined by the family Court in case any application is filed under Section 24 of the Act. Thus, such an order cannot be considered as an interlocutory order. Thus the petitioner in the present case was entitled to file an appeal before High Court against the order of Family Court dated November 16, 1987, passed in the present case. It has been observed in Priti Parihar Vs. Kailash Singh Parihar, (Supra) paras 4 and 5 as follows :- 4. The first question is, whether this Court had conclusively fixed the expenses by its order dated 6. 4. 72 ? The order Says " Out on this amount of Rs. 500/- a sum of Rs,400/- will be adjusted towards the expenses of litigation in the trial Court and Rs. 200/- towards the expenses of this appeal. It is however, further made clear that this amount of Rs. 400/- will not include the expenses which the present appellant not any have to incur in paying reasonable witness expenses in the lower court. " 5. would it be right to say that this conclusively determined expenses regardless of the course of litigation? The answer in the negative. It is not always possible for any court to anticipate the situations in the course of a litigation and it should be read to mean that if the litigation proceed normally this amount was assessed to be determined expenses or the probable costs, As would appear from para 7 of the application dated 4. 4. 73 before the learned District Judge that the wife filed (1) an unsuccessful appeal No. 88/72, (11) a successful revision application No. 312/72, some 30 applications besides incurring other expenses. All this would not be anticipated and it is erroneous, therefore, to say that the question of necessary expenses stood finally concluded by the order of this Court dated 6. 4. 1972.
(3.) IN the "v. C. Shukla Vs. State", (3) S. C. 962, expression 'interlocutory order' was interpreted it would be best to quote here paragraphs 23 and 95. They runs as under:- 23. Thus bustling up the natural and logical meaning or an interlocutory order, the conclusion is inescapable that an order which dose not tarninate the proceedings or finally decide the rights of the parties is only an interlocutory order, IN other words, in ordinary sense of the term, an interlocutory or order is one which only decides a particular aspect or a particular issue or particular matter in a proceeding, suit or trial but which dose not however concludes the trial at all. This would be interpreted in its natural and logical sense having resort without to Criminal procedure Code or any other steratuce. That is to cay,if we construe interlocutory order in ordinary parlance it would indicate the attributes,mentioned above, end this is what the term interlocutory order means when used in Sec. 11 (1) of the Act. " 95. Ordinarily speaking, the expression "interlocutory" in legal parlance in understood in contradistinctions to what is styled as final. IN the course of a judicial processing before a court,for judicially determining the main dispute brought to the court for its resolution, a number of situations arise, where that court judge on disposing of ancillary disputes raised by parties to proceeding by making orders and unless the order finally disposes of a proceeding in a court, all such orders during the course of a trial would be broadly designated interlocutory' orders such interlocutory orders are steps, taken towards the final adjudication and for assisting the parties in the prosecution of their case in the pending proceeding. They regulate the procedure only and do not affect any right or liability of the parties INdia V. Gokal Chand, AIR 1967 SC 799 ). Every such interlocutory order may, for the time being, dispose of a particular point of controversy raised in proceeding, Yet Nonetheless the order would be an interlocutory order unless by such an order the controversy between the parties is finally disposed of. " The attention of the learned Single Judge who decided "s. K. Pareek vs. Smt. Subhlaxmi Pareek, (Supra) was not invited towards the aforesaid decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and Division Bench of this Court. The Court is bound with the above- quoted observations of Hon'ble Supreme Court and the Division Bench. The aforesaid observations made in V. C. Shukla v. state, (Supra), and Priti Parihar v. Kailash Singh Parihar, (Supra) leave no manner of doubt that the impugned order is an interlocutory order and as such the appeal under section 19 or the Act does not lie. To achieve the object on the Act i. e. speedly settlement of dispute relating to marriage, it has not provided any appeal or revision against an interlocutory order. Admittedly, the appellant sought adjournment for the cross- examination or the respondent's witness Yashpal Singh and the court allowed the same on payment of Rs. 200/- to the witness. This was cost of adjournment under Order 17 Rule 1 (2), C. P. C. It is very much doubtful that such cost of adjournment will come in the ambit or the expression "necessary Expenses of the proceeding appearing in Section 24 of the Act. The Court awarded Rs. 200/- to the witness Yashpal Singh as the appellant herself sough adjournment for cross-examining him. If she would not have sought adjournment, there would not have been any occasion for imposing the said cost, In any view of the matter, it cannot be said that this amount was necessary to most the expenses of the proceedings. If such costs are included in the expression "necessary Expenses of the proceeding", the party interested in delaying the proceedings would be successful in prolonging them at the cost of the opponent. Such could not have been the intention of the legislature, One of the objects of the Act is to provide for the establishment of Family Courts with a view to secure speedy settlement of disputes relating to marriage Admittedly, the appellant had earlier moved an application for the pendente-lite maintenance and expenses of the proceedings, maintenance pendente-lits was granted and do amount was granted towards expenses of the proceedings, Undoubtedly, second application under Section 24 of the Act is maintainable as one cannot anticipate various situations which may arise during the course of proceedings. For the reasons mentioned in para 9, the appellant's application dated September 29,1989 for directing the payment of Rs. 200/- to witness Yashpal Singh by the respondent was not maintainable. 10. consequently, the appeal is summarily dismissed. . ;