B. R. ARORA, J. - (1.) THIS miscellaneous petition has been filed by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings pending before the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar. The sole ground raised by the petitioner for quashing the proceedings is that there is inordinate delay in completing the trial and the proceedings are pending for about ten years and the prolonging of the trial is without any fault on the part of the petitioner. THIS prolongation of the trial amounts to persecution of the petitioner and he, therefore, prayed that the proceedings should be quashed.
(2.) THE complaint was filed by one Shri Ram Niwas on December 12, 1980 under Section 120 and 406, I. P. C. against the petitioner in the Court of the Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar. THE learned Magistrate sent the complaint under Section 156 (3) Cr. P. C. to the police for further investigation and the police, after necessary investigation, presented a challan in the Court of the Additional Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganganagar, on February 13, 1981 for offences under Section 420 and 406, I. P. C. Though the charge-sheet was submitted on February 30, 1981, but the learned Magistrate framed the charge against the petitioner on January 29, 1985-At the time of framing the charge, the learned Magistrate came to the conclusion that no charge under Section 420, I. P. C. is made-out and he, therefore, framed the charge against the petitioner only under Section 406, I. P. C. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that he is appearing on all the dates fixed by the Court after framing of the charge and even prior to that, but no evidence has been recorded. THE petitioner, in support of his case, produced the certified copies of the order-sheets of the various dates. Upto September 13, 1990, i. e. , for about nine years, no witness was examined by the trial Court. Even on September 13, 1990, the statement of two witnesses, viz. PW 1 Sher Singh and PW 2 Bhagwan Das, were recorded. On September 14, 1990, one witness PW 3 Saru Ram was examined and on September 15, 1990, PW 4 Rajendra Kumar was examined and thereafter the matter was adjourned for recording the statement of the remaining witnesses on 10th and 11th October 1990. But none of the witnesses was examined. It is not in dispute that the trial in the present case was delayed, not on account of any fault on the part of the petitioner. The trial has been unnecessarily delayed for about ten years and still it is not sure how much time it will take for the conclusion of the trial. Every accused has a fundamental right for speedy trial and if the accused is not tried speedily and his case remains pending before the Court for an unreasonable length of time then there is a violation of the fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. There may be some reasons like: on account of the Courts of the Magistrates being over-burdened or on account of inadequacy of the strength and lack of satisfactory working conditions, but on account of inadequacy or insufficiency of the staff in the Court, or the Court being over-burdened, this right of speedy trial cannot be taken-away. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in : Hussainara Khatoon Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna (1), as under: - "if a person is deprived of his liberty under a procedure which is not 'reasonable, fair or just', such deprivation would be violative of his fundamental right under Article 21 and he would be entitled to enforce such fundamental right and secure his release. Now obviously procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of his liberty cannot be 'reasonable, fair or just' unless that procedure ensures a speedy trial for determination of the guilt of such person. No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21. There can, therefore, be no doubt that speedy trial and by speedy trial we mean reasonably expeditious trial in an integral and essential part of the fundamental right to life and liberty enshrined in Article 21. " The same principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Sheela Barse vs. Union of India (2), and the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that if an accused is not tried speedly and his case remains pending before the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge for unnecessary and unreasonable time, it is then clear that his fundamental right of speedy trial is vitiated unless the trial is held-up on account of an interim order passed by a Superior Court or the accused is responsible for the delay in the trial of the case. The consequence of violation of the fundamental right to speedy trial would be that the prosecution itself would be liable to be quashed on the ground that it is in prejudice of the fundamental right. The Supreme Court, in the case of Shri Niwas vs. Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh (3), again had an occasion to consider the case where the trial in the case of an offence under Sections 279, 304-A and 338, I. P. C was delayed for about 9 1/2 years. The Supreme Court quashed the proceedings by holding that quick justice is sine qua non of Article 21 of the Constitution of India and keeping a person in suspension state for 9 1/2 years without any cause at-all, cannot be with the spirit of the procedure established by law, Thus, the trial would be vitiated. Similar view has been taken by this Court and in a number of cases the proceedings pending before the trial Court on account of the delay, which cannot be assigned to the accused, were quashed. In the present case, the offence is alleged to have taken place in the year 1981 and the charges were framed in the year 1985 and still the trial has not been concluded and even the witnesses are not appearing. Upto September 15, 1990, even a single witness was not examined. The sword of Democlus cannot be allowed to remain hanging over the head of the accused for indefinite period. The right guaranteed for speedy trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India is a fair, just and reasonable one, which, on account of delay in the trial, stands violated. Looking to the nature of the act, alleged to have been committed by the accused-petitioner, and the other attending circumstances, I am of the opinion that it is an abuse of process of the Court in allowing the proceedings to continue in the trial Court. Consequently this Misc. petition is allowed and the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 502 of 1988 (State vs. Om Prakash) under Section 406, I. P. C, pending in the Court of the Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, Sri Ganga-nagar, are hereby quashed. . ;