JASRAJ CHOPRA, J. - (1.) BY this writ petition filed under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the petitioners have prayed for quashing the order annexure 13 dt. 31st May, 1988, whereby the waiver petition filed under ss. 273A and 273A(4) of the IT Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), has been rejected. A direction has also been sought for reconsideration of the waiver petition by the non-petitioners or, in the alternative, the petitioners have claimed waiver of the penalty amounting to Rs. 29,600 imposed against them under s. 271(1)(c), vide order annexure 6 dt. 12th March, 1987. They have further sought relief by way of quashing of the order, annexure 15, dt. 12th Dec., 1988, the notice annexure 16 dt. 15/24th Feb., 1988, the order annexure 21, dt. 23rd March, 1989, and the complaint annexure 20 pending in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Jaipur.
(2.) THE facts necessary to be noticed for the disposal of this writ petition briefly stated are : that petitioner No. 1, M/s Shree Singhvi Bros. is a registered partnership firm and petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, Shri Kushal Singh and Laxmansingh, are its partners. It is alleged that a search was conducted at the business premises as well as at the residential premises of the partners under the provisions of s. 132(1) of the Act on 6th May, 1981. During the course of the search, 65kgs. of silver was found, out of which 16kgs., of silver/silver ornaments were treated as unexplained by the authorised officers of the IT Department and, therefore, the Department included its value amounting to Rs. 32,000 in their income for the asst. yr. 1982-83 while making the regular assessment. THE petitioners explained that this silver belonged to Shri Mohansingh, Shri Banshilal and Shri Abdul Razid. After an order under s. 132(5) of the Act was made on 1st Aug., 1981, the petitioner firm filed its return on 1st Oct., 1982. However, the learned ITO was not satisfied with this explanation and he included the value of 16kgs. silver amounting to Rs. 32,000 in their income and further imposed a penalty of Rs. 29,600 under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act on the tax amounting to Rs. 14,880. An appeal was filed against this regular assessment and that came to be dismissed by the learned AAC, Udaipur range, Udaipur, vide order annexure 2 dt. 19th Sept., 1985. THEreafter, by order annexure 3 dt. 23rd July, 1987, the learned Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, also sustained the addition in question to the tune of Rs. 28,800. It may be stated here that the addition of Rs. 32,000 was reduced to Rs. 28,800 by the learned AAC and to this extent, the order of learned AAC was sustained by the learned Tribunal. THEreafter, the petitioner filed an application under s. 132(11) of the Act and that too was dismissed by the learned CIT, vide order Annexure 5 dt. 14th June, 1984. According to the petitioners, the maximum amount of penalty has been imposed in this case, vide order annexure 6 dt. 12th March, 1987, under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act, and, therefore, they filed an appeal against this order before the CIT (A), Jaipur, and the same is still pending. No final order has been passed but the written arguments which were submitted before the learned CIT (A) are contained in annexure 7. THEreafter, it is alleged that the petitioners filed an application before the learned CIT, IT Department, under s. 273A of the Act for waiver or substantial reduction in the penalty imposed against them. A copy of the waiver petition has been filed and marked as Annexure 8. THE petitioners have submitted that as per s. 273A of the Act, the CIT has discretion either on his own motion or otherwise to reduce or waive the amount of penalty imposed against the assessee and that discretion has to be exercised judicially and with extra caution because such a right is available to the assessee only once in his lifetime. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that a hearing on the application under s. 273A of the Act was fixed on 21st March, 1988, in pursuance of a notice dt. 2nd March, 1988. It is alleged that, during the course of the hearing of the petition under s. 273A of the Act, the learned CIT asked the petitioners to deposit the tax found due for the asst. yr. 1982-83 including the tax on the alleged unexplained silver weighing 16kgs., and then he would waive the penalty imposed against the petitioner- firm under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act. Such an assurance was specifically given to the petitioner during the course of hearing of the petition under s. 273A of the Act on 29th March, 1988. It was submitted that, actually acting on the said promise/assurance of the learned CIT, the petitioners agreed to pay the tax found due against the petitioner-firm as per the assessment order dt. 5th Jan., 1988, including tax on the alleged unexplained silver weighing 16kgs., and therefore, on 30th March, 1988, itself, the petitioners managed the funds and deposited the tax, vide challans (Annexure 10). It is alleged that this fact of specific assurance was duly put on record by a handwritten letter dt. 30th March, 1988 (Annexure 11) by counsel for the petitioner-firm which was duly handed over to the learned CIT personally on 30th March, 1988, itself. It was submitted that, if no such categorical and specific assurance was given by the learned CIT, such letter could not have been given to the learned CIT personally, who duly acknowledged the same and did not controvert the same at any time prior to the rejecting of the prayer for waiver. According to the petitioners, if it was otherwise, the learned CIT would certainly have felt rather offended by putting on record such a letter, but nothing of this sort happened and, therefore, the petitioners have contended that such an assurance was given. This fact of assurance was further reiterated in the application annexure 12 dt. 11th April, 1988 filed by the authorised representative of the petitioner-firm to the learned CIT. However, overlooking the said promise/assurance and to the surprise of the petitioners and without giving any further opportunity of hearing to them after 30th March, 1988, the waiver petition filed by the petitioners was dismissed by the learned CIT, vide his order Annexure 13 dt. 31st May, 1988. According to the petitioners, the order Annexure 13 is totally a non-speaking order and it does not contain any reasons whatsoever for rejecting the waiver petition. It is based on the findings of the Tribunal and that is no ground for rejecting the waiver petition. It was submitted that, immediately upon receiving the aforesaid order annexure 13 rejecting the waiver petition, the petitioners moved an application under s. 154 of the Act and that too came to be rejected by the learned CIT, vide order Annexure 15 dt. 12th Dec., 1988. It was contended by the petitioner that unless the CIT was not ready to waive or substantially reduce the penalty, there was no reason for the petitioner to deposit the tax on 30th March, 1988. It was contended on behalf of the petitioners that while acting as a Court in a quasi-judicial capacity, the learned CIT, while hearing the arguments on the waiver petition, has given a categorical and specific assurance/promise to the petitioner for complete waiver/substantial reduction of penalty in question, although that assurance/promise was not reduced in writing but that can be inferred by the order sheet dt. 29th March, 1988, which reads as under : "Shri B. M. Kothari C.A. Promise has been made to pay all the taxes for this year after giving effect. THE payment should be made by 30th March, 1988 at Udaipur. Heard. Put up with Tribunal's order." THEreafter, it is said that prosecution has also been launched against the petitioners. Before the launching of the prosecution, notice was given to the petitioner-firm to show cause as to why prosecution should not be launched against them. It is alleged that a hearing on the waiver petition was fixed on 21st March, 1988. THE hearing on the prosecution notice was also fixed on 21st March, 1988 and, on that day, an adjournment application was filed to defer the decision on prosecution notice until the waiver application/petition is decided. Although the case was adjourned on that day, thereafter, no further opportunity was given to the petitioners in pursuance of the said notice, Annexure 16 dt. 15/24th Feb., 1988, and an order was given for launching prosecution against the petitioners. It was contended that, in pursuance of the notice (Annexure 16) that was issued to petitioner No. 1, no opportunity of hearing was provided to petitioners Nos. 2 and 3. Even no notice was issued to non-petitioners Nos. 2 and 3, which was mandatory. Petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 came to know about this prosecution when a complaint was filed in the Court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate (Economic Offences), Jaipur, which was registered as Criminal Case No. 153 of 1989 (Asstt. CIT, Investigation Circle, Udaipur vs. Shree Singhvi Brothers) and the police came with arrest warrants and arrested petitioner No. 2, Shri Kushal Singh. Petitioner No. 3, Shri Laxmansingh, being out of station, could not be arrested and later he obtained anticipatory bail. Petitioner No. 2 was, however, released on bail. THE petitioners have, therefore, prayed for quashing of the prosecution proceedings and have also sought the reliefs as aforesaid. A return was filed on behalf of respondents Nos. 2 and 3 and it has been strenuously contended that no assurance whatsoever was given by the CIT. In this case, the waiver petition under s. 273A of the Act has been rightly rejected. It was submitted that before launching any prosecution, no notice whatsoever was necessary and the case did not require any sanction. The prosecution has to be launched at the instance of the CIT. The petition filed under s. 154 has also been rightly rejected because no mistake apparent on the face of the record was noticed. The prosecution has been launched against the petitioners under ss. 276C(1) and 277 r/w s. 278B of the Act. The prosecution was launched by the respondents after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners. A notice was given to the petitioner-firm by registered post on 15th Feb., 1988, and, in pursuance of that notice, petitioner No. 2 filed the reply and, after considering that reply and the relevant record, respondent No. 2 came to the conclusion that the prosecution should be launched against the petitioner. No separate notice was needed to be issued to the partners of the registered partnership firm, though in the present case, one of its partners has filed a reply. It was submitted that, before launching the prosecution and taking a decision for the same, the CIT is not required to give any notice to the assessee but anyhow, in the present case, a notice was given to the assessee. There is no prohibition for launching prosecution against the assessee for contravention of the provisions of the Act till the disposal of the waiver petition. However, in the present case, the waiver petition has also been dismissed before the launching of the prosecution. The addition of tax has been maintained upto the stage of the Tribunal. It was further submitted that if the petitioners have any grievance as regards the criminal proceedings, they can take action according to the provisions of criminal law applicable to the case concerned but, so far as this writ petition is concerned, it is not maintainable. It was further contended that the prosecution has been launched against the petitioners after affording an opportunity of hearing. The provisions of s. 279(1)(a) of the Act are not applicable in the present case. It was admitted that the appeal against imposition of penalty is still pending and it will be decided as and when it comes up for hearing. The petitioners cannot be permitted to raise this point before this Court as it is sub judice before the competent authority. According to the respondents, no question of promissory estoppel arises in the present case because no promise whatsoever was given by the CIT. All the orders have been passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. They have, therefore, prayed that this writ petition be dismissed. It was, however, disclosed that Shri P. C. Mishra, the then CIT, against whom it is alleged that he has given the assurance/promise, is no more alive and, therefore, his affidavit in this respect cannot be filed. I have heard Mr. Vineet Kothari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, and Mr. B. R. Arora, learned counsel appearing for the non-petitioners, and have carefully gone through the record of the case. It was contended by Mr. Vineet Kothari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, that now, he does not challenge the addition of income because the petitioners have already paid the tax levied against them on the basis of the assurance furnished by the CIt. He has further submitted that no penalty could have been imposed against the petitioners because it is not a case of concealing income. It is a case where a particular explanation has been offered by the assessee but that explanation has not been accepted. It was submitted that this explanation was offered prior to 1st Oct., 1982, when the return was filed and, therefore, it is not a case of concealment of income and hence no penalty can be imposed. He has, however, submitted that a specific assurance was given by the learned CIt that if the petitioners deposit the amount of tax levied against them, then the penatly imposed against them will be waived or substantially reduced and, therefore, the learned CIt is precluded from rejecting the waiver petition on account of the application of the principle of promissory estoppel in such cases. The contention of Mr. Kothari is that the addition to the income was made by the learned ItO and that was upheld upto the stage of the Tribunal but that is no ground to reject the waiver petition. The waiver petition has to be judged independently on the basis of the pleas taken therein and when it is not a case of concealment of income, the waiver petition should have been allowed. According to the petitioners, once the waiver petition is allowed and the tax is either reduced or waived, no prosecution can be launched. This right which is available to the petitioners only once in his lifetime should be decided after careful consideration of the material on record and the decision on the waiver petition should not be based on any extraneous reasons. It was contended that the prosecution has to be sanctioned by the ItO but in this case, no sanction has been accorded after due application of mind. It was further submitted that the partnership being a juristic person cannot be prosecuted. Mr. Kothari has further argued that in such quasi-judicial matters, the domestic tribunals should follow the principles of natural justice. Mr. Kothari has submitted that, if the waiver petition is disposed of or the prosecution is launched, an opportunity of hearing should be provided to the affected persons. The principle of audi alteram partem is the basic principle of natural justice. He has submitted that, in this case, before launching prosecution, the principle of audi alteram partem has not been followed. Mr. Kothari has submitted that, although petitioner No. 1 has been issued a notice and the case was fixed for hearing on 21st March, 1988, it was adjourned on that day and thereafter no further hearing was provided to the petitioners. According to Mr. Kothari, so far as petitioners Nos. 2 and 3 are concerned, the prosecution has been launched against them without giving them any notice. The contention of Mr. Kothari is that it is not a case of concealment of income because the facts leading to the disclosure of income were very much within the knowledge of the Department much prior to the filing of the return. He has, therefore, submitted that it is not a case of concealment of income. Rather, it is a case of non-acceptance of the given explanation as regards the property possessed by the petitioners and, therefore, no penalty can be imposed against them. Mr. Kothari has submitted that there was no criminal intention to conceal income and, therefore, no prosecution should have been launched against the petitioners. He has, therefore, submitted that the order rejecting the waiver petition should be quashed and the case be sent back to the learned CIt for redeciding it. These arguments put forth by Mr. Kothari have been strenuously opposed by Mr. B. R. Arora, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. Mr. Arora has argued that no assurance whatsoever was given and, therefore, the principle of promissory estoppel does not arise in this case. Mr. Arora has further submitted that before launching prosecution, according to s. 279(1) of the It Act (old), no sanction is necessary and the prosecution has only to be launched at the instance of the CIt and, therefore, the argument about sanction is not available to the petitioners. The contention of Mr. Arora is that if the petitioners have any grievance as to who is the active partner and who is responsible, they must raise that plea before the criminal Court. The proceedings can be compounded under the Act either before the launching of the prosecution or after the launching of the prosecution and, therefore, the launching of the prosecution is no bar to the compounding of the case. Moreover, the pendency of the appeal against the penalty proceedings is no bar to the launching of the prosecution. It has been contended by Mr. Arora that the appeal against imposition of penalty is still pending and, therefore, this Court should not interfere with the matter which is sub judice. According to Mr. Arora, when the matter is sub judice, this Court cannot waive the penalty at this stage. Mr. Arora has submitted that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the prosecution, they should avail of the proper remedy under s. 482, CrPC, as the writ jurisdiction is not the proper remedy which may be availed of in such matters. Mr. Arora has also taken me through the file in which proceedings as regards waiver petition and the petition filed under s. 154 of the Act have been recorded and, on the basis of those proceedings, Mr. Arora has argued that no specific assurance was given to the petitioners.
(3.) I have considered the rival submissions made at the Bar. Now, I proceed to decide this writ petition on merits. At the very outset, I make it clear that so far as the levy of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act is concerned, an appeal against that order is still pending and, therefore, this Court is not going to give any finding as regards that contention of the petitioners. In that view of the matter, now only two controversies remain to be decided and they are : (1) Whether the waiver petition filed under s. 273A has been rightly rejected or that order deserves to be quashed along with the order passed on the application under s. 154 of the Act ? and (2) Whether the prosecution launched against the petitioners is uncalled for and if that is so, whether it deserves to be quashed ? It is the admitted case of the parties that a search was undertaken in the business and residential premises of the partners of the petitioner-firm on 6th May, 1981, and, in that search, 65 kgs. of silver was found in their possession. The Department accepted their explanation as regards possession of 49 kgs. of silver but did not accept their explanation as regards possession of 16 kgs. of silver. It was contended by the assessee that 5,400 kgs. of silver belongs to Shri Mohan Singh; 8kgs. of silver belongs to Shri Banshilal and 2,600 kgs, of silver belongs to one Abdul Mazid and that is how they tried to explain their possession over this alleged unexplained 16kgs. of silver, which according to them belonged to their three workmen(Karigars) named above, who prepare silver utensils and silver ornaments. This explanation was submitted by the assessee in the proceedings under s. 132(5) of the Act but that was not accepted by the Department. However, the learned ItO felt that it is a case of concealment of income and, therefore, he added that income in the return that was filed by the petitioner on 1st Oct., 1982. The search took place on 6th May, 1981, and the proceedings under s. 132(5) of the Act were also initiated in which this explanation was furnished and it was not accepted. Thereafter, on 1st Oct., 1982, i.e., after one year and 5 months, the return for the asst. yr. 1982-83 was filed. Thus, prior to the filing of this return, it was very much within the knowledge of the Department that the petitioners were in possession of 16 kgs. of silver and they have furnished a particular explanation which was not acceptable to the Department. The regular assessment for the asst. yr. 1982-83 was done by the learned ItO on 5th Jan., 1985, and in that assessment, he added the value of 16kgs. of silver in the income of the petitioners, treating it to be a case of concealment of income. Thereafter, an appeal was filed and, in that appeal, the addition of Rs. 32,000 as the value of 16kgs. of silver was reduced to Rs. 28,000 by the learned AAC and that appellate order was also maintained by the learned Tribunal. No appeal or any other appropriate proceedings against that order have been filed and hence that order of the learned Tribunal has become final. Thereafter, it is alleged that proceedings under s. 271(1)(c) of the Act were initiated by the learned ItO, who imposed the maximum penalty amounting to Rs. 29,600 against the petitioners on the amount of tax evasion amounting to Rs. 14,800. It was against this imposition of penalty that an appeal was filed and a waiver petition was also preferred by the assessee before the learned CIt. That waiver petition came to be fixed for hearing on 21st March, 1988. In the meanwhile, a show cause notice was also issued to the petitioner-firm calling upon them to show cause why prosecution for concealment of income should not be launched against them. It is the admitted case of the parties that no notice was issued to the partners of the petitioner-firm. Be that as it may, in the notice, it was recorded that the case will be heard on 8th March, 1988, as regards launching of the prosecution. On that day, an adjournment application was filed. The notice is annexure 16. The adjournment application is annexure 17 wherein it has been prayed on behalf of the petitioner-firm that the waiver petition is pending under s. 273A of the Act and that has been fixed on 21st March, 1988, and, therefore, the hearing of the aforesaid matter be adjourned to the next date convenient to the learned CIt and it may be decided after the decision of the waiver petition. However, on the request of the parties, the case was adjourned so far as the notice regarding launching of the prosecution was concerned and the waiver petition was, however, fixed on 21st March, 1988, and, on that day, an adjournment was sought and the case was again fixed on 29th March, 1988. The order sheet dt. 29th March, 1988 reads as follows : "Shri B. M. Kothari, C.A. Promise has been made to pay all the taxes for this year after giving effect. The payment should be made by 30th March, 1988 at Udaipur. Heard. Put up with Tribunal's order." This order sheet has been signed by Shri B. M. Kothari, C.A., as also by the petitioner No. 2, Shri Kushal Singh Singhvi. It is alleged that it was on that date that an assurance was given that if the payment of tax is made by 30th March, 1988, then the penalty will be waived or substantially reduced. On 30th March, 1988, the payment of tax was actually made and it is not disputed that this payment was made, vide annexure-10. However, on 30th March, 1988, Shri B. M. Kothari has filed an application before the learned CIt in which he has submitted that with reference to the direction given by the learned CIt yesterday, the assessee has informed on telephone to his office that the entire amount of tax due for the relevant year for which waiver petition has been heard by the CIt has been deposited on 30th March, 1988 in S.B.B.J., Chetak Circle Branch, Udaipur. It was asserted by him that the learned CIt was pleased to observe that if the full demand of tax is paid on 30th March, 1988, their prayer for waiver or substantial reduction of penalty under s. 271(1)(c) imposed for the aforesaid year will be considered favourably. This application has also been signed by Shri B. M. Kothari, C.A., and Shri Kushal Singh Singhvi, petitioner No. 2. There is receipt of this application on the file also. Thereafter, one more application dt. 11th April, 1988 (Annexure 12), was filed by Shri B. M. Kothari, which is also signed by him as also by Shri Kushal Singh Singhvi, petitioner No. 2. In this application too, the same averments have been reiterated. However, no reference of these two applications has been made in the order sheet nor in the order of disposal of the waiver petition dt. 31st May, 1988. In spite of the fact that the application, Annexure 11, was submitted personally as alleged by the petitioners and this fact has not been denied. When this waiver petition was dismissed, an application under s. 154 of the Act for rectification of the order dt. 31st May, 1988, was filed and in that application it was contended that such an assurance was given by the learned CIt that if they deposit the amount of the tax their prayer for waiver or substantial reduction of penalty imposed under s. 271(1)(c) would be considered favourably, if the entire tax demand was deposited on 30th March, 1988. It is alleged that, on the aforesaid assurance given by the learned CIt, the partner of the petitioner-firm went to Udaipur and deposited the amount of tax. This application was dealt with on 21st July, 1988, in which the fact of the assurance given by the learned CIt was mentioned and the learned CIt, on this note, has given the following order : "Put up with the legal opinion from the standing counsel. (Sd.) P. C. Mishra, 21/7" It may be stated here that the learned CIt has nowhere stated prior to 21st July, 1988, or on 21st July, 1988, that no such assurance was ever given to the assessee. When the application was submitted to him personally, he could very well have mentioned on that application that it is absolutely wrong on the part of Mr. Kothari as also the assessee to claim that such as assurance has been given by him. There was no occasion for the petitioner, without extending any assurance by the learned CIt, to deposit the amount of tax including the tax on the amount which has been added to his income for asst. yr. 1982-83 within one day. Even in the order rejecting the application under s. 154 of the Act, the learned CIt has recorded as under : "I am of the view that no such specific assurance that if the assessee makes the payment of tax, the penalty imposed will be waived/reduced was given nor from the proceedings recorded on 29th March, 1988 (as noted above) can it be said that such an assurance was given to the assessee." Thus, the learned CIt observed that no specific assurance was given. Probably, no firm assurance was given. Initially, the contention of the petitioners was that an assurance was given that their case for reduction or waiver of penalty will be considered favourably. There was no firm assurance that it will be waived or substantially reduced but it appears that such an assurance was given that it will be considered favourably, otherwise there was no occasion for the petitioner-firm or its partners to give an assurance that the amount of tax will be deposited on 30th March, 1988. I am, therefore, firmly of the view that some sort of assurance was given to the assessee-firm, although it was not firm but it was specific that if the amount of tax imposed against them is deposited on or before 30th March, 1988, then the prayer for waiver or substantial reduction of tax will be considered favourably. Had the CIt not given any assurance to counsel for the petitioners, Shri B. M. Kothari, counsel for the petitioner would not have dared to give in writing on 30th March, 1988, and on 11th April, 1988, personally to the learned CIt that such as assurance was given and that the assessee had deposited the amount of tax on 30th March, 1988, on the basis of that assurance and the learned CIt would have written on these applications that no such assurance was given by him. This shows that although he gave such an assurance, he did not like to refer to that assurance in the order sheets. If it was a case of grant of no assurance he would have mentioned on these two applications that no such assurance was given by him. To this extent I, therefore, entirely agree with Mr. Kothari that some sort of assurance was given to the petitioners to deposit the tax on 30th March, 1988, so that their case may be considered favourably. It was contended By Mr. Kothari that if a party acts in pursuance of the promise then the party extending the promise is estopped by rule of promissory estoppel to act against such a promise, i.e., it cannot resile from it. In this respect, reliance has been placed on a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Orient Paper Mills Ltd. (1990) 1 SCC 176, wherein it has been held that if action is taken in pursuance of the Government assurance, the principle of promissory estoppel applies and the Government or its officer who has given that assurance will be bound by its assurance to grant that relief. Be that as it may, in this case, the only assurance that has been given to the petitioners appears to be that the case of the petitioners will be considered favourably. This cannot be treated as a specific assurance. Although, when such an assurance comes from the CIt, a party can easily be led to believe that if they agree to that suggestion of the learned CIt, their case will be considered favourably and a favourable decision can be expected, but giving an assurance that the matter will be considered favourably cannot be treated to be a firm or specific assurance and, therefore, it can at best be treated to be a case where the learned CIt had led a party to believe that if the petitioners act in a particular way, their case may be considered favourably but, if, after due consideration of the matter, the learned CIt found that he cannot grant any relief to the petitioners, then that assurance being non-specific or not firm, that assurance cannot be acted upon and the learned CIt cannot be held bound to substantially reduce or waive the penalty imposed against the petitioners. Thus, to this extent, although I agree with Mr. Kothari that some sort of assurance was given to the petitioners, still no relief can be granted to the petitioners because it is not a specific or firm assurance, and, therefore, in such a case, the learned CIt cannot be held bound by it on the basis of the principle of the promissory estoppel to reduce or waive the penalty imposed against the petitioners. ;