JUDGEMENT
MILAP CHANDRA JAIN J. -
(1.) THESE 22 similar writ petitions have been filed for quashing the decision Annexure 2 of the Mines (Group II) Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur dated March 25, 1989 by which it decided to withdraw the working permission given in the years 1983 and 1984 to Rajasthan State Mineral Development Corporation (in short RSMDC ) to undertake mining of marbles in the areas of Rajsamand, granted mining lease, in relaxation of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 (hereinafter to be called the 1986 Rules) "to (1) M/s. International Mineral Industries Limited (10 plots), (2) M/s. Mewar Marbles Limited (10 plots), (3) MLS. Saxena Marbles Ltd. (5 plots), (4) MLS Nirmal Marbles Ltd. (5 plots) and MLS Aditya Mining Limited (5 plots) (one of them impleaded as respondent no. 4 (hereinafter to be called as private respondents) who have earlier commenced the mining operation on the allotment of these plots by the RSMDC and to group the remaining 146 vacant plots in the delineated area in the blocks of 5 plots each and to allot them to the Khatedars of the land if they surrender their Khatedari rights and to entrepreneurs. It has also been prayed that the State of Rajasthan, Director, Mines and Mining Engineer (respondents no. 1,2 and 3, be directed to dispose of the applications received by them in pursuance of the gazette notification, Annexure 1 dated November 19,1981. On the request of the learned counsel for the parties, the cases being similar were taken together and arguments were heard for their final disposal. As such they are being disposed of by this common order.
(2.) THE facts may be narrated in short, as follows. THE Mining Engineer, Rajsamand (respondent no. 3) published notice Annexure 1 in the Rajasthan Gazette dated November 19, 1981 inviting applications for grant of mining lease for marble mineral for the are as situated in Rajsamand and Amet Tehsils on the terms and conditions mentioned therein the areas were divided into 181 plots of 100 x 100 square meters each. In pursuance thereof the petitioners submitted their applications for grant of mining leases for the various plots. One Rajendra Singh Mehta filed writ petition No. 2016/81 challenging the said notification Annexure 1. THE court was pleased to stay the operation of the notification by its order Annex. 1b, dated January 13, 1982, in all 2761 applications were received and no action was taken on the applications due to the sataly order. THE respondents no. 1 to 3 appointed RSMDC as their agent and granted working permission to it for undertaking mining operation in 65 plots for marble on certain conditions. Instead of commencing the work, the RSMDC allotted 35 plots to the said five private respondents. Finding that the aforesaid working permission given to the RSMDC did not financially benefit the Government, it withdrew it and took the said decision Annexure 2.
The respondents admit in their replies that notification Annexure 1 was issued on November 19,1981, writ petition no. 2016/81 was filed by the Rajendra Singh Mehta challenging notification Annexure 1, the operation of the notification was stayed and. the writ was subsequently dismissed, working permission was given to the RSMDC by the respondents no. 1 to 3, it allotted 35 plots to them and subsequently the State Government took the decision Annexure 2. Several preliminary objections against the maintainability of the writ petitions have been taken in the replies, namely, (i) Efficacious alternative remedy was available, (ii) Writ petitions have been filed after great delay, (iii) Disputed questions of facts are involved, (iv) RSMDC has not been made a party, (v) No subsisting interest exists in favour of petitioners and (vi) Facts have been misstated in the writ petitions. It has also been averred in the writ petitions that the decision Annexure 2 was taken in the larger interest of mineral development and better working of mines, the applications of the petitioners and others deemed to have been refused after the expiry of nine months as provided under Rule 8 of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1977 (hereinafter to be called '1977 Rules') the petitioners did not pursue their applications after moving them and they did not take any action against the RSMDC for granting working permission to the respondents no. 4. It has further been averred that since 1986 they (private respondents) started operating the mines scientifically and mechanically after installing big and huge plants and machineries, removing over burdens, clearing the site, making payments in advance to Khatedars of the plots, constructing 6 kms. long road, making huge investment and spending four years in developing the area and the RSMDC allotted plots and subsequently the government granted mining leases to them on account of their expertise, financial resources, man power and working zeal and enthusiasm. It has also been averred that Himmat Lal Hingar issued the letter Annexure 4 after he failed to get temporary injunction against them in the suit filed in the name of his wife in the court of the Munsif, Rajsamand, they have paid much more revenue to the Government and the writ petition of Rajendra Singh Mehta was dismissed by the Court on June 16,1986.
The learned counsel for the petitioners contended as follows. The grant of working permission to the RSMDC by the respondents no. 1 to 3 was contrary to law and consequently allotment of plots by the RSMDC to the private respondents was void ab initio. He relied upon M. S. Deb v. State of Orissa (l ). The decision Annexure 2 is arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, violative of principles of natural justice and illegal. It offends Article 14 of the Constitution of India, the State Government cannot be permitted to continue to perpetuate the illegalities. The antecedents of the private respondents were even not considered by the State Government while granting leases to them. Nothing in the direction of mechanisation of mines was done by any of them. During 4-5 years, they have not been able to operate even 2-3 plots and raise their production so as to cover the normal dead-rent for the plots held by them. The provisions of Rule 65 of the 1986 Rules were invoked by the respondents no. 1 to 3 in the colourable exercise of the powers to benefit the persons of their own choice and to side- track 2761 deserving applicants who are waiting their turn for grant of mining leases for the last 8 years. Reliance was placed on Ramana v. LA. Authority (2), and Radha Kishan Agrawal v. State of Bihar (3 ). The areas were delineated in 181 plots for the better development of marble mines. In the decision Annexure 2, the respondents no. 1 to 3 have turned round and have justified the grant of leases 5-10 plots each to the private respondents. Notice Annexure 1 has not been withdrawn so far. It is still in force. The decision Annexure 2 does not speak about the exercise of powers under rule 65 of the 1986 Rules. Grant of working permission was a systematic device to defy and flout the stay order passed by the Court in Rajendra Singh Mehta's writ petition. The petitioners are in position to operate marble mines in scientific and mechanised manner, they are willing to start marble processing units and there is no warrant in picking the respondents for grant of mining leases.
In reply, the learned counsel for the respondents raised several preliminary objections against the maintainability of the writ petitions. Firstly, the petitioners had efficacious alternative remedy. They could file revision before the Central Government under Section 30, Mines and Mineral (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (hereinafter to be called 'the MMRD Act' ). Reliance was placed on Ishwarlal v. State of Rajasthan (4 ). The applications of the petitioners stood refused on the expiry of 9 months under rule 8 (1) of 1977 Rules and appeals and revisions could be filed against this deemed refusal under rules 44 and 64 of 1977 Rules. Even after the dismissal of Rajendra Singh Mehta's writ petition on June 16,1986, appeals and revisions could be filed under rules 43 and 47 of 1986 Rules. Secondly, the petitioners are guilty of serious leches and gross and deliberate inactions, the applications were submitted in. the year 1981 and writ petitions have been filed in the year 1989 and no satisfactory explanation has been offered of this inordinate delay. Working permission was granted to the RSMDC in the year 1983 and 1984 and during this period huge investments were made on the disputed plots, big machineries and plants were installed, overburdens were removed, 6 kms. long road was constructed by the private respondents, all in the knowledge of the petitioners. In Ramanna v. International Airport Authority (Supra), delay, 6f 5 months was held to be fatal. On account of this inordinate delay a definite equity has arisen in their favour, Thirdly, many disputed questions of facts are involved in these writ petitions. Fourthly, the petitioners have no subsisting pergonal interest as their applications have stood refused under rule 8 of the 1977 Rules. Fifthly, the RSMDC to whom the working permission was granted by the State Government and who initially allotted plots to the private respondents is a necessary party.
It was further contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the respondents No. 1 to 3 cannot fall back and snatch away the area allotted to the private respondents and grant lease to other persons. Rajsamand Marble and Khaniz Utpadak Sangh is no legal entity, Himmat Lal Hingar has sought to utilise its name in order to obstruct the working of the areas, he filed a suit in the court of Munsif, Rajsamand as holder of power of attorney of his wife Kamla Devi against the private respondents challenging the said decision Annexure 2, he failed to get a temporary injunction in it and, thereafter, he has go filed these writ petitions in order to put pressure upon the private respondents. They further contended that it has been falsely stated in the writ petitions that the private respondents have not raised the productions to cover the normal dead-rent even, in fact they have paid much more revenue, the Government in relaxation of Rules was fully competent to take decision Annexure 2, the petitioners have no bonafides, they did not move any application for impleading them as parties in the Rajendra Singh Mehta's writ petition, the letter of the Rajsamand Marble and Khaniz Utpadak Sangh, Kankroli is absolutely baseless and factually incorrect, the decision dated March 25, 1989 Annexure 2 is neither illegal nor arbitrary, nor discriminatory, nor violative of principles of natural justice, the grant of working permission to RSMDC perfectly legal, it was taken in the best interest of the mineral development, financial assistance can be obtained for processing unit but not for mining operation without having any lease from the Government the petitioners are not in position to do marble mining in scientific and mechanised manner, they have done nothing for last 9 years, they have filed the writ petitions after a lapse of 8 years with intention to enjoy the ready fruits of the hard labour and huge investments of the private respondents, a large part of the area is already held by Khatedars, it is not ready for grant till the khatedars surrender their khatedari rights, the working of the area has clearly shown that the scientific and mechanised mining of marble could be better undertaken in the area of 5 plots each instead of stray plots of 100 x 100 sq. meters each, the answering respondents have entered into agreements with the khatedars of the land and have made payments in advance to them and the writ petitions deserve to be dismissed with costs. They relied upon Ishwarlal. v. State of Rajasthan (Supra), State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nandlal (6), Industrial Development v. State (7), and Dr. S. Sinha v. S. Lal & Co. (8 ).
(3.) THE first question for consideration in these writ petitions is whether the petitioners had an efficacious remedy for getting the order Annexure 2 quashed ? A revision under section 30 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957 (In short 'the Act') could be filed by the petitioners before the Central Government. THE first contention of the learned counsel for the petitions was that the writ petitions cannot be dismissed on this ground after they have been admitted. It is correct that about 10 writ petitions were admitted on December 7, 1989. THE orders admitting the writ petitions are not speaking orders. It cannot be said that this preliminary objection was over-ruled while admitting them. By their admission, the respondents are not deprived of taking this preliminary objection. THEy have specifically taken it in their replies. At the commencement of the arguments, aforesaid preliminary objections were raised by the learned counsel for the respondents and in fact the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties centered round the aforesaid preliminary objections. In Hridaya Narain v. I. T. G. (9), relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, the writ petition was dismissed on the ground of having alternate remedy after hearing arguments at length on merits. Such is not the case here.
It was next contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners that order Annexure 2 is in fact not an order but a decision and no revision lies under section 30 of the Act against a decision. This contention is also devoid of force. In para no. 13 of the writ petition this order Annexure 2 has been described as an order and not as a decision. The word "decision" means the determination of question or controversy and not the reasons or grounds which weight with the decision taking authority in arriving at such a decision. In Black's Law Dictionary " Order" has been defined as a mandate, precept, a command or direction authoritatively given". The word "order" has not been defined either in the Act or in the Rules. It is comprehensive enough to include every decision, award or order made under the Act. The word "order" is not a term of art. It has no fixed legal meaning. It has been observed in Gangadhar Lalliram v. Nirvachan Adhakari Marketing Society, Vijapur and others (10), as follows :- In our opinion, the word "order" as used in Section 77 of the Act is comprehensive enough to include every decision, award or order made under the Act, The word "order" is not a term of art. It has no fixed legal meaning. In 67 CJS 520, the following statement occurs:- "order" , as a noun, has been held equivalent to or synonymous with 'decision' See 26 CJS 38 Note 72, 'regulation', 'rule', 'resolution', 'shipment' and 'warrant' and has been compared with, or distinguished from;, 'regulation' and warrant'. " The word "order" has not been defined in the Act like the Code of Civil Procedure, which gives it a special meaning in order to distinguish it from a decree. " It cannot, therefore, be said that no revision petition could be filed against the order Annexure 2 under section 30 of the Act.
There is also no force in the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that there exists no provisions for the execution of the order passed by the Central Government under section 30 of the Act and as such it cannot be said that it provides efficacious remedy. The facts of Daulal Purohit V. State of Rajasthan (11), are quite different and distinguishable. Observations relied upon have been made in respect of the Rajasthan Service Appellate Tribunal. It was not a case relating to the Act. Attention was invited towards the order (Annexure 6) dated August 31, 1988 of the Central Government passed in Revision Application No. 1/389/85/miv, Dilip Dixit vs. Government of Rajasthan, and the order of the State of Rajasthan dated September 20, 1989 (Annexure 7) enclosed with the writ petition No. 237/anil Kumar v. State of Rajasthan. These two orders do not show that the order Annexure 6 was not complied with by the State Government. It is clearly stated in the order dated September 20, 1989 (Annexure 7) that the State Government has taken a policy decision not to grant any mining lease to any private sector in respect of Dolomite mineral. The circular letter. No. l (18)/66/ii dated August 26, 1966 of the Government of India in the Ministry of Mines and Geology. New Delhi runs as under :- Sub:-Classification of Dolomite as minor mineral of the analogy of limestone. I am directed to say that the Mineral Advisory Board has recommended at its 12th Meeting held at New Delhi on the 4th and 5. 03. 1965 (vide item 4-G (i) of the minutes mineral depending upon its end use. The matter has been considered carefully by the Central Government and it has been decided that dolomite should continue to be classified as major mineral as the conservation of this mineral to the fullest extent is essential for the following reasons- (a) dolomite is an important and basic raw material for all blast furnaces; and (b) dolomite is not very much in abundant supply in the country. I am accordingly to request, that the State Govt. may grant mine all concessions for dolomite only under the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 at present. " In view of this circular, it cannot be said that the State of Rajasthan did not comply with the said order Annexure 6 of the Central Government.
;