MOHINI KAPUR, J. - (1.) THE petitioner has moved this application under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act against the non-petitioners who are the SHO and Head Constable of the Police Station Tehla, district Alwar for disobeying the order dated 5. 10. 1988 passed by this Court in S. B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No. 2581/88. This application under Section 438 Cr. P. C. was allowed and it was directed that in the event of the arrest of the petitioner he shall be released on bail on certain conditions. THE petitioner obtained certified copy of this order dated 5. 10. 1989 and went to the Police Station Tehla on the next day last 6. 10. 1988 and informed the Station House (Officer about the order of this Court. On 8. 10. 1988 at about 9. 30 P. M. the non-petitioners came at the residence of the petitioner at Phulera with other police personnel in civil dress. THE petitioner showed the order of this Court but he was arrested and taken to Police Station Tehla. According to the petitioner, the order of this Court was wilfully and knowingly disobeyed and the petitioner who was prepared to furnish bail and bonds was not allowed to do so. THE petitioner was taken in custody and the present contempt petition was moved by his wife Smt. Kamla with the prayer that the Station House Officer and the Head Constable, be punished and that the petitioner be released from custody. This petition was presented on 25th Oct. 1988 and on 15. 11. 1988 it was orded that notice be issued to the non-petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be punished for contempt of Court.
(2.) THE respondents denied having committed any contempt of this Court. At this stage I am not going into the details of the factual aspect of the matter as first the legal objection raised by the respondents is to be decided. A plea has been raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners that the alleged contempt is in the nature of a criminal contempt and under Section 18 of the Contempt of Courts Act, every case of criminal contempt is to be heard and determined by a bench of not less than two judges. In the present case the application for grant of anticipatory bail was decided by me and when the contempt application was moved this Court issued notices to the non-petitioners to show cause as to why they should not be punished for contempt of Court. The matter was not placed before a Division Bench for purposes of taking cognizance. For deciding the objection raised by the learned counsel for the non-petitioners first of all it has to be seen whether the alleged contempt in the present case amounts to a civil contempt or criminal contempt. Section 2 (b) (c) of the Act defines civil contempt and criminal con-tempt and the same read as follows: - (b) 'civil Contempt' means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree direction, order, writ or other process of a court or wilful breach of an undertaking given to a court. (c) 'criminal Contempt' means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act, whatsoever which - (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of, any court; or (ii) prejudices, or interfere or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceedings; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfer with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. Sections 14 and 15 of the Act provide for taking cognizance in cases of criminal contempt and the procedure for the same has been prescribed in the preceding sections of the Act. Thus, Section 18 of the Act provides 'that every case of criminal contempt under Section 15 of the Act shall be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges. ' The learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the order which has been disobeyed by the non-petitioners is an order which was passed in judicial proceedings and disobedience of the same amounts to civil contempt. According to him, the disobedience of the order of this Court does not amount to interference with the administration of justice or interference with the due course of judicial proceeding so as to say that the same amounts to criminal contempt. Another distinction pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the party aggrieved is an individual then the effect of disobedience of any order of the Court would be civil contempt and when the public as a whole is affected by disobedience of the order of the Court then it would amount to criminal contempt. From the definition of criminal contempt it is contended that the disobedience which can be said to be criminal contempt, would be a public wrong but for civil contempt it would be a civil wrong.
(3.) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the non-petitioners has tried to place before me the circumstances on basis of which it is argued that the alleged contempt in the present case amounts to criminal contempt. Referring to paragraphs 4 and 8 of the rejoinder submitted by the petitioner, it has been contended that when the petitioner feels that there has been a disregard for the majesty of law and the act of the non-petitioners tantamounts to interference with the administration of justice then these matters would fall under the definition of criminal contempt and in such a case cognizance can be taken only in accordance with Sections 15 and 18 of the Act. Before looking into the authorities, which have been cited by both the learned counsel, Rule 324 of the Rules of High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan may also be looked into. Sub-rule (1) of Rule 324 of the Rules provided that where an application for the taking of proceedings for contempt of court is presented before a Judge other than the Chief Justice he shall direct that it be laid before Chief Justice for ordrs. And the Registrar shall, on receipt of a report against any person of contempt of Court lay the papers before the Chief Justice for orders. ' Sub-rule (2) says that the provisions of sub-rule (1) shall not be applicable in cases where the contempt consists in disobedience of a judicial order of the High Court. In such cases, the Bench concerned may pass appropriate orders and for orders. The learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon Daulal Chandra Bhar Vs. Sukumar Banerjee (1 ). In this case, the question arose before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was as to whether an appeal would lie against an order for contempt because under the Letters Patent provisions, appeal would lie if the case was one of civil contempt but if the contempt amounted to Criminal contempt it would be beyond the jurisdiction of the High Court to consider the merits of the order of a Single Judge. In the proceedings under Section 145 Cr. P. C. the learned Single Judge had caused certain orders and when the matter was sent to the Magistrate he also issued certain directions. The contempt found against the appellant was violation of the order made by the Single Judge of the High Court. Considering the distinction between criminal and civil contempt, it was observed as under: - "the line between civil and criminal contempt can be broad as well as thin. Where the contempt consists in mere failure to comply with or carry out an order of a Court made for the benefit of a private party, it is plainly civil contempt and it has been said that when the party, in whose interest the order was made, moves the court for action to be taken in contempt against the contemner with a view to an enforcement of his right, the proceeding is only a form of execution. In such a case, there is no criminality in the disobedience and the contempt, such as it is, is not criminal. If however, the contemner adds defi-nance of the Court to disobedience of the order and conducts himself in a manner which amounts to obstruction to or interference with the course of justice, the contempt committed by him is of a mixed character, pertaking as between him and his opponent of the nature of a civil contempt and as between him and the court or the State, of the nature of a criminal contempt. In cases of this type, no clear distinction between civil and criminal contempt can be drawn and the contempt committed cannot be broadly classed as either civil or criminal contempt. There is, however, a third form of contempt which is purely criminal and which consists in conduct tending to bring the administration of justice to scorn and to interfere with the course of justice as administered by the Courts. Contempt of this class is purely criminal, because it results in an offence or a public wrong, where as contempt consisting in disobedience of an order made for the benefit of a private individual results only in a private injury. To put the matter in other words, a contempt is merely a civil wrong where there has been disobedience of an order made for the benefit of a particular party, but where it has consisted in setting the authority of the Courts at naught and has had a tendency to invade the efficacy of the machinery maintained by the State for the administration of justice, it is a public wrong and consequently criminal in nature. " ;