P. D. KUDAL, J. - (1.) THIS reference has been made by the Senior Magistrate, Children Court, Kota.
(2.) THE breif facts which have given rise to the present reference are that a challan was submitted against the accused Ram Kishan and Haboo under section 127 of the Railways Act. THE learned Magistrate by his order dated 14. 4. 1979 submitted the case before the learned Sessions Judge, Kota, who transferred the same to the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, by his order dated 17. 8. 1979. Before this, by order dated 24. 5. 1976. the learned Sessions Judge transferred this case to the Court of the learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Kota, but later on, vide order dated 15. 7. 1976, this case was transferred to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kota as the accused were children. THE learned Addl. Sessions Judge vide his order dated 22. 9. 1979, held that under section 27 of the Criminal Procedure Code only those offences are to be tried by him which are either punishable with imprisonment for life or with death sentence, and all other cases are to be tried by the Chief Judicial Magistrate dealing with the children cases. THE offience under section 127 of Railways Act is punishable with imprisonment for life. THE learned Magistrate while relying on section 14 (3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure after the amendment of 1978 has made the reference. THE learned Magistrate has opined that as the incident took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the Sessions Judge, Bharatpur, it should be tried before him. It has, however, been pointed out that the Children Act has not been made applicable to the District of Bharatpur and, if the case is tried by the learned Sessions Judge, Bharatpur then the accused would be deprived of the benefits of the provisions of the Children Act. THE learned Magistrate has, therefore, prayed that a direction be issued whether the case should be tried by the Children Court at Kota, or this case be sent to the Sessions Judge, Bharatpur for disposal according to law. On behalf of the State, it has been contended that on 15. 3. 1976, a case under section 127 of the Railways Act was registered at G. R. P. Police, Bharat-pur at the instance of Shri D. K. Sarkar a railway engine driver. It was contended that when the goods train, driven by the informant was coming from Bayana to Bharatpur and was at station Jaycholi, a stone was hurled at the cabin of the driver which damaged the glass panes, by which both the eyes of the driver were liable to be damaged but he was saved. The police after investigation challaned Ram Kishan and Habbu, who are admittedly below 16 years and are children as defined in the Rajasthan Children Act in the Court of Railway Magistrate, Kota who had jurisdiction for trying such railway offences for Bharatpur District also. The Court of the Railway Magistrate was created under section 11, Cr. P. C. It was further contended on behalf of the State that the Railway Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Sessions Judge for trial on 14. 4. 1976, as the offence under section 127 of the Railways Act was punishable with imprisonment for life or with ten years imprisonment. The learned Sessions Judge transferred the case to the Court of Addl. Sessions Judge on 24. 4. 1976 The learned Addl. Sessions Judge in trun sent the case for trial to the Children Court (CJM) on 15th July, 1976. The statements of four eye-witnesses were recorded by the Children Court. Thereafter, an objection was taken on behalf of the prosecution on the basis of which the case was sent back to the Sessions Court keeping in view the provisions of section 27 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The learned Sessions Judge again transferred the case to the Addl. Sessions Judge's Court for trial. As stated earlier, the learned Addl. Sessions Judge by his order dated 22. 9. 1979, sent the case back to the Children Court. The reference, as stated earlier, has thus been made by the Children Court. It was further contended that Section 14 was amended by Act No. 45 of 1978 with effect from 18th Dec, 1978. By this amendment sub-section (3) of section 14 Cr. P. C. was added. The contention on behalf of the accused-respondent is that Section 14 (3), Cr. P. C. should be read with section 177, Cr. P. C. and by harmonious construction, the only possible interpretation is that the offence is triable by the Sessions Judge in whose territorial jurisdiction the offence has been committed. It was further contended that in a similar case, this Court has taken this very view. Reliance has been placed on Lakhpat Singh vs. State (1 ). On behalf of the State, it has been contended that a bare reading of section 14 (3), Cr. P. C. would show that the special jurisdiction of the Railway Magistrate, whose court has been created under section 11, Cr. P. C. is not controlled by section 177, Cr. P. C. It has been further contended that section 177, Cr. P. C deals with the general jurisdiction of trial courts and postulates that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by the court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. It was further contended that the courts of Judicial Magistrates were to be established in every district under section 11 and the Chief Judicial Magistrate was to define the local limits of such Magistrates under section 14, Cr. P. C. The court of special Judicial Magistrates were created by a special order for the particular class of cases having the local jurisdiction of more than one district. Section 14 (3) was enacted in connection with such cases where the Magistrate was having the local jurisdiction beyond the district where it was ordinarily holding courts. It was further contended that if the plain and simple reading of Section 14 (3) leads to the irresistible conclusion, then it is not necessary to refer to the various rules of interpretation. Reliance has been placed on the Interpretation of Statutes 11th Edn. P. 3, where in it has been stated that "the first and the elementary rule of construction is that it is to be assumed that the words, phrases of technical legislation are used in their technical meaning, if they acquired one and otherwise in their ordinary meaning and second, the phrases and sentences are to be construed according to the rule of grammar. It was further contended that statutes are to be read literally-that is by giving the words their ordinary meaning. Reliance has been placed on : Jugalkishore vs. Raw Cotton Co. (2), Rajanayaya Singh vs. Baijnath Singh (3), Amar Singh vs. State of Rajasthan (4), Hira Devi vs. District Board, Shahjahanpur (5 ). It was also contended that the Courts are not permitted to read into an act word which is not there, when the meaning is clear. Reliance was also placed on Malinakhya vs. Shyam Sunder (6),
(3.) IT has been contended on behalf of the State that the plain reading of Section 14 (3) would be as following after omitting such words which are not necessary for the present case. Section 14 (3) would read as under : - "where the local jurisdiction of Magistrate - - extends to an aread beyond the district. . . . . . in which he ordinarily holds Court, any reference in this Code to the Court of Sessions. . . . . . . . shall, in relation to such Magistrate, throughout the area within his local jurisdiction, be construed - - as a reference to the Court of Sessions. . . . . exercising the jurisdiction in relation to the said district. " On the basis of the above reading it was contended on behalf of the State that the plain reading of this Section gives the ordinary and literal meaning of this effect that where the jurisdiction of a Magistrate extends beyond the district where he ordinarily holds the Court, then any reference to the court of Sessions in respect of that court will be that Sessions Court where the Magistrate holds his court ordinarily. It was further contended that Sec. 14 (3) does not create jurisdiction of that Sessions Judge where the offence was committed, but creates jurisdiction of that Sessions Judge where Magistrate holds court. It was further contended that the interpretation made by the learned counsel for the accused with reference to section 177, Cr. P. C. is wholly untenable. It was further contended on behalf of the State that according to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the accused, the offence triable by the Magistrate if committed in Bharatpur were to be tried at Kota by Railway Magistrate; but the offence triable by the Sessions were to be tried by the Sessions Judge Bharatpur. According to the learned Public Prosecutor this would create an anomo-lous position and would have discriminated the offenders and such interpretation is to be avoided. It was further contended that the only interpretation which can achieve the objects of the enactment is that with reference to the Magistrate that Sessions Judge will have jurisdiction in whose jurisdiction the Magistrate holds court ordinarily; may be the main seat or a camp court. It was further contended that for the camp courts, the Sessions Judge of that area will have the jurisdiction as the Railway track of that Sessions division is not excluded for local jurisdiction of that Sessions Judge. It was further contended that the view taken by the learned Single Judge in 1980 Cr. L. J. 776 (supra) is not in conformity with law. It was further contended that the Amended section 14 (3) was not brought to the notice of the learned Single Judge and in view of Mamleshwar vs. Kanahiya Lal (7) that judgment is not binding. It was further contended on behalf of the State that section 27 excludes the jurisdiction of the Children Court unless the offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life, but in Rajasthan Children Act, the offence has been defined as including all offences, and it does not distinguish the offences punishable with life imprisonment or minor offence. It was further contended that as such all the offences are triable by Children's Court by virtue of section 7 (2) of the Children's Act. It was further contended that the Children's Act is a special enactment, but by virtue of Sec. 5 of the Code of Criminal Procedure the Children's Act will prevail over Sec. 27, Cr. P. C. Even otherwise, Sec. 5, Cr. P. C, Sec. 27 and section 7 (2) of Children's Act are to be harmoniously construed. In Indramani vs. W. R. Natu (8) it was held that if two constructions of a penal statute, then one favouring the accused is to be considered. Under these circumstances, section 7 (2) of the Children Act shall prevail over section 27, Cr. P. C. On behalf of the State,iit was prayed that the reference may be answered in the following terms : - "where the local jurisdiction of the Railway Magistrate extends to an area beyond the District in which he ordinarily holds courts, any reference in Cr. P. C. to the Sessions Court shall, throughout the area within the local jurisdiction of the Railway Magistrate, be construed as a reference to that Court of Sessions who is exercising jurisdiction in relation to the said district where the Magistrate ordinarily holds court. " As the accused Ram Kishan was unrepresented, Shri Jagdeep Dhan-kar was appointed under the Legal Aid Programme. ;