- (1.) THIS is a revision application under Sec. 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against an order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated 26-10 68 refusing to grant a stay, and vacating an ex-parte order of stay granted by him, in respect of an order dated 24 9-68 by the Assistant Collector, Neem-ka-thana, against which an appeal had been filed with the Revenue Appellate Authority. By his order the Assistant Collector had granted a temporary injunction against the applicant in a suit for eviction, permanent injunction etc.
(2.) THE facts are that the land in dispute was the khatedari of one Jeeta. He appears to have sub-let the land to the applicant sometime in 1961. THE applicant put up residential construction and a limekiln (Bhatta) on the land. THE Tehsil took objection to this and started proceedings against him in May 1962. Some how action in the proceedings came to a stand still towards the end of 1962, until in 1966 the applicant submitted an application for 'regularisation' of his occupation and use of the land THE Tehsildar passed an order, accepting the request, on 12-9-66 referring to a Government circular dated 24 4 63. As appears from copy of order available on the S DO 's file the Tehsildar subsequently saw another Government circular dated 20 12-63, in accordance with which only the Collector could authorise a Bhatta and that too only to the Khatedar of the land THE Tehsildar noted that the applicant was not the khatedar. He, therefore, reviewed his order of 12-9-66, and by an order dated 19 9-66 cancelled it, and directed the applicant to submit proof of his title to the land. An appeal against this order was rejected by the Additional Collector by his order dated 3-4-67. On the other hand, however, the non-applicants No. 1 and 2 had purchased the land from Jeeta for Rs. 700/- on 12-6-65 by a registered sale deed. A mutation was also recorded in their name. The applicant started proceedings to get the mutation upset, but there is nothing to show that he has been successful so far. After the purchase of the land, the non-applicants No. 1 and 2 put up an I. O. C. petrol pump on part of the land, and the rest is stated to be under cultivation, except, of course, the part on which the applicant has his structures and Bhatta. The non-applicants filed a suit against the applicant on 19-8-68 for eviction and permanent injunction. An application for a temporary injunction was also made. By his order dated 24-9-68, the Assistant Collector granted a temporary injunction prohibiting the applicant (defendant before him) from putting up any further construction or collecting material for such construction, and from operating the Bhatta on the ground that the land was in the khatedari of the plaintiffs and the defendant's Bhatta was unauthorised, and that there was danger of damage to the land as a result of the operation of the Bhatta. An appeal was preferred against this order. An application for stay of the Asstt. Collector's order was also made. The Revenue Appellate Authority initially granted an ex-parte stay but after hearing the parties, refused to confirm the stay and vacated the ex parte order. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that in a matter of grant of temporary injunction, the question of possession was of prime importance. In this case, possession by non-applicants (plaintiffs) was prima facie not there over that part of the land on which he had his Bhatta etc, since 1962. Even though the sale deed executed between Jeeta and the non-applicants No. 1 and 2 might, on paper, have referred to transfer of possession, actual possession over this part could not have been transferred. The applicant had his structures and Bhatta on it and continued to be in possession. The very nature of the suit filed by the non-applicants against him showed his continued possession. He said that much was now being said by the non-applicants about danger of fire to their petrol pump from the Bhatta, but the pump was set up by them when the Bhatta was already there. They obtained permission for the pump without disclosing the existence of the operating Bhatta to the authorities concerned. The suit itself was brought more than three years after the purchase of the land. The occupation of part of the land by the applicant and the operation of the Bhatta continued all the time. Learned counsel attacked the Revenue Appellate Authority's order, as well as the order of the Assistant Collector, as being not proper judgments, fulfilling the statutory requirements in respect of judgments as elucidated in the Rajasthan High Court Judgment in Dhanraj vs. Hira Chand (1963 RLW 3 16 ). He said that the Revenue Appellate Authority did not discuss the essential conditions for a temporary injunction, the existence of prima facie case, the question of possession and that of the balance of convenience, and after merely recording the arguments on both sides disposed of the order, summarily. Similarly the Assistant Collector had also not discussed these questions and, particularly, had not examined the question of possession at all, The Assistant Collector's order should, he said, have been reversed by the Revenue Appellate Authority. He said that the well recognised principles for grant of temporary injunction were that there could be no order of temporary injunction unless there was a finding that the party seeking injunction had satisfied the court about prima-facie title to the land and possession of it and that such injunction should not be granted when possession was in dispute, and both parties asserted possession, or if the defendant was in possession. Temporary injunction can be granted only if the essential condition of prima facie case, irreparable injury in the absence of temporary injunction and balance of convenience in favour by its grant, are shown. The purpose of temporary injunction is to maintain and preserve status quo as at the time of initiation of proceedings. It is not to be granted in order to disturb the status quo or to establish a state of things. He cited the following rulings in support: - 1. AIR 1951 Patna 266 (Subodh Gopal vs. Dalmia Jain & Co. ). 2. AIR 1955 NUC Hyderabad 4856 (Padmani Bai vs. Zamu Bai ). 3. AIR 1951 Travancore Cochin 221. 4. 1962 RLW 404 (Govindi vs. Mahant Laxmi Chand ). 5. AIR 1965 MP 142 (Durga Transport Co. vs. R. T. A. Raipur ). 6. 1966 RRD 121 (Bastimal vs. Prahlad ). Learned counsel explained that these principles had been completely overlooked by the lower courts, and their orders were, therefore, perverse. There could be no injunction to prevent the defendant applicant from enjoying the use of the land of which he was in possession. Learned counsel for the non-applicant 1 and 2 argued that the revision application did not lie at all. An application had also been submitted on their behalf raising this objection, on 27-5-50. The Revenue Appellate Authority's order was no at all a 'case decided', against which alone a revision application could be entertained under Section 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. The order was a purely interim order in a matter in the discretion of the court. Even apart from the question whether or not it was a 'case decided', a revision could be maintainable only if there was any illegality or material irregularity in the exercise of the discretion. He cited the following rulings in support of his contentions: - (i) 1969 RRD 1. (Roopa vs. Bhaira ). (ii) AIR 1949 Ajmer 1 (Rajmal vs. Phoondalal ). (iii) AIR 1921 Lahore 185 (Firm of Badridas Jankidas vs. Mithanlal. (iv) AIR 1964 Assam 81 (United Club vs. Nowgong Fot Assam ). In 1969 RRD 1 it was clearly held that grant of stay was a discretionary matter and the order could not be held to involve any illegality if the discretion was judicially and properly exercised. Similarly AIR 1949 Ajmer I held that stay was discretionary and the order could not be interfered with if discretion was exercised judicially and not arbitrarily. He said that the Revenue Appellate Authority had exercised his discretion not to grant stay of the Assistant Collector's order, judicially and not arbitrarily. There was also no material irregularity in the manner of exercise of his jurisdiction. I have considered the matter. I am concerned here with the revision application directed against the Revenue Appellate Authority's order dated 26-10 63 refusing to stay the operation of the Assistant Collector's order. The merits of the Assistant Collector's order are still the subject matter of appeal, and the Revenue Appellate Authority had yet to decide it. The Revenue Appellate Authority was not, by the impugned order, deciding the appeal. Much of the criticism directed by the learned counsel for the applicants against the Revenue Appellate Authority's order is as if the order had disposed of the appeal, and upheld the Assistant Collector's order. The impugned order is a purely interim order, refusing to grant stay. The criteria laid down in 1963 RLW 316 could hardly apply to such an order. There should be very extraordinary circumstances to justify revisional interference with such an order, if at all it could be interfered with. The Revenue Appellate Authority was obviously, prima facie satisfied that the applicant was operating a Bhatta without authority or sanction, and that continuous operation of the Bhatta would render the land unfit for agriculture. For these reasons, he did not consider it desirable to grant to the applicant the temporary relief of a stay. A temporary injunction is granted to maintain status quo. The Revenue Appellate Authority apparently thought that continued running of the Bhatta, which would be the effect of the stay would alter the status quo in regard to the land (that is, change its existing condition regarding culturability), as he has said that the agricultural land would become unfit for agriculture. The Revenue Appellate Authority cannot be regarded as having exercised his discretion illegally or capriciously, nor does there appear to be any material irregularity in the exercise of his jurisdiction. I do not, therefore, find adequate jurisdiction to interfere with the Revenue Appellate Authority's orders, and reject the revision application. Considering the nature of the temporary injunction granted by the Assistant Collector, I would, however, direct the Revenue Appellate Authority to hear and dispose of the appeal expeditiously. . ;