L.N.CHHANGANI, AG.C.J. - (1.) THIS application raising a question relating to the interpretation of the words 'within such period, not being less than 30 days, as may be specified in the notice' in Section 34 Sub -section (2) of the Rajasthan Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been referred to this Full Bench by a Division Bench. The reference has been made as the Bench hearing the writ application did not feel inclined to agree with the interpretation of similar words namely, 'within a period of not less than one month' in Section 14(2) of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Municipalities Act), and 'within a period of not less than one month' used in Section 3(2) of the Rajasthan Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Markets Act) in two earlier Bench decisions of this Court in Suresh Chandra and Ors. v. Birdhi Chand and Ors. ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793 and Bhikam Chand and Ors. v. The State and another ILR (1965) 15 Raj 897, and entertained doubts about the soundness of the view adopted in these two cases and considered necessary an examination of the controversy by a Full Bench.
(2.) THE facts relevant for deciding the writ application as also answering the reference may be stated as follows: On the 27th of January, 1960, a notice was issued against Thakur Mangal Singh the predecessor -in -interest of the petitioner Bhupendra Singh under Section 54 of the Act calling upon him to submit his return for the agricultural income for the year ending 31st of March, 1954. By a like notice issued on the same day, he was also asked to submit his return for the agricultural income for the year ending 31st of March, 1955. By these notices, Mangal Singh was required to submit the necessary returns 'not later than 26th February, 1960 or within thirty days of the receipt of this notice'. Thakur Mangal Singh did not submit any return in response to these notices and consequently, the Agricultural Income -tax Officer, by his order dated 25th March, 1960, made an exparte assessment against him by which he assessed him to a tax of Rs. 2,499 97 for the assessment year 1954 -55 and to an exactly identical amount for the following year 1955 -56. Thakur Mangal Singh died on 6th January, 1961. After his death, the petitioner received notices requiring him to deposit the amounts under the above two assessments The petitioner on receipt of the notices filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of the two assessments. During the hearing of the writ application the petitioner pressed only one point, namely, that the notice to the assessee dated 27th January, 1960, under Section 54 of the Act was altogether invalid being in contravention of the provisions of Section 34(2) of the Act. It was contended that while Section 54 read with Section 34(2) of the Act required that the notice to the assessee must give him time to file return 'within such period not being less than 30 days, as may be specified in the notice', the notice dated 27th January, 1960. required him to submit the return 'not later than 26th February,l960' or 'within30days of the receipt of the notice' The notice having been served on the assessee on 30th January, 1960 both the points of time in the notice, namely, 26th of February or 'within 30 days of the receipt of the notice,' did not give the assessee a period of not less than 30 days. Consequently, it was urged that the notice was illegal and wholly insufficient to serve as any valid foundation for the lawful assessment tax of the petitioner's father. Before the Division Bench, Commissioner of Income -tax v. Ekbal and Co AIR 1945 Bom. 316 was relied upon. In the Bombay case AIR 1945 Bom. 316 it was held that the expression 'not less than 30 days' could not be equated with the expression 'within 30 days'. The Bench hearing the writ application considered the Bombay case AIR 1945 Bom. 316 as affording an almost exact parallel to the present case and felt no hesitation in following it. The Bench was, however, faced with a Bench discision of this Court in Sureh Chandra and Ors. v. Birdhi Chand and Ors. ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793. In Suresh Chandra's case ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793 Section 14(2) of the Municipalities Act required the draft of the order under Sub -section (1) to be published for filing objections thereto within a period of not less than one month and a notification issued under Section 14(2)'objections within one month' was held valid conforming to the requirements of this section. In this judgment, the expression 'within a period of not less than 30 days' was treated as equivalto the expression 'within 30 days'. It was further observed that the observations of the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ekbal and Co. AIR 1945 Bom. 316 did not square with the observations of the Supreme Court in (H. H. Raja) Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh and Ors. : [1957]1SCR208 . It may also be mentioned that the same Bench on the same day interpreted the similar words in the Markets Act in the same manner vide their decision reported in Bhikam Chand and Ors. v. The State and another ILR (1965) 15 Raj 897.
(3.) THE Bench hearing the writ application noticed the Supreme Court Case AIR 1957 SC 271 in detail and considered the two Bench decisions of this Court. The Bench felt inclined to disagree with the view adopted in the two Bench decision and found force in the following contentions made before it: 1. That the Supreme Court case affords no parallel to the Bombay case and the case before the Bench and that the authority of the Bombay case is not shaken by the decision of the Supreme Court. 2. That the expression 'within a period of not less than 30days' could not be properly interpreted as amounting to same thing as 'within one month' even on the law quoted in Suresh Chandra's case ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793, from Asalsbury's Laws of England. Third Edition, Volume 37, on pages 94 97, and Maxwell's Interpretation of Statues, Eleventh Edition, at page 394, and that the expression 'within such period not being less than 30 days' cannot be rightly accepted as being equivalent to 'within 30 days'. Naturally, the Bench entertained doubts about the soundness of the view adopted by the Bench in the two cases - -Suresh Chandra v. Birdhi Chand ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793 and Bhikamchand v. The State ILR (1965) 15 Raj 897 and considered it necessary to have the controversy examined by a Full Bench. At the out set, it will be useful to notice the Bombay decision in Commissioner Income -tax v. Ekbal and Co. AIR 1945 Bom. 316 and the Supreme Court decision in (H.H.Raja) Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh and Ors. : [1957]1SCR208 which was construed by the Bench of this Court in Suresh Chandra't case ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793 as weakening the authority of the Bombay decision in Commissioner of Incom -tax v. Ekbal and Co. AIR 1945 Bom. 316. In the Bombay case AIR 1945 Bom. 316 a Division Bench consisting of Stone C. J. and Kania J. was interpreting the words 'within such period not being less than 30 days,' appearing in Section 22(2) of the Income Tax Act of 1922 and was considering the validity of a notice requiring the assessee to file the return within 30 days of the receipt of this notice. Both the learned Judges held the notice invalid. Stone C.J observed,: Time can be indefinitely divided There is no fraction of a second which is so short duration that it cannot be divided into something smaller. In my judgment expressions 'within 30 days' & 'not less than 30 days' are two quite different things. 'Within 30 days' is within two points of time, ore at which the period begins and the other at which it expires. On the other hand, not less than 30 days' is outside these two points of time. There must be an interval of not less than 30 days and that means 30 days clear: See (1885) 29 Ch. D. 204 The period must continue beyond the expiration of the stated time. Whereas 'within' the stated period must mean what it says, something less than the moment of expiration. Kania J. observed: Reading the section by itself therefore it clearly means that period within which the assessee has to send his return must neither at the beginning nor at the end encroach upon the 30 days To put it in other words 30 clear days must elapse before his obligation to send the return becomes effective. In (H.H.Raja) Harinder Singh v. S. Karnail Singh and Ors. : [1957]1SCR208 , the Supreme Court was considering the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act in relation to an election petition, which under Rule 119(a) was required to be filed 'not later than 14 days'. The contention before the Supreme Court was that Section 10 of the General Clauses Act can apply on its own terms only when the act in question is to be done 'within a prescribed period' and not to a case where the election petition was to be filed 'not later than fourteen days.' Their Lord ships observed,: Broadly stated, the object of section is to enable a person to do what he could have done on a holiday, on the next working day. Where therefore, a period is prescribed for the performance of an act in a Court or office, and that period expires on a holiday, then according to the section the act should be considered to have been done within that period, ii it is done on the next day on which the Court or office is open. 2. For that section to apply, therefore all that is requisite is that there should be a period prescribed, and that period should expire on a holiday. 3. Now it cannot be denied that the period of fourteen days provided in Rule 119(a) for presentation of an election petition is a period prescribed, and that is its true character, whether the words used are 'within fourteen days' or 'not later, than fourteen days ' 4. That the distinction sought to be made by the appelleant between these two expressions is without substance, will be clear beyond all doubt, when regard is had to Section 81 of the Act, Section 81(1) enacts that the election petition may be presented within suce time as may be prescribed and it is under this section that Rule 119 has been framed. It is obvious that the rule -making authority could not have intended to go further then what the section itself had enacted, and if the language of the Rule is construed in conjunction with and under coverage of the section under which it is framed, the words 'not later than fourteen days must be held to mean the same thing as within a period of fourteen days'. The decision of the Supreme Court holding the expression 'nor later than fourteen days' as equivalent to within fourteen days' was arrived at on a reading of Rule 119(a) with Section 81 of the Representation of the People Act (1951) in connection with the applicability of Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, and having regard to these factors and the circumstances of the case, we have no hesitation in holding that the Supreme Court case AIR 1957 SC 271 affords no parallel to the kind of the case which was before the Bombay High Court or to that which is before us and we are unable to hold that the authority of the Bombay case AIR 1945 Bom. 316 is in any way shaken by the decision of the Supreme Court in Harinder Singh v. S. Karnil Singh : [1957]1SCR208 , or to agree with the observations in Suresh Chandra v. Birdhichand and ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793 that the observations of the Bombay case AIR 1945 Bom. 316 do not square with the observations of the Supreme Court in Harinder Singh v. S. Karnil Singh : [1957]1SCR208 . In our opinion, the view taken by the Bombay High Court in Commissioner of Incom -tax v. Ekbal and Co. AIR 1945 Bom. 316 was the correct one and that it does not in any way stand over -ruled by the Supreme Court decision. Thus, one of the arguments relied upon by the Bench. Suresh Chand v. Birdhichand ILR (1965) (15) Raj 793 must be treated as having no proper basis. The learned Judges, however, adopted some other line of reasoning in support of their conclusion, They quoted passages from Halsbury's Laws of England and Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes and reached the following conclusions.;