- (1.) THIS is a revision petition filed u/s 230 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against the order of the learned Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner dated 13-8-1965, whereby he dismissed the appeal of the petitioners and upheld the order of the trial court.
(2.) BRIEFLY, the facts of this case are that Panna and Lala opposite party in the instant case filed a suit u/s 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act against Naharsingh. the present petitioners, in the court of the S. D. O, Bali. The dispute related to Khasra No. 216, 217 & 218, measuring 63 bighas and 6 biswas and situated in village Sepatavas, tehsil Desuri. The plaintiffs were dispossessed in samvat year 2015. It is alleged that the parties arrived at a compromise and the deed is Ex. D/- 1, by virtue of which the disputed land was transferred to the defendants for a consideration of Rs. 200/ -. The allegation is that Panna shifted his stand and alleged that the consideration was not paid to him and, therefore, he repudiated the compromise. Issue was framed on this as follows: - "whether the suit was not maintainable on account of 'rajinama' that has taken place between the parties". Evidence was recorded and after considering the same the court held that the plaintiffs were not bound by the compromise Ex. D/- 1 as the sale was without consideration. On appeal, the learned R. A. A. upheld the order of the trial court and dismissed the same. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners argued that once a compromise was arrived at, the court had no jurisdiction to go into the question of payment of consideration. He cited the case Puttolal vs. H. H. Maharaja Dhiraj Shri Sumer Singhji of Kishangarh reported in 1962 RLW 651, and Ram Asrey vs. Rameshwar Prasad reported in 1961 AIR All, 529 in support of his contention that the court was bound to record the compromise and it had no jurisdiction to go into the question of fraud and payment of consideration. He further contended that even if the compromise is oral, the court is bound to record the same. The learned counsel further urged that if the plaintiffs desired to have the 'rajinama' set aside, they should have filed a separate civil suit alleging fraud. The learned counsel appearing for the opposite party supported the concurrent findings of both the lower courts on the ground that in accordance with the provisions of O 23, R. 3 of the C. P. C. , it was incumbent on the trial court to satisfy itself that the compromise is lawfully arrived at. He averred that both the lower courts had come to the conclusion that the compromise was not valid as both the parties had not agreed to the same. He contended that the 'rajinama' was never verified before the trial court and the plaintiffs repudiated it at the earliest opportunity. He further maintained that even if the finding of the lower courts is deemed to be erroneous, there was no justification for interfering with the same as there was no error committed by the lower courts in regard to exercise of their jurisdiction. He cited the case Ratanlal vs. Rajna reported in 1965 - RRD 73 in support of his contention that interference with the orders of the lower courts in revision is justified only where jurisdiction has been exercised either illegally or with material irregularity, or when it was not vested in the court, or there was failure to exercise jurisdiction where vested in it. He also drew my attention to the case Bakhtawar vs. Mandir Murti Shri Thakurji, Khohari reported in 1961-RR. D 394, wherein it has been held that revisional court should not interfere, where external conditions of jurisdiction are satisfied, even if findings be erroneous. The learned counsel further argued that where parties do not admit having adjusted the suit by compromise it is not valid. In support of this contention, he cited AIR 1960, A. P. 473. I have carefully considered the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties and have also examined the record of this case. In the instant case 'rajinama' was presented by the defendant-petitioners before the court under O. 23, R. 3 of the C. P. C. 0. 23, R. 3 runs as follows: "where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the suit". A bare reading of this provision makes it abundantly clear that it casts a duty on the court to satisfy itself that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by agreement or compromise, or that the defendants have satisfied the plaintiffs in respect of the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit. The court will order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded only where these conditions are fulfilled. In the instant case the trial court recorded evidence when 'rajinama' Ex, D/1 was presented before it, and it came to the conclusion on the basis thereof that the 'rajinama' was not bilateral and that the plaintiffs' suit had not been satisfied either wholly or in part. The trial court, therefore, refused to record this compromise. The trial court, has, therefore, acted in the spirit of the provisions of O. 23, r. 3 of the CPC The first appellate court has also upheld the finding of the trial court. I entirely agree with the contention made by the learned counsel for the opposite party that there is no case for exercising the revisional powers of this court so as to justify interference with the concurrent finding of both the lower courts. There is no substance in this revision petition, which is, therefore, rejected with costs. Pronounced in open court. . ;