- (1.) THIS is a reference made by D. B. to a larger bench of the Board in a second appeal presented by Shri Uma and others plaintiff-appellants, u/s. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, against the decree & order of the Revenue Appellate Authority Udaipur dated 5-9-67 passed in appeal reversing the order & decree of the S. D. O. Udaipur dated 12-1-67. The facts of the case, in brief, are that the plaintiff-appellants filed a suit u/s 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act for possession of suit land, Khasra No 194 to 197 measuring 4 bighas 10 biswas in village Dhayala, tehsil Nathdwara. It was alleged that Kajor, defendant-respondent dispossessed the plaintiff-appellants from the suit land in Smt. 2012 (1955 A. D.) after about 2 years of the demise of Roda, ancestor of plaintiff-appellants. The plaintiff appellants were 'muafidars' of the suit land and as per admission of the parties, it was resumed to the State on 17-1958 (samvat year 2015 ). The defendant respondent contested the suit on the ground that he was in possession of the suit land, since Smt. 2007 (1950 A. D.) as a mortgagee and since Smt. 2009, when the land was purchased by him from one Da!u deceased father of Mst. Bhowani, his married daughter, defendant No 3 from the date of resumption of the 'mafi' in Smt. . 2015, he became khatedar of the suit land. The suit was decreed by the S. D. O. , on 12-1-67, against which an appeal having been filed before the R. A. A. , the decree and judgment of the S. D. O. was set aside, on the ground that the plaintiff-respondent before him, who were 'mafidars' and whose 'mafi' was resumed to the State could not bring a suit u/s 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, because they were not in a position to admit the defendant respondent as tenant and also because their right, title and interest in the 'muafi' land had vested in the State from the date of resumption of the 'muafi' land.
(2.) IT is against this order that the plaintiff-appellants filed a second appeal. The D. B. consisting of Members sarva Shri G. L. Mehta and Narayan Chand arrived at the conclusion that sec 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act could not be given an interpretation to mean that the plaintiff-appellants who were 'bhils' i. e members of scheduled tribe, were unable to bring a suit for ejectment of the defendant-respondent who belonged to non-scheduled caste or tribe because sec. 46-A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act embodies a special provision under which a person being a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe could not let or sub let the whole or any part of his holding to any person who was not a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe. The learned Members were accordingly in favour of accepting the appeal and setting aside the judgment and decree of the R. A. A. , but in view of a contrary decision in a revenue appeal No. 278/67/appeal/bharatpur District, by another D. B. of the Board, having come to their notice, they considered it necessary to make the following reference to a Larger Bench: "whether in the circumstances of the instant case, suit can be brought forth by a member belonging to a scheduled tribe or a scheduled caste, u/s. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, against a trespasser who is not a member of a scheduled tribe or a scheduled caste, the former having been held as not competent to admit the latter, as a tenant in view of the provisions of sec. 46-A of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act". The matter has, therefore, been heard by us in the Larger Bench. We had the benefit of hearing the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the parties, as also the learned Government Advocate, Dy. Government Advocate and Shri Roopchand Sogani, as Amicus Curiae. In the case No. 278/67/appeal/bharatpur (Ramchandra vs. Hari Singh (Scheduled caste) the D. B. consisting of Shri G. B. K. Hooja, Chairman, and Shri B. P. Sood, Member decided on 24-6-69 that the provisions of sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act ran counter to the intention of the legislature as envisaged in sec. 46-A of the Act, and since a person belonging to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe could not let or sub-let his holding, in part or in whole to a non-scheduled caste person, he was precluded by sec. 183 of the Act to eject him as trespasser. The learned D. B. , while accepting the appeal, however, considered it appropriate to bring the anomaly to the notice of the Government for such action as it may deem proper to take in this behalf. By the above reference, a very important question of law has been raised for answer. Sec. 183 of the Act provides for the ejectment of certain trespassers. Under this section, a trespasser who has taken or retained possession of any land without lawful authority is liable to be ejected on the suit of the person or persons entitled to admit him as tenant. In other words, this section entitles a person to sue for ejectment another as trespasser, of the former is entitled to admit the latter as his tenant. Sec. 46-A of the Act, contains a special provision for letting or subletting by members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes. Under this Section a person belonging to a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribe is debarred from letting or subletting the whole or any part of his holding to any person who is not a member of a scheduled caste or a scheduled tribes Shri Chordia learned counsel for the respondent argued that in this case the plaintiff is a member of a scheduled tribe and defendant is a non-scheduled caste person. For the purpose of ejectment of a trespasser the holder of land should be a person entitled to admit him as tenant. If a person is not entitled to admit him as tenant, then he cannot bring a suit for his ejectment. Sec. 46-A prohibits a person belonging to a scheduled caste or tribe to let or sub-let his holding to a non-scheduled caste or tribe person. Both sections read together would mean that a scheduled caste or scheduled tribe person cannot bring a suit for ejectment from his holding against a trespasser, if the latter belongs to a non-scheduled caste or tribe because the former is not entitled to admit him as tenant. Such a simple and clear meaning flowing out from these Sections, it was argued, was capable of no ambiguity and required no interpretation, other than what is clear from the plain reading of their words. He repelled, as redundant, the plea that it will be against the intention of the legislature to conclude that a scheduled caste or tribe person will be debarred from ejecting trespasser belonging to a non-scheduled caste or tribe, while he could do so in the case of trespasser if he belonged to his own caste or tribe, particularly when the intention of introducing sec. 46-A in the Tenancy Act was to protect the members of Scheduled castes & tribes from the exploitation of socially and economically well of communities of the society. As to how a statute should be interpreted, he cited a number of rulings Ruling AIR (32) 1945 Privy Council 48 (Emperor vs. Benoarilal) was cited, wherein it was observed that in construing enacted words the court is not concerned with the policy involved or with the results, injurious or otherwise, which may follow from giving effect to the language used. AIR (29) 1942 Bombay 39 (Emperor vs. Mahamed Kassam Panwalla) was cited wherein a view was expressed that the judge has to take the language as he finds it, although he has to look at the Act as a whole and construe it so as to give effect to what appears from the language of the whole Act to be the intention of the legislature. It should not take into consideration as to what the object of the legislature was and then construe the Act so as to fit in with that object. Air 1963 S. C. 1128 (Mysore State Electricity Board vs. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Ltd) was cited where in in respect of a submission made by the Attorney General that if a question between the Mysore State Electricity Board and a consumer is to be referred to arbitration, then in cases where the Board itself supplies electric energy there may be thousands of consumers each of whom may raise a dispute and call for arbitration. In that event there will be thousands of arbitration and the legislature could never have contemplated such a situation. In this matter, it was observed that inconvenience was not a decisive factor in interpreting a Statute. On the analogy of this case, it cannot be said that inconvenience and hardship will be caused to scheduled caste or tribe person if they were relegated to position of helpless spectators in not having the capacity to eject trespassers belonging to a non-scheduled caste and tribes from their holdings. 1952-RRD 156 (Shri Abhimanyu vs. Shri Sukhlal was cited, wherein it was observed that where words are clear and unambiguous then whatever may have been the intention of the legis-lture, it would be doing wrong to an express provisions of law by inserting words which could by no means be imported therein. Air 1966 S. C. 529 [the Martin Burn Ltd. , vs. Corporation of Calcutta] was also cited, wherein it was observed that a result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A court has no power to ignore a provision of law with a view to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. A statute must of course be given effect to whether a * court likes the result or not. On the basis of this ruling, it was argued that assuming for a moment that hardship and distress will be caused if as a result of the provisions of sec. 46-A read with sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, a member of scheduled caste or tribe will not be entitled to bring a suit for ejectment of a trespasser belonging to non-scheduled caste or tribe, even so the court could do nothing to relieve the distress. It could simply, point this out for such action as the Government may like to take in the matter. Air 1959 S. C. 894 [y. V. Srinivasa-murthy vs. State of Mysore] was cited wherein it has been observed that the court has no concern with the wisdom of the legislature and it would be a dangerous precedent to allow the views of the members of the court as to the serious consequences of excessive taxation to lead to a conclusion that the law is ultra vires. All the above rulings were cited to stress the point that the court should not be concerned with the results flowing from the operation of provisions of an Act however, inconvenient, hard, injurious, or distressing they may be to a party and no interpretation other than what naturally flows from the clear and unambiguous words of the Act, should be given by the court by saying that this should not have been or should have been the intention of the legislautre. The court cannot give an interpretation inconsonant with the supposed intention of the legislature in disregard of the plain and simple meaning of the words used in the statute. Shri P. D. Kudal also supported the decision made by the D. B. on 24-6-69 in the matter. According to him, the views of the D. B. which has made a reference to the Larger Bench, seemed to have been weighed heavily by one consideration, above, all, i. e. , that they felt that the whole object of introducting Sec. 46-A in the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, will be defeated if an interpretation to the provisions of this Section read with Sec. 183 of the Act was given to land us into the anomalous situation where an ordinary citizen could get a trespasser ejected from his holding, but a person belonging to a scheduled caste or trile would not be able to do so, if the trespasser happened to be a non-scheduled caste or tribe. According to the learned D. B. the intention of the legislature in placing this restriction on the members of scheduled caste and tribes was to afford them protection from exploitation by the socially and economically dominant Section of the Society, In the view of the D B. this intention would be nullified if a member of a scheduled caste or tribe was precluded from suing a trespasser for ejectment from his holding, if he happened to belong to a non-scheduled caste or tribe, because in terms of Section 183 of the Act, a person suing for ejectment should be first entitled to admit the trespasser as his tenant. He argued that whether, the very object with which Section 46-A was enacted, and which seemed to provide protection to the members of scheduled caste and tribe from non-scheduled caste and tribe persons, would be frustrated, or be nullified or will be contrary to the intention of the legislature, was a matter upon which this court is not competent to say anything except point out the legal lacunae noticed by it. Reference was made to Air 1953 SC 148 (Para9) (Shri Nalinakhya vs. Shaymsundar), wherein it was observed that it is not competent for any court to pro-ceed upon the assumption that the legislature has made a mistake. The court must proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said. Even if there is some defect in the phraseology used in the enactment the court cannot said the defective phrasing of an Act or add or amend or by construction with a view to make up the deficiencies which are left in the Act. In our considered view it is none of our business to interpret and connote a meaning to any word or phrase used in Section 46-A or 183 of the Act, when the two interpretations could be given to them. Nor is it our business to harmonise between two seemingly conflicting provision of these Sections, by giving an interpretation so as to bring them in consonance with the intention of the legislature, which has to be inferred from words used in the sections. The words and phraseology used in these sections are simple and plain enough to give no other meaning than what was intended by the legislature. In respect of the seeming conflict between the provisions of Section 46-A and Section 183 of the Act, it was argued that Section 183 was procedural in nature, while sec. 46 A was substantive and so both the provision did not stand on the same footing and, therefore, the provision of substantive law should prevail. We do not find any conflict in the provisions of sec. 46-A and sec. 183 of the Act. Sec. 183 of the Act lays down the qualifications of a person intending to sue for ejectment of a trespasser from his holding. The primary qualification is that he should be entitled to admit the trespasser as his tenant. Under sec. 46-A, a scheduled caste or tribe person cannot admit a non-scheduled caste or tribe person to his tenancy. Sec. 46-A, therefore, acts as a bar to proceeding u/s. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act by a member of scheduled caste or tribe against another who is not a member of the scheduled caste or tribe. In the exposition of the law as it stands, we subscribe to the view held by the D B. of this Board in case No, 278/67/appeal/ Bharatpur in the case of Ramchandra vs. Hari Singh. In effect, this deprives an aggrieved person belonging to the scheduled castes or the scheduled tribes from seeking the ejectment of a person not belonging to these classes, if the latter chooses to commit a trespass. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the legislature. Evidently, this is an anomalous situation wherein a person belonging to the scheduled tribe, if dispossessed by any person not belonging to these classes is left without a remedy. There is no other provision in the entire Tenancy Act providing a remedy to a scheduled caste or tribe khatedar whereby he may eject an unauthorised trespasser belonging to non-scheduled caste or tribe, from his holding. In this regard it was pointed out by Shri Chordia that barring a remedy from a revenue court did not mean that doors to him are closed for good. In such a case a scheduled caste or tribe person could go to a civil court for ejecting a person who has unauthorisedly trespassed upon his land. It is this anomaly and handicap in view of which the learned D. B. referred to above, considered it appropriate to bring the same to the notice of the Government for such action as it may deem proper in this regard. Shri Pareek argued that Section 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act was similar to that of Section 180 of Uttar Pradesh Tenancy Act, 1939. U/s. 181 of that Act a person competent to admit to occupation can bring a suit for ejectment. Sec. 5 (43) defines a tenant and sec. 5 (26) a land holder. It was also argued that the non-obstante clause shall prevail and exclude sec. 46-A for the purposes of Sec. 183. In other words Sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act will operate and 46-A of the Act will not act as impediment. We are not inclined to accept this view for the reasons given in the foregoing paras. Shri Bhagat, in the course of his arguments took us to the genesis of the provisions of Sec. 46-A, the directive principles of the Constitution, and the first amendment of the Constitution in 1951 by which Article 15 (a) was added. According to him the object of introducing sec. 46-A could not be interpreted as restrictive of the advancement of scheduled castes and tribes and any provision of the Act which retarded the object of sec. 46-A would be legally anachronistic. His contention was that the right of a person of scheduled caste or tribe as a khatedar to eject a trespasser could not be abridged by sec. 46-A, which was enacted to advance and protect the interests of persons belonging to scheduled caste or tribes.
(3.) WE have given full consideration to the various arguments advanced and rulings cited in support thereof. In view of the observations made above, we are of the considered view that Sec. 46-A was not open to any two interpretations and this section read with sec. 183 of the Act means that a person belonging to scheduled caste or tribe cannot bring a suit u/s 183 of the Act to eject a non-scheduled caste or tribe trespasser for the reason that sec, 46-A debarred him to make him his tenant and one who could not be admitted as tenant, could also not be sued for ejectment. In our view the law as it stands, must inexorably grind its wheel irrespective of class of persons and individuals. If there is any anomaly between these two sections, it is not our business to iron out the same. Therefore, while agreeing with the decision taken in case No. 278/67/appeal/ Bharatpur [ram Chandra vs. Hari Singh] decided by D. B. on 24-6-1969, the reference made is answered as below - A member belonging to the scheduled caste or tribe cannot bring a suit under sec. 183 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, against a trespasser who is not a member of a scheduled caste or tribe, for ejectment, because the former is not entitled to admit him as tenant in view of the provisions of sec. 46-A which debarred him from letting out his holding to a non-scheduled caste or tribe person. .;