TYAGI, J. - (1.) -
(2.) THIS petition has been filed by the Railway Employees Cooperative Credit Society Ltd. , Jodhpur (hereinafter called the Society) under Article 227 of the Constitution challenging the correctness of the order dated 2nd May, 1967, passed by the Authority set up under sec. 15 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (hereinafter called the Act ). The facts giving rise to this petition are as follows: Narendra Kumar Goel, respondent No. 2 was working as clerk in the petitioner society. On 29th of July, 1964, the managing committee of the society by its resolution No. 6 created certain additional temporary posts of senior grade styled as "sub-heads". The grade of this senior post was Rs. 160-250. The respondent No. 2, who was drawing a salary in the junior scale of Rs. 110/200, was appointed as a sub-head. After some time, the managing committee reviewed the situation and realised that it had committed an error in creating the posts of subheads in the senior grade and, therefore, by adopting another resolution on 16th December, 1964, it abolished the posts of sub-heads with effect from 17th December, 1964 and reverted the respondent No. 3 to his substantive post of a clerk in the grade of Rs. 110/200. It so appears that a representation was made by the respondent No. 2 to the managing committee challenging the order of his reversion, but his representation did not bear any fruit. The respondent No. 2, therefore, preferred to file an application before the Authority (respondent No. 1) appointed under the Act, claiming that the society has illegally deducted his wages to the extent of Rs 303,06 pertaining to the period commencing from 17th December, 1964 to 30th November, 1965. The petitioner society contested the claim of the respondent, inter alia, on the ground that it is not a case of deduction of wages and, therefore, the respondent No. 1 had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim of the respondent No. 2. The Authority under the Act examined witnesses on behalf of the parties and after hearing the arguments of learned counsel for the parties, it held that since the respondent No. 2, according to the distribution of work among the clerks, continued to do the same work which he was doing as a sub head before the abolition of that post and discharged the higher responsibilities, he was entitled to draw the salary of the sub-head and in this view of the matter passed the impugned order directing the society to pay to the respondent No. 2 salary in the senior scale of sub head from 25th February, 1965 to 30th November, 1965. It may be mentioned here that the claim of the respondent No. 2 for higher salary before 25th of February, 1965 had become time-barred under the Act. The petitioner society has challenged the impugned order of the authority under the Act on various grounds but learned counsel for the petitioner has directed his argument mainly on this ground that the authority under the Act had no jurisdiction to decide this matter as it was not a case of deduction of wages but it was really a dispute about the reduction in rank of the respondent No. 2 which was not within the jurisdiction of the authority. No reply has been filed by the respondents. Mr. Mridul, appearing on behalf of respondent No 2, however, orally argued the case of the respondent and submitted that the definition of 'wages' as given in sec. 2{vi) of the Act is so wide that it covers the respondent No. 2's case as placed by him before the authority. In order to determine the controversy, it will be necessary to examine the definition of 'wages' as given in clause (vi) of sec. 3 of the Act minutely. 'wages', according to this definition, 'means all remuneration (whether by way of salary, allowances or otherwise) expressed in terms of employment, express or implied, were fulfilled, be payable to a person employed in respect of his employment or of work done in such employment. ' This definition also includes other payments to the employee but as that portion of the definition is not relevant for deciding the controversy raised in this writ petition, I have re-produced here only that portion of the definition of the term "wages" which is relevant. The argument of Mr. Mridul is that if his client is made to do the work of a higher responsibility which entitles him to draw the salary of the higher post, then he can raise his claim before the authority (respondent No. 1) under the provisions of the Act to direct the petitioner to pay salary of the higher post because the definition of the term "wages", according to him, covers the remuneration for the work done in the employment. In other words, he submits that if the work is done by an employee in course of his employment and if that work entitles him for higher wages of superior post then those wages of the higher post cannot be denied to the employee and the employer can be asked under the provisions of the Act by the Authority to pay the higher wages to the employee, and if the employee is paid less than what he ought to have been paid for the work done by him in the course of his employment then it shall be taken that the employer has deducted the wages of the employee. Learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, submits that a person can claim wages or payment by way of remuneration for the work done in the employment in which he has been engaged by the employer. According to him, if a person has been appointed as a clerk and even if he is made to discharge the duty of a higher post while acting as a clerk, then he cannot claim wages of the post in which he is never appointed by his employer even though he is required to discharge the responsibilities of a higher post. According to the definition of "wages" a person is entitled to claim remuneration by way of salary, allowances or otherwise expressed in terms of money or capable of being so expressed which would be payable to him in respect of the employment or for the work done by him in that employment. This definition makes it clear that an employee can claim remuneration in respect of any employment given to him or in respect of any work done by him in that employment. The language in which the term "wages" has been defined is quite unambiguous and it does not admit of more than one interpretation. According to the definition, an employee is entitled to claim the remuneration of his employment or the work done in his employment. This necessarily takes the Court to find out the true meaning and the scope of the expression "employment" as used in the definition. The expression 'employment", in my opinion, covers the terms and conditions of the appointment of a person to ascertain post. In the present case, after the abolition of the post of the "sub-head" respondent No. 2 was appointed as a clerk and therefore he was employed to do the job of a clerk and draw his remuneration in the grade prescribed for a clerk. If a person is required to discharge the work of a different nature than what is ordinarily required for a particular employment, then he cannot claim under the definition of "wages" the salary of the post to which he was never appointed as it cannot be said that he did the job of higher responsibility during the course of his employment. His employment is definitely for the post|of a clerk and even if he was required to discharge the function of a job other than that of a clerk, then he can definitely demand his promotion to the higher post and claim higher salary by raising industrial dispute but cannot claim any relief under sec. 15 of the Act which has a limited scope of granting relief regarding the deduction of wages or delay in payment of wages. The claim raised by the respondent No. 2, in my opinion, does not fall within the scope of the deduction of wages as it is a claim for allowing wages in higher or superior post in which the respondent No. 3 was never employed. Under the scheme of sec. 15 of the Act, which deals with the deduction of wages or delay in payment of wages, no claim for salary of higher or superior post can be made as the deduction of wages or delay in payment of wages has a direct relationship with the wages which an employee is entitled to draw under the terms of the contract of his service. In order to determine the wages it is necessary, therefore, to see as to what remuneration could be claimed by an employee in terms of his employment. Undoubtedly, the respondent No. 2 was reverted to his substantive post of a clerk after abolishing the post of "sub-heads" by the management of the society and therefore the terms of his employment do not entitle him to claim wages of a post other than that of a clerk. Even if this submission of the respondent No. 3 is admitted that he was required to discharge the duties of a "sub-head" even after his reversion to the post of a clerk, he cannot claim the wages of a "sub head" under the provisions of the Act as the term of his employment does not permit him to raise that claim and demand the wages of a "sub head". He was only a clerk and he could claim the wages of a clerk. If he felt aggrieved by his demotion from the post of a sub-head to that of a clerk he could have raised an industrial dispute the forum for which was entirely different from the one chosen by the respondent No. 2. In my opinion, the respondent No. 2 cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the authority under the Act by claiming that his wages have been deducted unless the term of his employment entitled him to claim the wages of the sub-head The bare reading of the term "wages" as defined by the Act shows that the remuneration must be payable to the person employed in terms of him employment, express or implied, and it is only then that remuneration can be claimed as wages by him. The expression "or of work done in the employment" as used in the Act while defining the term "wages" cannot be given a wider meaning so as to entitle the employee to claim the wages of other employment in which he has not actually been employed. In the present circumstances when a specific order was passed by the management abolishing the post of sub-heads and the respondent No. 2 was reverted to his substantive post of a clerk, then he cannot claim under the terms of his employment the remuneration for a post on which his appointment was never made. A person who was specifically reverted from the post of a subhead cannot therefore be allowed to claim the remuneration of the post which by the same order stood abolished.
(3.) THE argument of Mr. Mridul for widening the scope of term "wages" can be tested from other angle also. If the order passed by the authority is allowed to stand, then its effect would be to nullify the order of reversion of the respondent No. 2 from the post of subhead to that of a clerk, and in the garb of exercising a jurisdiction conferred on the authority under sec. 15, it shall be deciding a dispute whether reversion of the petitioner was justified or not. Such a dispute in my opinion should go to the Industrial Tribunal if the respondent No. 2 really felt aggrieved by such an order of reversion. In Anant Bhagoji vs. Captain Superintendent Indian Naval Dockyard. Bombay (1), a dispute was raised by a painter who could not qualify himself by passing a test and was therefore re-classified by the railway authorities as Brush Painter. He claimed the wages of a Painter according to the re-classified grade. In that case the petitioner first of all applied to the Captain Superintendent of Indian Naval Dockyard, Bombay claiming that the revision of pay scale resulting in reduction of his wages was illegal and that he was entitled to receive wages according to the notification issued on 31-12-1947. When he failed to get any relief from the aforesaid officer, he moved the authority under the Payment of Wages Act for the refund of Rs. 240/- which, according to him, were illegally deducted from his wages. The learned Judges of the Bombay High Court, after hearing the parties at length, came to the conclusion that the Payment of Wages authority had no jurisdiction to entertain such application because if such an application was entertained by the authority, then it would necessarily require the authority to go into the question whether the petitioner was unlawfully re-classified as a Brush Painter even though he was entitled to be classified otherwise. In other words, the learned Judges held that if the Payment of Wages Authority is called upon to decide such a dispute then it would be tantamount to conferring new jurisdiction on the authority to decide a dispute whether the petitioner should be upgraded in another scale. Their Lordships of the High Court, therefore, in such circumstances dismissed the claim of the petitioner on the ground that the Authority under the Payment of Wages Act had no jurisdiction to entertain it. While coming to this conclusion, the learned Judges relied on the authority of the Supreme Court in A. V. D. Costs, Divisional Engineer, G. I. P. Rly. vs. B. C. Patel (2), where it has been held by the Supreme Court that the authority set up under sec. 15, Payment of Wages Act. 1936 is indisputably a tribunal of limited jurisdiction. Its power to hear and determine disputes must necessarily be found in the provisions of the Act. Such a tribunal, it is undoubted, cannot determine any controversy which is not within the ambit of the provisions of the Act. According to their Lordships of the Supreme Court, the Authority has the jurisdiction to decide what actually the terms of the contract between the parties were, that is to say, to determine the actual wages according to the terms of the contract and the authority has no jurisdiction to determine the question of potential wages. In view of the above referred decisions of the Supreme Court and the Bombay High Court. I am of opinion that in the instant case the claim set up by the respondent No. 2 would require the authority to investigate whether the reversion of the respondent No. 2 was illegal and it is only after coming to the conclusion about the illegality of the reversion of the petitioner that it can pass order directing the petitioner to pay the amount of the claim set up by respondent No. 2. This matter whether the respondent No. 2 was rightly reverted or not and whether after reversion the respondent was entitled to draw the salary of the post of a subhead as he was made to discharge the functions of a sub-head, does not fall within the jurisdiction of respondent No. 1 and the authority, therefore, cannot adjudicate the claim of the respondent No. 2 as raised by him. The impugned order passed by the respondent No. 1 is without jurisdiction and it cannot, therefore, be sustained. For the reasons mentioned above, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned order passed on 2nd of May, 1967 is quashed. In the circumstances of this case, I pass no order as to costs. . ;