- (1.) THIS case originally came-up before the Board as reference u/s 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, '56 by the Settlement Commissioner. The matter was considered and a DB of this Board on 10 5-67 decided that the matter should be treated as a revision u/s 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. On behalf of the ex-jagir-dar of Kuchaman, two preliminary objections were raised that the Board of Revenue did not exercise the powers of Director of Land Records and further that the Board was not competent to suo moto entertain a revision u/s. 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. A D. B. of the Board vide their decision dated 29-11-68 over-ruled these objections and hence the case has been listed for being heard on merits.
(2.) THE learned counsel appearing for the ex-jagirdar of Kuchaman raised the following preliminary objections: - (i) THE Board of Revenue should not interfere with the impugned order of the Assistant Settlement Officer dated 14-12-1964, because this order was appealable and no appeal was filed on behalf of the State Government. THE learned counsel cited Mohan v/s Jeevan (1969 RRD 544) in support of his contention; (ii) Secondly it was contended that a DB of this Board have held in this very case that the Board is the Director of Land Records vide their decision reported in 1967 RRD 39 and that the right of second appeal would lie to the Board as Director of Land Records and in view of this, a revision was incompetent, (iii) thirdly, it was urged that the State Government had not filed a memo of revision alongwith a copy of the impugned order and that therefore, the mandatory provisions of Rule 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual vol. I had been violated. He cited 1965 RRD 17 (Sohanlal Chajjulal vs. Bolya) and 1968 RRD 471 (Mohammad Ishaq vs. State) in support of this contention; and (iv) lastly it was argued that there are two contradictory judgments by the Board, namely, a judgment reported in 1967 RRD 39 and given by a D. B. of this Board on 29-11-1968, and that this conflict has not been resolved. THE learned counsel would, therefore, have this court to draw the conclusion that the Board is the Director of Land Records. The learned Government Advocate contended that preliminary objections raised on behalf of the ex-jagirdar of Kuchaman had already been heard and disposed of vide a judgment of the DB of this Board on 29-11-68, and that the learned counsel could not exercise an unlimited right of raising objections. However, he countered the first objection by his submission that revision is a right of the court and not a right of a party, and the Board has unlimited revisional powers, as has been held in State vs. Guman Singh (1962 RRD 24 ). In regard to the section it was contended by the learned Government Advocate that the latest judgment of the Board which has duly considered the relevant notifications issued by the State Government, is that the Board is not the Director of Land Records, and therefore, there is no question of second appeal lying to the Board. It was, therefore, urged by him that the revision is competent and the objection raised has no force in it. As regards the third objection, the learned Government] Advocate averred that the rulings cited are inapplicable and that in the instant case, the Board has suo moto exercised the power of revision conferred u/s. 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, and that under these circumstances there was no question of filing a memo of revision and making compliance of the mandatary provisions of R 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual. He cited Ramkishore vs. Narsingh (1968 RRD 99) as a complete answer to this objection. It was finally argued by the learned Government Advocate that an application for reviewing the order dated 29-11-68 has been rejected and, therefore, order given by the Board had been confirmed and there was no occasion now for challenging the same. I have duly considered the preliminary objections and the controversion thereof made by the learned Government Advocate, and I am inclined to agree with the contentions made by the latter. I do not see any conflict between the judgments of the Board reported in 1967 RRD 39 in this very case and that given by another DB of the Board on 29-11-68. The observations of the Board in their judgment dated 12-4 66 reported in 1967 RRD 39, that the Board is the Director of Land Records, was by way of obiter dicta. The point under their consideration was whether the Board could entertain a reference u/s, 82 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, and they held that the Board could not do so and they ordered that the Board should entertain a suo moto revision. In this judgment, the Board did not consider the Notification No. F. 2 (172) Revenue/63 dated 11-6-63, at all. The DB of this Board in their judgment dated 29-11-68 after a due consideration of the said Notification and the other relevant provisions of law and notifications relevant there to, has come to the conclusion that the Board of Revenue does not exercise the powers of the Director of Land Records. This is a well settled view and I do not agree that there is any conflict between the two judgments. Similarly, the objection that there is no memo of revision and that mandatory provisions of rule 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual have been violated, is also devoid of substance. The Board have suo moto entertained a revision u/s 84 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. In view of this circumstance, there was no occasion for the State Government, either to file a memo of revision or to make compliance of the mandatory provisions of R. 17 of the Rajasthan Revenue Courts Manual. The preliminary objections are frivolous, and are therefore rejected. The case was heard on merits also. The learned Government Advocate strongly contested the impugned order of the A. S. O. dated 14-12 1956. He contended that Khasra No. 12 in village Panwari Tehsil Nawa measuring 2163 bighas 9 biswas was entered in the settlement records as "germumkin Pahad" and as "bila-lagani", and that the ASO had no jurisdiction to change the entry and is not competent to declare it as khudkasht. He characterised the impugned order as absurd, as unculturable and could not be declared as khudkasht. Adverting to the statements of Kamdar Shivraj and witnesses - Allahbux and Ragunath Prashad, produced on behalf of the ex-jagirdar, the learned counsel contended that they had never averred that the land was in the khudkasht of the thikana. He, therefore, attacked the impugned order on the ground that it went far beyond even the claim of the ex jagirdar and the assertions of his witnesses. The learned counsel for the ex-jagirdar of Kuchaman argued that the thikana was resumed on 1-8-1954 and the demand slip dated 19-5-55 for a sum of Rs. 2063/-showed the disputed khasra number and the rent rate of 10| annas per bighas, has been shown in this demand slip of the thikana. He drew my attention to the girda-wari slip for the Smt. 2011 in which the land has been shown as khudkasht. The same entry had been repeated in the demand slip for the Smt. 2012, the learned counsel further referred to the khatoni for Smt 2003 of the former Jodhpur State and the land had been shown as Makbuja-khud. He further urged that in the Girdawari of Smt. 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017, khasra No. 12 has been shown as in the thikana's possession. It was further contended by the learned counsel that the lower court had he jurisdiction to decide rightly or wrongly and there was no ground for interference in the instant case. He further contended that the learned Government Advocate had been negligent and the Board should not interfere due to his laches. He averred that the scope of revision is very limited as held by the Supreme Court in AIR 1968 SC 202. During his rejoinder the learned Government Advocate pointed out a glaring irregularity in the impugned order. He submitted that the ASO's order dated 28-7-55 which was passed after hearing objections and both the parties, it became final and in this, khasra No. 12 was not included as khudkasht and it was not so indicated in the final parcha distributed. He submitted that the ASO had no jurisdiction to reopen the case without taking recourse to the review proceedings. . The ASO had failed to issue notice to the State Government, while reopening this case and making changes in respect of K. No. 12. As regards the demand slips, he contended that the details given on the back showing khasra numbers were not signed and authenticated by any officer. As regards the khatoni for Smt. 2003, he argued that the ex jagirdar has failed to produce it when the first judgment of the AsO was given on 28-7-55. Moreover, the entire jagir land of the thikana was Makbujakhud before the jagir was resumed on 1-8-54. This Khatoni did not prove that the land was in the khudkasht of the ex-jagirdar. I have given due consideration to the arguments advanced on behalf of the parties on the merits of this case. The demand slips to which my attention has been drawn are mere scraps of paper. These documents have not been signed even by the patwari and the details of the khasra numbers given at the back, appear to be an after thought and the entries made at the instigation of the thikana. They have no evidentiary value in the absence of their authentication by a responsible revenue officer. As regards entries in the khasra girdawari, the Board have, in their judgment in Pannesingh vs. Gumansingh (1964 RRD 101), held that the khasra girdawari is not the record of rights and, therefore, no reliance can be placed on the entries in the khasra girdawari which also appear to have been made in collusion with the thikana. The Khatoni-bandobast for Smt. 2003 of the former Jodhpur State cannot, in any way, help the ex-jagirdar, as before the resumption of the jagir on 1-8-54, the entire Sivay-chak land of the thikana was in the possession of the thikana and therefore "makbujaj thikana. " This cannot lead to the inference that the land was in the khudkasht of the thikana. As the land was entered as "germumkin Pahar", the question of cultivation cannot arise and the entry has been made by the AsO in a malafide manner. Lastly, I find great force in the argument of the learned Government Advocate that the impugned order is entirely illegal. The AsO had invited objections and after hearing them, decided the matter on 28-7-55, and his order, therefore, became final. As a result, when the settlement parcha was issued, khasra No. 12 was not included in this. The AsO had, therefore, no jurisdiction to reopen the case without resort to review proceedings. He could not make any changes in the settlement parchas earlier issued by him without notice to the State Government and taking recourse to regular proceedings for review of his earlier order.
(3.) THE result is that the order of the A S. O. dated 14-12-1956 is held as entirely illegal and malafide and is, therefore, set aside. THE necessary changes in the land records and other relevant records may, therefore, be made accordingly. .;