JAGAT NARAYAN, C. J. - (1.) THESE two writ petitions have been referred by a Learned Single Judge because he was of the opinion that the decision of another learned Single Judge in Harishchander Singh vs. Regional Transport Authority (1) requires reconsideration.
(2.) THE relevant facts are these. THE petitioner is one out of 17 existing operators on the Bikaner-Dungargarh-Sardarshahar route. Formerly there was no road between Dungargarh and Ratangarh. A new road was later on constructed and applications were filed by different persons for grant of permits over Bikaner-Dungargarh-Ratangarh route and over Bikaner-Dungargarh-Ratangarh-Churu route. THEse applications were published in the Gazette from time to time, and a meeting of the Regional Transport Authority was convened on 25-6-69 to consider them. Neither the petitioner nor any other person filed any objection against the grant of permits on these routes to the applicants in accordance with the provisions of sec. 57 (3 ). On the date of hearing the petitioner appeared before the Regional Transport Authority and filed an application that it could not grant any permit on the Bikaner-Churu route as it had not fixed the limit of permits as required under sec 47 (3 ). THE R. T. A. thereupon proceeded to fix the scope of both he routes. THE scope of Bikaner-Churu route was fixed at 5 permits providing 2 return services daily. THE scope of Bikaner-Ratangarh route was fixed at 5 permits providing 6 return trips daily THEreafter at the same meeting the R. T. A. considered the rival claims of the applicants for permits on these two routes. On the Bikaner-Churu route it granted 5 permits to respondent No. 2 to 6 of writ petition No. 1134/69. On the Bikaner Ratangarh route the scope of which was fixed at 5 permits it granted 3 permits to respondent No. 2 to 4 of writ petition No. 1135/69 as these 3 persons alone had applied for grant of permit on this route. Girdharilal filed the present writ petitions challenging the grant of permits to these respondents on 22-8-69. It was contended before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the petitioner that as the R. T. A. had not fixed the limit under sec. 47 (3) by means of an independent order of an anterior date the grant of permits on the routes was without jurisdiction and could be challenged by filing a writ petition. The learned Single Judge was inclined to accept this argument. Chandmal J. had taken a different view in Harishchander Singh vs. Regional Transport Authority (1) and therefore he made this reference. The view taken by Chandmal J. cannot be sustained in view of the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in R. O. Naidu vs. Addl. S. T. A. T. Madras (2 ). But it was not held even in that case that the grant of permit without fixing the limit under sec. 47 (3) was null and void. This matter was considered by us in Smt. Shakuntala Devi vs. Transport Appellate Tribunal Jaipur (D. B. Civil Special Appeal No. 1 13/69 decided on 28-1-70) and we held that the grant of permit in such a case would no doubt be illegal as being against the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, but it would not be null and void. The permit so granted is not a nullity and has to be challenged by filing an appeal against the grant of permit to the Transport Appellate Tribunal and this Court will not entertain a writ petition against the grant of permit unless an appeal has been tiled before the T. A, T. and has failed. These two writ petitions cannot therefore be entertained by this Court. It may be mentioned here that in this case the R. T. A. first took a decision to open these two new routes on the ground that a road connecting Dungargarh and Ratangarh had been newly constructed and that it was necessary to provide direct services between Bikaner and Churu and Ratangarh respectively. The R. T. A. then fixed the limit of permits on these two new routes. Thereafter it proceeded to consider rival claims of the applicants for the Bikaner-Churu route and granted 5 permits to the 5 respondents. After that it granted 3 permits to the 3 respondents for Bikaner-Ratangarh route. The scope of this route was fixed at 5 permits, but as there were only 3 applicants 3 permits were granted, It is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the procedure followed by the Regional Transport Authority in fixing the limits was in accordance with law. Suffice it to say that the order of the R. T. A. deciding to open the new routes and fixing the limit under sec. 47 (3) is revisable by the State Transport Authority on an application to it under sec 64-A and the petitioner or any other existing operator had sufficient interest to challenge that order This was so held in Lakshmi Narain vs. State Transport Authority, U. P. (3) and J. N. Wahal vs. S. M. Jan (4 ). The petitioner could have challenged the order granting permits to the respondents by filing appeals to the T. A. T. provided that he had filed representations against the grant of permits under sec. 57 (3) within 30 days from the date of the publication of the applications. He could have opposed the grant of the permits on the ground that the new routes should not be opened or on the ground that the limit under sec. 47 (3) should first be fixed and then applications should be invited for the grant of permits on these new routes. In R. O. Naidu vs. Addl. S. T. A. T. Madras (1) the permits were granted without fixing the limit under sec. 47 (3) by the R. T. A. The grant of permits was opposed by the existing operators before the R. T. A. on the ground that there was no need to open the route. The Transport Appellate Tribunal set aside the order granting permits on the ground that limits under sec. 47 (3) had not been fixed. This order was upheld by the High Court as well as by the Supreme Court. In the present case the R. T. A, fixed the limit before granting the permits. But this was done at the same meeting. In R. O. Naidu's case (1) their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that first there should be a determination by the R. T. A. Under sec. 47 (3) of the number of stage carriages for which stage carriage permits may be granted on that route and thereafter applications for stage carriage permits on that route should be entertained. This was the view taken by the T. A, T. and the High Court and this view was held to be correct. Their Lordships proceeded to observe - "if contrary view is taken it will throw open the door for manipulations and nepotism There may be possibility of the personality of the applicant influencing the decision of the R. T. A. on the question of need for a stage carriage permit on the route and thereby public interest which should be the main consideration while taking a decision under sec. 47 (3) may suffer. If we accept the view taken by the R. T. A. as correct, an operator who happened to apply lor the route first will be in a commanding position. The R. T. A. will have no opportunity to chose between competing operators and hence public interest might suffer. " In Sri Raja Rajeshwari Bus Service vs. R. T. A. (5) the Regional Trans-Authority invited applications for the grant of a stage carriage permit on a new route. Three applications were filed which were published on 12-1-68 and 8-2 68 was fixed as the date on or before which the representations in connection with the applications should be submitted furnishing copies thereof simultaneously to the applicants. The petitioner who was an existing operator in the area did not file any representation or objection within the prescribed time. He sent an application by registered post before the date fixed for the meeting praying that proceedings under sec. 47 (3) should be taken before consideration of the applications for permit on the merits. He appeared before the R. T. A. at the hearing and made the same submission. One permit was granted by the R. T. A. The petitioner challenged the grant before the High Court by filing a writ petition under article 226 of the Constitution. It was observed - "there is no dispute that, for the route in question, there has been no prior determination under sec. 47 (3 ). But the question is whether the proceedings are liable to be challenged under article 226 and quashed at the instance of the petitioner, who had admittedly made no representation under sec. 57 (3) within the prescribed time. There can be no doubt - and it has been so held following the decisions of the Supreme Court - that sec. 47 envisages two stages of inquiry, (1) fixation of number of permits under sec. 47 (3) and (ii) consideration thereafter of the appli-cations for the grant of permit and representations, if any, by persons mentioned in sec. 57 (3 ). The contention of Mr. K. K. Venugopal that the petitioner could not, in proceedings under sec. 57 (3) raise objection as to want of a prior determination under sec. 47 (3), is devoid of merits. The rule that where an inquiry under sec. 47 (3) is necessary it must precede the disposal of applications for permit on their merits, does not preclude the raising of all germane objections and relevant representations within the time prescribed. Once the objections raised and representations made call for a determination under sec. 47 (3), under the rulings it is incumbent upon the Regional Transport Authority to take proceedings under sec. 47 (3) first before embarking upon the merits of the applications under sec. 57. Here the petitioner has not notified his objections to the grant of permit on the route, and sub-section (3) and (4) of Sec. 57 read together preclude the Regional Transport Authority from hearing the petitioner at the inquiry under tec. 57 (3 ). Sec. 57 (4) bars the authority from considering any representation in connection with an application referred to in sub-section (3), unless the application is made in writing before the appointed date. In Purushethom Bhai Punambhai Patel vs. State Transport Appellate Authority, Madhya Pradesh (6) the Supreme Court held - "we consider that the terms of S, 57 (3) and (4) of the Act preclude any party who had notified its objections in time to be heard at any stage of the proceedings original or appellate in relation to the grant of the permit on an application duly advertised under Sec. 57 (3 ). " For the above reasons the learned Judges of the Madras High Court declined to interfere in the matter under article 226 of the Constitution. This decision is fully applicable to the facts of the present cases. A Division Bench of this Court held in Sharma Roadways v. Sohanlal Soni (7) that a party failing to file a representation within the prescribed period was not entitled to hearing by the Regional Transport Authority and was not entitled to get relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution either. It was contended on behalf of the petitioner that he is mainly interested in challenging the order passed u/s. 47 (3) and that the Motor Vehicles Act does not provide a specific legal remedy to enable him to challenge that order. It was argued that the remedy by way of a revision application provided under section 64-A was not a specific legal remedy. Reliance was placed on some observations made in M. Basha v. C. Sultan Beig (8), In that case an order was passed by the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority granting an application for renewal of a permit and this was challenged by filing a writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It was contended that the petitioner should have availed of the remedy provided under the Motor Vehicles Act. Their Lordships held that no appeal lay under sec. 64 against an order passed by the Secretary. Nor did any revision lie under sec. 64-A as it applied only to orders passed by the Regional Transport Authority. That section runs as follows: "the State Transport Authority may, either on its own motion or on an application made to it, call for the record of any case in which an order has been made by a Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies, and if it appears to the State Transport Authority that the order made by the Regional Transport Authority is improper or illegal, the State Transport Autho-tity may pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit: Provided that the State Transport Authority shall not entertain any application from a person aggrieved by an order of a Regional Transport Authority, unless the application is made within thirty days from the date of the order: Provided further that the State Transport Authority shall not pass an order under this section prejudicial to any person without giving him a reasonable opportunity of being heard. "
(3.) THE learned Judges proceeded to observe that even assuming that the section applies to the order in question it cannot be said that the petitioners had a specific legal remedy which would bar a writ of certiorari. "as laid down in A. R. Sarin v. B. C. Patil (9) by Chief Justice Chagla, specific legal remedy, which would bar a writ of certiorari can only mean that the petitioner must have a right to approach a court and he must have a right to a remedy if his case was just. Applying this principle, it cannot be said that the petitioners have a right to approach the State Transport Authority under sec. 64-A, and have a right to remedy if their case was just. . . . . . . . . . . . . In this case also, Sec. 64-A of the Motor Vehicles Act only deals with the power of the State Transport Authority to interfere with an order of the Regional Transport Authority and not with the rights of a party who is affected by the said order. A party may approach the State Transport Authority but he has no right to do so nor has he a right to a remedy because the State Transport Authority may refuse a remedy under this section. " It is clear that the above observations are obiter. Further with great respect we are unable to agree with them. Sec. 64-A expressly makes provision for an application by an aggrieved person to the State Transport Authority to call for the record of any case in which an order ha$ been made by the Regional Transport Authority and in which no appeal lies and to pass such order in relation to the case as it deems fit. An aggrieved person has thus a right to approach the State Transport Authority. We may in this connection again refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Lakshmi Narain v. State Transport Authority, U. P. (3) in which it was held that a revision application under sec. 64-A lies against an order made under sec. 47 (3 ). The remedy by way of a revision application under sec. 64-A is therefore a specific legal remedy which was available to the applicant. Further this remedy is fully efficacious as the State Transport Authority is competent to pass such order as it deems fit. If on a revision application under sec 64-A the State Transport Authority is of the opinion that the route should not be opened then it is competent to it to cancel all the permits granted by the Regional Transport Authority on the new route opened by it. Further in case the State Transport Authority is of the opinion that the limit fixed by the Regional Transport Authority is too high it can reduce the limit and pass an appropriate order. In the result we dismiss both the writ petitions. We however leave the parties to bear their own costs. . ;