- (1.) THIS is an appeal under sec. 224 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, against the Revenue Appellate Authority, Kotah, by which he set aside the judgment of the Sub-Divisional Officer, Bharatpur dated 31-3-1967 decreeing the suit of the present appellant for declaration and redemption. The appellant had filed the suit chiming that the land in question (7 khasra numbers measuring in all 16 bighas 13 biswas) was his khudkasht, that he had mortgaged it to the respondents in Samvat 2007 for 10 years, for a sum of Rs. 500/-, but that the respondents refused to return the land to him on the expiry of the period The case of the respondents (defendants in the suit) was that they were in cultivatory possession of the land by virtue of a Patta by the appellant (plaintiff in the suit ). The relationship between them was that of landlord and tenant. They had in due course been entered [in the records as khatedar tenants and could not be declared as trespasser and ejected.
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant attacked the judgment of the R. A. A. as not being a proper judgment in the eye of law, as it was in total disregard of the mandatory provisions of O. 41 R. 31 of the Civil Procedure Code and judicial pronouncements laying down the essential requirements for judgments of lower appellate courts. He cited the following rulings in support: Rajasthan High Court - (i) Radhabai vs. Parasram (1961 RLW 627), (ii) Dhanraj vs. Hirachand (1963 RLW 316), Rajasthan Board of Revenue - (i) Govt. of Rajasthan vs. Khumansingh (1958 RRD 222), (ii) Mana vs. Roopa (1962 RRD 183), (iii) Pusha vs. Pusha (1962 RRD 282), (iv) Mavasi vs. Balwant (1964 RRD 139), (v) Kesa vs. Dhana (1964 RRD 290), (vi) Shivbux vs. Bhanwar Kanwar (1965 RRD 242), (vii) Moti Shankar vs. Ganeshlal (1969 RRD 213 ). Learned counsel argued that in the present case, the first appellate court had not dealt with the various issues framed by the trial court. Just one paragraph (para 2) of the R. A. A. 's judgment disposes of the evidence and arguments. Half of this para too, only repeats what was said in the plaint and in the written statement of the defendants. He added that as many as a dozen witnesses had been put up at the trial (2 by the plaintiff and 4 by the defendant ). The evidence of none of these has even been mentioned in the R. A. A. 's judgment. He said that this was thus an example of a judgment in complete violation of the requirements of O. 41 R. 31 of the CPC and of the standards laid down in the judicial pronouncements cited by him for judgments of lower appellate courts. He would seek a decision by us on this point first. If we accept his contention, there can be only one result, that is, that the case must be remanded to the first appellate court. We have gone through the rulings cited. Their cumulative effect on the point raised by the learned counsel for the appellant may be summarised as follows: (a) The provisions of O. 41 R. 31 CPC are mandatory and the judgment of an appellate court must state (i) the points for determination, (ii) the decisions thereon, and (iii) the reasons for the decisions. (b) This rule applies to affirming judgments an well as reversing judgements of the appellate courts. (c) The first appellate court must discuss, analyse and make an appreciation of the evidence independently in respect of the issues involved, and give a self contained judgment. The judgment need not be very elaborate in the case of a judgment of affirmance, but must all the same substantially comply with O. 41 R. 31 CPC. In the case of a reversing judgment full and detailed reasons with reference to the evidence must be given for the reversal. (d) It would not be proper for a subordinate court to decide an appeal merely on one or two issues and refrain from giving a finding on other issues. It would not also be proper for such a court to discard any part of the evidence in a general and sweeping manner without discussing it. (e) A finding of fact, in order to be respected by the second appellate court, must be based on proper appreciation of evidence. After careful consideration, we agree with the learned counsel for the appellant that the judgment of the R. A. A. in this case falls far short of the requirements in respect of a reversing judgment as indicated in para 6 above. The judgment is extremely laconic. The evidence has not been discussed and detailed reasons have not been given for reversing the judgment of the trial court. The judgment must, therefore, be set aside, as involving a substantial defect. We accordingly accept this second appeal, set aside the judgment of the R. A. A. and remand the case to him for a fresh judgment after giving to the parties an opportunity of being heard and keeping in view the provisions of O. 41 R. 31 of the CPC and the requirements laid down in the rulings referred to above regarding judgments of appellate courts. .;