BILAS RAI Vs. CHAIN SINGH

LAWS(RAJ)-1970-1-23

HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN

Decided on January 05,1970

BILAS RAI Appellant

VERSUS

CHAIN SINGH Respondents

JUDGEMENT

LODHA, J. - (1.) -
(2.) THIS is a plaintiff-landlords* second appeal arising out of a suit for arrears of rent and ejectment. The respondents mortgaged the suit property with possession in favour of the appellants Bilas Rai on 7-9-1956, and took back the same on lease from the mortgagees on a monthly rent of Rs. 20/ -. The respondents also executed a rent note in respect of the premises in question (Ex. 1 ). It appears that the appellants also previously filed a suit for arrears of rent for the period commencing from 7-2-1957 to 6-2-1960. This suit was registered as Civil Original Suit No. 47 of 1960 and was decreed on 28-7-1962. The respondent-defendants did not pay rent even thereafter. Consequently the plaintiff-appellants filed the present suit for arrears of rent for the period commencing from 7 8-1960 to 7-1-63 and also for ejectment on the ground of default in payment of rent as well as on the ground of bonafide reasonable personal necessity. The defendants raised several objections and pleaded that neither they had committed any default in payment of rent nor the premises in question were required reasonable by the plaintiffs. After recording the evidence produced by the parties the trial court decreed the plaintiffs' suit of rent as well as for ejectment on the ground that it had been proved that the defendant had committed default in payment of rent and had thereby incurred the liability of being ejected. It, however, recorded a finding against the plaintiffs on the question of reasonable and bonafide personal-necessity. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree of the trial court the defendants preferred appeal which has been allowed by the District Judge, Jhunjhunu and the plaintiff appellants' suit for ejectment has been dismissed. Consequently they have come in second appeal to this Court. No-body appears on behalf of the respondents and therefore I have heard this appeal ex-parte. The only ground on which the decree for ejectment passed by the trial court has been set aside by the first appellate court is that there was no legal termination of the defendants' tenancy inasmuch as it is mentioned in the rent note that the plaintiffs would be entitled to evict the defendants after serving one month's notice on them when they required the premises in question. It has been held by the learned District Judge that one month's notice had been properly served as required by sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, but the notice cannot be considered valid because according to the terms of the rent note notice of termination of tenancy could be given only in case the plaintiffs required the premises and since it has been found that the premises in question are not required reasonably and bonafide by the plaintiffs for their personal necessity, the notice of eviction is ineffective. The view taken by the learned District Judge is untenable on the very face of it. Under the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 the plaintiffs are undoubtedly entitled to evict the defendants on any of the grounds mentioned in Sec. 13 (1) and one of those grounds is the failure on the part of the tenant to have paid or tendered the amount of rent due from him for six months. The clause contained in the rent note that whenever the plaintiffs require the premises in question, they would give one month's notice to the defendants, cannot be interpreted to mean that the plaintiffs must prove their reasonable and bonafide necessity. This clause only means that the plaintiffs would be entitled to get possession of the premises in question from the defendants when they so desired subject to the condition of giving one month's notice. It does not mean that the plaintiffs must establish their reasonable and bonafide necessity. That is only one of the requirement of law for eviction contained in the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. If the interpretation given by the learned District Judge were accepted it would mean that even if some of the conditions laid down in Sec. 13 (1) were fulfilled the plaintiffs would not be entitled to evict the defendants unless they establish their bonafide and reasonable personal necessity. In other words according to the interpretation put by the learned District Judge the plaintiffs would not be entitled to evict the defendants even after they had sublet the premises or altered the condition of the premises or may have violated any of the conditions prescribed in Sec. 13 (1) of the Act. I have no doubt in my mind that the interpretation put by the learned District Judge would make the position ridiculous. The learned District Judge has relied on Gopal Chandra v. Bhutnath (1 ). I have gone through this ruling and am constrained to observe that it is wide off the mark and has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It was a case under the Bengal Tenancy Act and the point raised before the learned Judges of the High Court was that a notice had not been served in accordance with the provisions of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the learned Judges remanded the case to the lower appellate court to come to a finding as to whether a notice had been duly served in accordance with the terras of the lease. ? Since the only ground on the basis of which the appellants suit for ejectment has been dismissed by the first appellate court falls, there is no alternative left to me but to set aside the judgment and decree of the first appellate court. Accordingly I allow this appeal, set aside the judgment and decree by the learned District Judge, Jhunjhunu and restore that of the trial court. Since the respondents have not put in appearance to contest the appeal, there will be no order as to costs. .;

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