BHARGAVA, J. - (1.) THIS appeal is directed against the judgment and decree of the learned District Judge, Jaipur District dated 31st May, 1954 dismissing the plaintiff's suit for recovery of Rs. 13,000/ -.
(2.) THE main contention which has been urged before us is that the learned District Judge was in error in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation. The plaintiff's case was that his father after obtaining the sanction of the Jaipur Government advanced loans to the defendant's father. On settlement of accounts on 28th June, 1933 a sum of Rs. 5691/14/- was found due in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant's father died in 1935 and as the defendant then happened to be a minor, the Jagir was placed under the management of the Court of Wards under the Jaipur Court of Wards Act, 1925 (hereinafter called the Act ). In pursuance of a notice issued under sec. 18 of the Act calling upon persons having claims including decrees for money whether secured by mortgage or not against the wards or its property, the plaintiff notified his claim to the manager appointed by the Court of Wards. His claim for Rs. 5,691/14/- was admitted by the Court of Wards on 16th April, 1937. Thereafter it is stated by the plaintiff that various payments were made by the Court of Wards towards his debt commencing from 3rd October, 1943 to 5th August, 1948 and the total amount paid to him was Rs. 720/ -. It was also stated that the plaintiff from time to time submitted applications before the Court of Wards for the payment of the debt and orders amounting to an acknowledgment of the debt were passed on these applications, the last application being of 23rd February, 1951. Defendant's Jagir was released from the superintendence of the Court Wards in August, 1951 and the present suit was filed for recovery of the outstanding dues on 9th February, 1952. The contention of the plaintiff was that the various orders passed by the Court of Wards on his application for the payment of the debts are acknowledgments within the meaning of sec. 19 of the Indian Limitation Act and by virtue of these acknowledgments the suits was within limitation. Further he was entitled to the exclusion of the period during which there was superintendence of the Court of Wards over the defendant's Jagir i. e. , upto August, 1951. The defendant in his written statement denied the plaintiff's claim and pleaded the bar of limitation. In regard to other allegations in the plaint he pleaded his ignorance. As many as 10 issues were framed by the trial court and excepting the undermentioned issues Nos. 4,6 and 7 which relate to the question of limitation, the rest were decided in favour of the plaintiff. Issue No. 4: - Whether the Court of Wards paid Rs. 720/- in all as interest on this loan on different dates as detailed in para 3 of the plaint. Issue No. 6.- Whether various orders passed by the Court of Wards on different applications made by the plaintiff as detailed in para 3 of the plaint amount to an acknowledgment. If so is the plaintiff bound by such acknowledgments? Issue No. 7: - Whether the plaintiff's suit is within limitation? The suit was dismissed as it was held to be barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to assail the finding of the court on issues Nos. 4 & 6. The alleged payments last of which is dated 5th August 1948, do not save the limitation. Besides the entries regarding these payments are not in the handwriting of or in the writing signed by the person making the payments or by his duly authorised agent as required under sec. 20 of the Indian Limitation Act. In regard to the alleged acknowledgments the finding of the trial court is that in order that an acknowledgment may be effective so as to extend the period of limitation it should be made before the expiration of the period prescribed for the suit. It has been pointed out by the court below that between 7th August, 1938 and 15th July, 1943, the plaintiff has not been able to show that any order acknowledging the debt was passed by the Court of Wards. The other orders relied on by the plaintiff are therefore, of no avail to him. Learned counsel has not been able to satisfy us that the view taken by the court below in this respect is in any way contrary to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act. The main point upon which stress has been laid by the learned counsel is that in view of the provisions of the Act he could not institute any suit against the defendant during the period his jagir was under the superintendence of the Court of Wards as his claim had been admitted by the Court of Wards. In other words the argument is that in cases where the creditors' claim is admitted by the Court of Wards and its superintendence continues the creditor's right to file the suit under the general law remains suspended and he is therefore, entitled to the exclusion of that time by virtue of sec. 14 and 15 of the Indian Limitation Act. In this connection he has referred to sec. 21 of the Act which runs thus: - "nothing in sec. 19 and 20 shall be construed to prevent any person from instituting or continuing in any competent Court any suit or proceeding in respect of any claim which has been disallowed in whole or in part by the Manager under sec. 19 or by the Court of Wards under sec. 20 sub-para (1 ). Provided that when the laimant has failed to notify his claim under sec. 18, no suit or proceeding in respect of such claim shall be maintainable unless the claimant shall show good and sufficient cause for such failure. '' It is suggested that it is only in those cases where the claim has been disallowed in whole or in part that a creditor is permitted to file a suit in a civil court; but in other cases where the claim is allowed by the Court of Wards it follows by necessary implication that he cannot institute any suit. In order to appreciate this contention it is necessary to refer to other provisions of the Act. Sec. 11 provides that on the publication of a notification under sec. 15 a manager appointed by the Court of Wards shall publish a notice calling upon persons having claims etc. to notify the same in writing to such manager within six months of the date of the publication of the notice. Sec. 19 relates to the effect of failure to notify the claims as required under sec. 18. It says that : "subject to the provisions of sec. 21 every claim of the nature specified in sec. 18 against the ward or his property, other than debts due to and liabilities incurred in favour of the Durbar, which is not notified under sec. 18, shall be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions whether during continuance of superin of Court of Wards or afterwards to have been duly discharged. Provided that if the claimant can show sufficient cause for failure to comply with the provisions of sectionl8, the Manager shall receive his claim, and the claim so received shall be demeed to have been notified under sec. 18. Provided also that the provisions of this see tion shall not be deemed to extinguish any such claim in any case in which the Court of Wards after assuming the superintendence of such property releases the same from its superintendence tendence without discharging the liabilities thereof in the manner provided in this Chapter. Provided further that nothing in this section shall apply to a mortgagee in possession of such immovable property of the ward as is so transferrable under the law for the time being in force. Lastly there is section 22 which deals with the stay of execution of decrees and runs thus: - " (i) On publication of the notice under sec. 18, no fresh proceeding in execution of any decree against the ward or his property shall be instituted in, nor shall an attachment or other process in any such proceeding then pending be issued by any Court until the decree-holder files, (a) a certificate to the effect that the claim has been notified or is deemed to have been notified in accordance with sec. 18 and 19; (b) a copy of the final order or decree of the Civil Court allowing the claim in any suit or proceeding referred to in sec. 20. (ii) Any person holding a decree against the ward or his property shall be entitled to receive from the Manager free of cost a certificate to the effect specified in sub-sec. 1 (a), and proof of the truth of facts required to be stated therein. (iii) In computing the period of limitation prescribed by the Limitation Act or the Civil procedure Code for any application for the execution of decree, proceedings in which have been stayed or temporarily barred undersub sec. (i) the time from the date of notices or of the decree if it was passed subsequent to the publication of the notice, to the date when the Manager's decision under sec. 20 is confirmed by the Court of Wards shall be excluded. " It would thus appear from these provisions that claimant is bound to notify his claim to the Court of Wards failing which the claim shall be deemed for all purposes and on all occasions whether during the continuance of the superintendence of the Court of Wards or afterwards to have been fully discharged. When the claims are so notified if the Court of Wards disallows the claim either wholly or in part the claimant has been given a right to file a suit in a civil court but it does not contemplate a suit when the claim is admitted. Under sec. 20 of the Act the Court of Wards is empowered to disallow the payment of interest which has accrued since the publication of the notice under sec. 18 and may also fix the rate of interest to be paid on the claim and this decision is not open to question in any Civil Court.
(3.) IT appears that in this case the Court of Wards admitted the plaintiff's claims to the extent of Rs. 5691/14/- without any future interest, vide Ex. P. 3. IT further appears that by arrangements between the parties the payment of the debt was to be made by instalments and in consequence of the arrangement, the Court of Wards made the aforesaid payments. The plaintiff continued requesting the Court of wards to make further payments till 18th April, 1951 vide Ex. P 18. In these circumstances when the plaintiff was seeking the satisfaction of his claim and had come to an arrangement with the Court of Wards a fresh cause of action arose to him in respect of the unsatisfied claim on the removal of the management of the Court of Wards. We may in this connection refer to a few cases. In Surnomoyee Vs. Shooshee Mokhee, (1) a sale under the Patni Regulation having been set aside and the patni-dars restored to possession, the zamindar sued them to recover the arrears of rent which had accrued before and during the time they were out of possession; the contention of the tenants that the claim was barred because the suit had not been brought within three years from the date when each instalment of rent fell due, was overruled, and it was held by the Judicial Committee that the cause of action accrued upon the reversal of the auction sale and the consequent revival of the obligation to pay the rent. " In Bassu Koer Vs. Lala Dhum Singh, (2) "a debtor agreed to convey certain property to his creditor and to set off the debt against part of the consideration for conveyance. A sale deed was executed, but a dispute arose as to whether it had been executed in accordance with the contract, Litigation was commenced by the debtor to enforce the agreement, but he was unsuccessful. The creditor then sued to recover the debt and was met by the plea of limitation. The Judicial Committee held that the time began to run only when the agreement became wholly ineffectual and that from that date a fresh obligation was imposed upon the debtor to pay his debt. " In Nrittyamani Dassi Vs. Lakhan Chandra Ben (3) "the plaintiffs commenced an action for declaration of their title to a share in certain properties and for possession. They, as proforma defendants, had supported the plaintiffs in an earlier suit in ejectment and had asked for a declaration that they too had a share in the property in suit. A decree was passed declaring them jointly entitled to a share and entitling them to possession to the extent of that share. The said decree was set aside on appeal on the ground that the said relief could not be given as between co-defendants, the suit itself not having been one for partition but for ejectment. The primary Court dismissed the suit as barred computing the period from the original dispossession. The Court of appeal doubted whether the case fell under S. 14 of the Limitation Act, but held that the decree which the plaintiffs had obtained as co-defendants in the previous suit, so long as stood undischarged, was susceptible to execution and it was not open to the plaintiffs to institute a fresh suit for the attainment of the very object which they had successfully attained in the previous suit. They held that during the time that decree was undischarged the plaintiffs' right to recover the property was suspended and they were entitled to a deduction of the period. } On an appeal being preferred the Judicial Committee dismissed the appeal observing that they concurred generally with the reason given by the Court of appeal, and held that the plaintiffs were entitled to a deduction of the period during which they were litigating for their rights. " In Muthu Korakkai Chetty Vs. Madan Ammal and others (4) the principle of law was thus stated by Sadasiva Ayyar, J.- "whenever proceedings are being conducted between the parties bonafide in order to have their mutual rights and obligations in respect of a matter finally settled the cause of action for an application or for a suit the relief claimable wherein follows naturally on the result of such proceedings, should be held to arise only on the date when those proceedings finally settle such rights and liabilities. " In our opinion the present case falls within the ratio decidendi of the above mentioned cases. In the present case the management of the Court of Ward was removed in August, 1951 and therefore, the present suit which was filed on 9th February, 1952, cannot be said to be barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the respondent has relied upon P. Mathura Prasad Vs. Deputy Commissioner, Kheri, (5 ). In that case the plaintiff had notified his claim but he had not received any reply from the Court of Wards and had therefore, to file a suit against it. The trial court decreed the claim but did not allow cost. An appeal was taken to the Chief Court of Oudh and it was in this connection that it was observed that: - "sec. 20 only enables a person to institute or continue in Civil Court as suit or proceeding in respect of a claim which has been disallowed by the Collector or the Court of Wards and by no logic can it be argued that it bars the general legal right of a person to bring a claim in the Civil Court. " If we may say so with respect the plaintiffs suit in that case was really a suit to which sec. 20 of the U. P. Court of Wards Act was applicable because no reply was given by the Court of Wards to the plaintiff after he had given a notice of his claim. Virtually, therefore, it meant that the claim was disallowed by the Court of Wards. This case is quite distinguishable and at any rate does not run counter to the view we have taken. Plaintiff's claim for a sum of Rs. 5691/14/- was admitted by the Court of Wards. Later on he has received payment of Rs. 720/- as mentioned earlier. The total amount which remained unsatisfied is Rs. 4971/14/- for the recovery of which the plaintiff had a fresh cause of action in August, 1951 when the management of the Court of Wards was removed. We accordingly hold that the suit in regard to this sum is not barred by limitation. The position however, with regard to the claim for interest (Rs. 7308/2/-) is different because further interest was disallowed to the plaintiff by the Court of Wards by its order dated 16th April, 1937 and sec. 21 of the Act clearly permitted the filing of a suit for such claims. The time therefore, began to run in regard to the claim for interest from 16th April, 1937 and the present suit for its recovery is barred by time. ;