- (1.) THIS appeal under sec. 39 of the Rajasthan Land Reforms and Resumption of Jagirs Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) has been filed against an order of the Deputy Collector, Jagir, Bhilwara dated 25. 6. 1960 under sec. 38 of the Act whereby the parties were directed to have their respective titles with regard to receipt of compensation payable to the deceased Jagirdar adjudicated upon by a competent civil court. We have heared the learned counsel for the parties and have examined the record as well. Raja Bahadur Amar Singh Jagirdar of Karada filed his statement of compensation and rehabilitation grant under sec. 31 of the Act as his Jagir was resumed under sec. 21 read with sec. 26 of the Act. But before he could receive the full payment of compensation and rehabilitation grant he died on 13. 8. 1959. The resumption of this Jagir had taken place in 1954. After the demise of Raja Bahadur Amarsingh 3 claimants appeared on the scene. Shri Chandersinghji minor with Shri Shiv Charan Das as guardian claims the unpaid compensation and rehabilitation grant by virtue of having been taken in adopt on by the deceased in 1951. It has also been contended on his behalf that in 1929 a will was made by the deceased in his favour as well. Sarv Shri Rawat Shambu Singh and Sarup Singh respondents No. 2 and 3 contested the claim of Chander Singh on the ground that Chandersinghji was not adopted by the deceased, that even if he was adopted it was invalid as no prior sanction of the State Government was obtained, that the will was ineffective as it was executed a few days before the death and that the deceased had long ago executed an agreement to take in adoption boys from the line of the respondents. The respondents claim to be entitled to receive the compensation and rehabilitation grant by virtue of their being collaterals of the. deceased. The learned lower court came to the conclusion that as there was a dispute it was essential to direct all claimants to have their respective titles adjudicated upon by a competent court. Sec. 38 of the Act runs as below - Payment of compensation on the death of Jagirdar -
(2.) IF any Jagirdar to whom compensation is payable under this Act dies before the full payment of such compensation to him, such compensation as may remain payable to him under this Act, shall be payable to the person or persons found by the Collector upon inquiry in the prescribed manner to be the heir or heirs of the deceased Jagirdar according his personal law '. Provided that, in cases in which the question of such succession or heirship is in dispute, the Collector shall direct all claimants to succession or heirship to have their respective title there to adjudicated upon by a competent Civil Court and payment of the remaining compensation shall be in accordance with such adjudication. This section provides that if a Jagirdar entitled to compensation and rehabilitation grant dies before receiving the full payment then the Collector upon enquiry shall determine the person to whom the same should be paid. The proviso to this section lays down that where the question of heirship or succession is in dispute the Collector shall direct all claimants to succession or heirship to seek an adjudication from a competent civil court as regards their respective title. This naturally raises a question as to what should be the contents of the term 'dispute'. To our mind a dispute within the meaning of this section should be a bona fide dispute which raises genuine doubts as regards the person entitled to receive compensation after the demise of the Jagirdar. If objections are raised which are clearly untenable and which have in the past been held so independently of these proceedings then it cannot be held that the dispute is a bonafide one. On the contrary it would be a dispute intended to delay or defeat the legitimate claims of a valid heir. To hold the proviso applicable to such a case also would definitely be tantamount to placing a premium on vexatious and frivolous pleas. As laid down in sec. 35 (4) of the Act the payment of compensation money under this Act to a Jagirdar shall be a full discharge of the Government from the liability to pay com-pensasion in lieu of the resumption of his Jagir land by the Government but shall not prejudice the rights to which any other person may be entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom any amount has been so paid. This provision makes it abundantly clear that the liability of the Government to pay compensation shall stand fully dischar-ged. But any person who considers himself entitled to receive the money which has in fact been paid to somebody else can enforce his right in a competent civil court. We have referred to this provision to show that an order regarding payment under sec. 38 of the Act acquires finality only as far as the liability of the State Government is concerned but does not in any way prejudice the rights which other persons may deem to be holding in the payments made under the Act. This brings us to the question as to whether the contest in the present case can be held to be a bonafide dispute or not. A reference to the record leaves no room to doubt that the appellant was taken in adoption by the deceased in 1951, that the necessary ceremonies of giving and taking were fully gone through, that an adoption deed was executed and that the deceased thereafter treated the appellant as his adopted son and maintained him in that capacity till his demise. It is also a fact that in 1959 a registered will was executed by the deceased wherein the clear mention of the fact of adoption was recited. It has been argued on behalf of the respondents that if adoption had taken place actually it was superfluous to execute a will and hence the adoption should be held as not proved. This argument is untenable. The deceased anticipated, and rightly too, challengages to the title of his adopted son after his death. He, therefore, naturally thought of placing the claims of his adopted son on an invincible platform and the execution of the will can be clearly traced to this natural motive. A reference has also been made in this connection to sec. 108 of the Kanunmal Mewar 1947 which provides that the Jagirdar could take a son in adoption only with the prior consent of the ruler. This question is extraneous to the present proceedings. If the question involved for determination had been as to whether the appellant should or should not be allowed to succeed to the grant on the basis of adoption it would have been pertinent to examine as to whether prior consent of the ruler was obtained or not to legalise succession of the adopted son. But in the present case it is not the devolution of the State grant upon an adopted son which has to be decided. The State grant stands resumed and the jagirdar it he had been alive would have received cash payment which after his death would go to his heir according to personal Jaw. It is an admitted fact that the personal law, namely the Hindu law does not recognise any prior consent as a condition precedent for the validity of an adoption. Thus the position becomes perfectly clear that even if no sanction of the ruler to adopt was taken then also the adopted son can obtain payment of the compensation and rehabilitation amount under sec. 38 of the Act. With regard to the validity or otherwise of an adoption without prior consent of the ruler reference may be made to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court ` dated 8. 11. 1960 in Civil Reference No. 36 of 1960 in D. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 187 of 1956. In that case the question for consideration before their Lordships was that a person who was given no prior permission by the Jaipur ruler for being taken in adoption could be allowed to succeed to the State Grant or not. Their Lordships were pleased to observe as below : - "it can no. longer be disputed that the grant held by a Jagirdar is his property of which he cannot be deprived arbitrarily after coming into force of the Constitution. On the death of the Jagirdar the grant does not remain in suspension till the matmi is effected in the name of successor. It vests in the successor as soon as the holder dies. . . . . . We have pointed out above that so long as the ruler exercised unlimited sovereignty it was open to resume the Jagir on the death of a holder. He could refuse to confer it on the nearest heir and could confer it on somebody else. It was in the exercise of this power that he sanctioned matmi in favour of the heirs and recognised adoptions for purposes of succession to the Jagir. As was held by this court in Th. Bahadur Singh Vs. the Rajpramukh this power disappeared on the coming into force of the Constitution and the questions off succession to Jagirs are to be decided in accordance with the personal law applicable the last holder. . . . . . . . . We are of the opinion that on the death of the holder of a Jagirdar without leaving any issue the grant would vest in his adopted son provided that the adoption has been made in accordance with the personal law of the adopter Jagirdar". This authoritative pronouncement on the point leaves no room to doubt that the appellant is entitled to get the compensation money. To decide as to whether the dispute in the present case should be held to be a bonafide one or not, it will have to be seen that on the one side stands the appellant who is the adopted son of the last Jagir holder. The factum of adoption has never been challenged seriously in all the proceedings that were carried out between the parties hitherto during the previous years. In fact, the evidence on record is so strong on the point as to render any plea to the contrary liable to be held as puerile and untenable. The adoption deed of the year 1951 clearly mentions the fact of adoption along with the observance of all the necessary formalities. The conduct of the deceased with regard to the appellant also raised the same presumption. The same inference is to be drawn from the will of the year 1959. Objections were raised to the validity of adoption on the ground that no prior sanction of the Darbar was obtained and that the deceased should have adopted a son from amongst the respondents. As for the first point it has been clearly held that no permission would be needed in accordance with the personal law of the Jagirdar and that even if it was needed it would be of no significance after the enforcement of the Constitution. The contract alleged to have been entered into by the last holder is not of any significance when in fact the appellant was taken by him. As against the appellant are arrayed respondents No. 2 and 3 who are the collaterals of the last Jagirdar. The appellant belongs to Class 1 of the heirs laid down by the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The respondents are definitely not included within Class 1. The irresistible conclusion, therefore, is that the objections raised by the respondents are entirely frivolous and can serve no useful purpose except unnecessarily protracting these proceedings. To allow them would definitely amount to an abuse of the process of the court. We, therefore allow this appeal, set aside the order of the lower court and direct that the amount of compensation and rehabilitation grant remaining payable to the deceased Jagirdar shall be paid to the appellant in accordance with law. .;