SARJOO PROSAD, C. J. - (1.) THIS is an appeal against the order of the Election Tribunal Pratapgarh, dated 1st December, 1959.
(2.) THE election petition in this case under section 80 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 (Act No. XLIII of 1951) hereinafter referred to as "the Act" was filed on the 23rd of April, 1957, by the appellant Inder Lall, an elector in the Chittorgarh Constituency praying that the election of the respondent Shri Lal Singh to the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly should be annulled and declared void on account of illegal and corrupt practices which vitiated the election. THE elections in the various constituencies took place in February and March, 1957. THEre appear to have been three contesting candidates at the election. Shri Lal Singh, the first respondent, who was the successful candidate, secured 7272 votes; the second respondent Shri Lakshman Singh, the Maharawal Dungarpur, secured 7261 votes, while the third respondent Shri Chhoga Lal only 569 votes. THE result of the election was declared on the nth of March, 1957, and notified in the Rajasthan Rajpatra on 14th March, 1957, and Shri Lal Singh was returned. The grounds on which the election has been challenged are mainly two-fold and have been enumerated in paragraph 4 of the election petition. Firstly, it is alleged that the respondent Shri Lal Singh procured or abetted or attempted to procure either by himself or by his agents or by other persons with his connivance or that of his agents the application by persons for ballot papers in the name of other persons, whether living or dead or non-existent, or whose names appeared in the same ward for two different houses, or persons who were not citizens of India but whose names all the same appeared in the electoral rolls; or even in names of fictitious persons. Secondly, it was alleged that the said respondent, his agents and other persons with his connivance or that of his agents published such statements of facts which were false and which they either believed to be false or did not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of the respondent No. 2 and in relation to his candidature, calculated to prejudice the prospects of the election of the second respondent, Shri Lakshaman Singh. Details of the above allegations find mention in the lists marked A and B appended to the petition. List A has again been sub-divided into six different parts. We will deal with these details in their appropriate place. The respondent Lal Singh traversed the allegations in his reply. The locus standi of the petitioner to present the election petition was also challenged, but the point has been found in his favour. It has been held that he was an elector of Chittorgarh Assembly Constituency residing in House No. 76, Ward No. 4. The point of locus standi has not been canvassed before us any further. The contesting respondent, however, seriously denied the allegations of corrupt practice made in the petition. He asserted that neither the respondent nor anybody else to his knowledge or with his connivance committed any such corrupt practice. It was also stated that full particulars of the persons responsible for the corrupt practices alleged and the date and place of their commission were not mentioned as required by the law. The respondent claimed that the votes cast in his favour were all valid votes and the complaint in the election petition was baseless and the election of the respondent should be accordingly upheld. The second respondent has supported the averments in the election petition, and said that the false statements made against him were widely circulated and explained to the masses in the whole constituency with the result that it materially affected the election of this respondent who lost only by a margin of about 11 votes. The respondent No. 3 did not put in appearance at all. In the replication filed by the petitioner further particulars of the polling booths and the dates where and when the corrupt practices mentioned in Lists 1 to 6 under head "a" were committed were given. It was further averred that the votes were cast in favour of the respondent No. 1 on behalf of persons who were either dead or fictitious or non-existent or not entitled to vote were invalid and the Tribunal had jurisdiction to examine the ballot papers in order to see whether on those invalid votes the respondent Lalsingh was entitled to succeed or that the second respondent should be deemed to be duly elected. The election petition was dismissed in the first instance because it was held by the Tribunal that the security deposit as required by sec. 117 of the Act had not been validly made; but on appeal the order of the Tribunal was set aside and the petition was sent back for disposal according to law. The Tribunal after recording evidence in the case dismissed the election petition by its order under appeal. The Tribunal found substantially on both the points against the case of the petitioner. The point, therefore, which has to be determined in this case is whether the petitioner has been able to establish the grounds on which the election of the first respondent is challenged. The burden of proof of the grounds set out by him lies upon the petitioner, and specially in a case of corrupt practice the burden lies heavier and has to be strictly discharged. Suspicion cannot take the place of proof. Let us, therefore, deal with the allegations in their order. As pointed out earlier the first allegation is that the petitioner or his agent procured or abetted procurement of fictitious votes in the names of persons, whether living or dead or non-existent. Full details of the corrupt practices alleged are given in the list marked "a" attached to the petition. List A itself has been divided into six different lists. The first list contains the names of voters who were alleged to be already dead long before the date of election, i. e. , 1. 3. 57. The second list consists of names of persons who were alleged to have left India for Pakistan long before 5. 3. 1957, and had not returned to India till the 9th of March, 1957. The third list is of names of voters who, according to the petitioner, had left the Chittorgarh Constituency long before 1. 3. 1957, and had gone to distant places like Bombay from where they never returned till 12. 3. 1957. The fourth list is of persons who applied twice for ballot papers in their own names or other persons fictitiously on different electoral numbers taking advantage of the wrong entries in the electoral rolls. The fifth contains the names of persons who personified and applied for ballot papers in the names of certain persons who actually did not exist, having names wrongly recorded in the voters list. The sixth and the last list is of voters who left India in the year 1949 to reside permanently in Pakistan and were actually in Pakistan at the time of polling. The names of these persons were not deleted from the electoral rolls, according to the petitioner, and votes were wrongly received on their behalf. At the outset it is submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that the above recital in the petition being a recital of corrupt practice alleged to have been committed by the returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent or connivance of the successful candidate or his agent, it falls under sec. 100, sub-sec. (1) (b), of the Act; and since there was no evidence to establish that those votes were cast illegally at the instance of the contesting respondent or his agent, the petitioner's application should not be entertained on that ground. The frame of the petition undoubtedly supports the contention; but in arguments before this Court the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that in case it is found that illegal or invalid votes were cast and the result of the election was materially affected thereby, on account of the reception of those invalid votes, the case would still fall under sec. 100 (i) (d) (iii) of the Act, even then it should be the duty of the Tribunal to declare the election of the returned candidate void. The relevant provision requires that where the Tribunal is of opinion that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of any vote or the reception of any vote which is void, the Tribunal should declare the election of the returned candidate void. The learned counsel for Shri Lalsingh, however, contends that he was not called upon to meet a new case under clause (d) (iii) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 100 of the Act, which was not made out specifically in the petition and the petitioner should not be allowed to change his case. We do not feel inclined to entertain this contention of the respondent for the obvious reason that the relevant particulars have all been stated in the petition and the contesting respondent has not been taken by surprise in the matter. If, in fact, it is held that votes were improperly received in consequence of which the election of the petitioner was materially affected, it would be the statutory obligation of the Tribunal to declare the election void. We have, therefore, to see whether the allegations in regard to improper reception of votes as contained in those lists are actually correct. We may point out that although the names of a number of persons have been included in those lists, the petitioner does not support his case in respect of all those persons. We may briefly indicate at this stage the names of persons in respect of whom the case has been actually pressed either before the Tribunal or before this Court as mentioned in the Voters' list with their respective serial number. For instance, in the first list which contains 19 names the petitioner has pressed his case in respect of seven persons only viz. , Kasam (No. 58), Aleema (No. 80), Jenab (No. 91), Gulam Mohammed (No. 95), Jamal-ud-din (No. 1056), Ahsan Mohammed (No. 1329), and Jahuruddin (No. 1723 ). It is said that the list contains the names of persons already dead. The Tribunal has found that Kasam, husband of Koyal Bai, died before the General Elections took place in the year 1957. As to others it was held that it had not been satisfactorily established whether they had actually died before the elections. In the second list out of twelve names the petitioner confined his case to two only viz,, Aziz Mohammed (No. 851) and Gani Mohammed (No. 946 ). The Tribunal held that the petitioner had utterly failed to show that these two persons were in Pakistan at the time of the polls. In the third list we find as many as 31 names mentioned, but the petitioner's case is confined only to seven of them, viz. , Gulam Rasul (No. 48), Yusuf (No. 50), Emna (No. 54), Halima (Alima) (No. 79), Fatma (No. 1057), Gulamrasul (No. 1323), and Ahmed Noor (No. 833 ). Here again the finding of the Tribunal is that the petitioner failed to prove that these persons were not at Chittorgarh at the time of the poll and had gone to other places, and that in their place votes were cast by certain other individuals. In the fourth list also there are 11 persons mentioned but the objections are confined only to two, viz. , Gulam Rasul son of Karim Bux (No. 326 and 1323) and Ishwarlal (No. 502 and 379 ). Here also the Tribunal did not find any convincing evidence to indicate that these very persons were entered at two different places in the electoral roll and that, therefore, they took advantage of double voting in view of the fictitious entries. In list 5 also the objection is confined to two voters, viz. , Vesar son of Ibrahim (No. 1392) and Rahim Bux son of Noora (No. 855), who actually did not exist according to the petitioner. The Tribunal found that Vesar son of Ibrahim was merely a clerical error. It should have been actually Nisar son of Ibrahim, which had been duly corrected, and that Rahim Bux son of Noora was also not a fictitious person as alleged but was a resident of Chittor and was entitled to cast his vote. In the last list there are as many as 40 names relating to persons who were alleged to have left India in 1949 with a view to reside permanently in Pakistan and were said to be actually in Pakistan at the time of polling ; but here also the petitioner was content to rest his case only with reference to eleven of them, viz. , Gulam Rasul son of Ibrahim (No. 10), Ibrahim son of Ismail (N0. 40), Ahmed son of Hasham (No. 65), Batool W/o Ahmed (No. 67), Safi Mohammed son of Hasam (No. 68), Janat W/o Sefi Mohammed (No. 69), Ahsan Mohammed son of Noor Mohammed (No. 86), Mohammed (Ahmed) son of Davad (No. 1322), Anwar son of Rahim Bux (No. 988) Kulsum W/o Lal Mohammed (No. 31) and Sakina (Koyal Bai) W/o Kasam (No. 59 ). In respect of Kulsum the Tribunal found that although she was married to Lal Mohammed, an Indian national, she came to India under Pakistani Passport which showed her to be a Pakistani citizen and since at the time of the General Elections she had not obtained the certificate of Indian citizenship she was not entitled to vote. In regard to Sakina alias Koyal Bai also the Tribunal held that on the date of poll she was a Pakistani citizen ; but curiously enough the Tribunal held that she was admittedly at Chittor on the date of poll when she cast her vote, and since she voted in her name there was nothing wrong. In regard to others the Tribunal found against the petitioner. These findings have been very seriously challenged by the petitioner, and we have been taken through the evidence on the record in support of the allegations made in the petition. We think it necessary to observe that we are not much impressed by some of the findings of the Tribunal, and generally speaking it appears to us that its appreciation of the evidence is more mechanical than analytical and at places even inconsistent. The question, however, still remains as to whether it world be desirable for us in appeal to interfere with those findings if we feel that they are otherwise supported by certain broad features of the case. We would, therefore, refer to these broad features without attempting to encumber the judgment with a detailed discussion of the evidence in relation to such particular name as given in the various lists. The petitioner does not claim that he had any personal knowledge of the alleged invalid votes having been cast at the polls. He says that he received information thereof from four persons, viz. , Rahim Bux, Kesarimal Pancholi, Khoobchand Mundara, and Ishaq Mohammed. The last named person Ishaq Mohammed was a worker on behalf of the respondent No. 2, the Maharawal of Dungarpur, during the elections. The petitioner states that it was only on enquiry from the aforesaid persons that he got the details which he mentioned in the various lists appended to his petition. Ishaq Mohammed has not been examined, although, as the Tribunal says, he was present on all the dates of hearing. He was expected to be in better know of things, since admittedly he was a worker on behalf of the Maharawal, the second respondent. Kesarimal, who was the polling agent of the Maharawal in Chittor, says that when Mangilal, one of the candidates, enquired of him as to how votes were cast, he told him that there was nothing wrong and to his knowledge no forged votes had been cast. He also admits that he did not object to any voter on any of the grounds alleged in the petit on. Khoobchand in his evidence has said nothing on the point in corroboration of the evidence of the petitioner. The evidence of Rahim Bux stands self-condemned. Thus we are left only with the evidence of the petitioner and since he does not claim any personal knowledge of the matter, the allegations made by him deserve to be thrown out on that ground alone. It stands to reason that if the electoral roll contained the names of dead or nonexistent persons or of persons who had left for Pakistan and settled down there, the other candidates or their agents to even the voters had plenty of opportunity of having the rolls corrected. On the other hand the contesting respondent has examined some of the Presiding Officers at the polls, who depose that the agents of the respondent Maharawal were present throughout the polling and no complaint was ever made that improper votes were being cast or that there was any case of false personation. These witnesses are Shri V. Halve (N. A. W. 11) and Shri Dipchand (N. A. W. 22 ). They have also produced their diaries Exs. A/12 and A/13. Shri Halve, a Civil Judge of Beawar, was the Presiding Officer at the Khatar Mahal polling station at the time of the 1957-General Elections, while Shri Dipchand, a Tehsildar, was the presiding Officer at the Chittor Cinema House polling station. Their evidence is also borne out by the entries in the diaries which made contemporaneous records of the progress of voting and showed no such complaints of false and invalid voting made by any of the agents of the Maharawal. According to Shri Halve the Maharawal's agents at his polling station, who were present there, were Bhagwati Lal and Roshan Lal; while at the other polling station, as stated by Shri Dipchand, the agent who represented the Maharawal during the polls was Mathura Lal. Bhagwati Lal (A. W. 4) and Mathura Lal (A. W. 32) have both deposed in the case. Bhagwati Lal admits that he had no occasion to doubt the identity of persons who cast their votes. He only vaguely suggests that after the close of the day when he was passing through the bazar some Mohammedans told him that faked votes had been cast in the name of persons who had gone to Pakistan which fact he could not detect; but the witness himself made no enquiry about their names, nor did he convey this information to anybody else. He lives in Ward No. 4 in Chittor since his childhood and we have no doubt that if in fact there was any such case of personation and faked voting he would have certainly detected the same and made his complaint in time. Mathuralal, who is a resident of Chittor, also admits that he made no complaints to any of the authorities about any irregularities in the polling or casting of votes. Even about the alleged irregular double voting of Ishwarlal (vide list A-No. 4), about which he deposes that it came to his knowledge later, he says that he made no complaint to the authorities. The Presiding Officers have further deposed that they used to satisfy themselves about the identity of the voter as he entered the polling booth and before he was issued any ballot paper to cast his vote. It also appears from the evidence that the number of ballot papers noted against the names of the Voters in the electoral rolls Exs. 9, 10 and 11, which were used by the Polling Officers concerned, were actually issued and cast by the voters noted in the lists. This is borne out even by the evidence of the petitioner's witnesses. The Presiding Officers have deposed that soon after the poll was over they sealed these marked copies of the electoral rolls and they were received by the Tribunal in a sealed condition and exhibited thereafter. A comparison of these electoral rolls with the lists given by the petitioner would show that the statements in the petitioner's lists have been made somewhat recklessly and without regard to facts as disclosed in the evidence.
(3.) IT is also to be remembered that these local Muslim voters are largely Chhipa Musalmans and most of their names appear to be common. Mohammed Yusuf (A. W. 44) says that the name of his Bare Bap is Ismail son of All Mohammed and he admits that there may be others of that name. According to the witness their identification can be by Attak or surname. The evidence, however, is not very clear whether even by Attak there can be convincing identification, because Aziz Mohammed (A. W. 49) admits that some people may have several Attaks. Any way, the evidence is clear that there were several people in the locality of the same name and, therefore, there was nothing surprising if different persons bearing the same name had been entered in the voters' list in respect of different houses. In this state of the evidence we are inclined to accept the conclusion of the Tribunal that the petitioner has failed to establish that there was any reception of invalid votes or any such reception of invalid votes as to materially affect the result of the election and enable the Tribunal to declare the elect on void. We have done so notwithstanding our inability to endorse some of the reasonings of the Tribunal on the point. We may pick out just a few instances to illustrate our meaning. It has of course been admitted by Sahabuddin (N. A. W. 35) that Koyal Bai alias Sakina was the widow of Kasam son of Hakim Jodhpuria, and that the said Kasam died some four or five years ago. It has also been found that Koyal Bai, who has been described as the widow of Kasam, went to Pakistan on passport dated 20th October, 1956. On these materials the Tribunal found that Kasam must have died before the elections took place; but the case of the respondent is that the Kasam described in the voters' list was son of Habib residing in Ward No. 4, House No. 14, and not the son of Hakim, and that the description about his parentage was a mere error, which was rectified at a later stage. This is of course borne out by the voters list (Ex. 10 ). In such a situation it was for the petitioner to show that the correction of the voters' list was arbitrary and that Kasam son of Hakim, who died, was the identical Kasam entered in the voters' list. The Tribunal, in our opinion, was in error in throwing the burden of proof on the contesting respondent and in presuming to the contrary. In the case of Ahsan, son of Ismail, we are more impressed with the evidence of the petitioner, from which it appears that Ahsan died before the elections. The petitioner's case is supported by the-affidavit of Ismail. Admittedly Ismail (N. A. W. 28) is. the father-in-law of Ahsan. This affidavit was sworn on an earlier occasion, but the Witness unsuccessfully sought to explain it. In the case of Aleema, whose name appears in serial No. 80 in the voters' list, the evidence of the Presiding Officer Dipchand is that she was an aged lady and blind, and it was at her request that he cast the vote for her. Witness Dipchand has been corroborated by the entry in his own diary. The evidence of Dipchand should be convincing on the point. Then again in dealing with the case of Kulsum, widow of Lalmohammed, we are not satisfied that the Tribunal has taken a correct view of the matter. The finding of the Tribunal on the evidence is that Kulsum, when she was a minor, went with her parents to Pakistan in the year 1953-Admittedly the parents had migrated to Pakistan at the time,, She appears to have been married there to Lalmohammed and returned with him under a Pakistani passport to India. Lalmohammed is admittedly an Indian national residing in India. It appears that later Kulsum obtained a certificate of Indian citizenship; but on the day when the General Elections took place she had not obtained any such certificate. The Tribunal, therefore, held that when she came to India on a Pakistani passport, it must be assumed that she was a Pakistani citizen, and it was on that account that she felt the necessity of acquiring Indian citizenship, which she admittedly acquired after the polls had taken place; accordingly she had no right to vote at the polls. Now admittedly she was a minor at the time when her parents migrated to Pakistan. She had, therefore, no volition in the matter, and it could not be said that she had willingly transferred her allegiance to the other country. It is not clear from the evidence whether before her marriage with Lalmohammed she had attained majority or she was still a minor; because in that case the question may arise whether she did not acquire the domicile of her husband even if it is assumed that her domicile had changed on account of her perents' migration. In our opinion, as held in Mohammad Khan Vs. Government of Andhra Pradesh (1), the mere fact that a passport is given to a person, who is an Indian national, whether the passport is legal evidence or not cannot lead to any irresistible inference that the said person had voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State, for such a passport could also be issued to a citizen by birth or descent. That being so, we find it difficult to accept the observation of the Tribunal on the point. We do not, however, feel called upon to finally determine the position because even if it is assumed that Kulsum was not entitled to vote the fact that she did so did not materially affect the result of the election. Besides the Tribunal appears to have confused what was required to be proved, if we may respectfully point out, under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 100 of the Act and clause (d) (iii) of that sub-section. Then again we are unable to understand how on the finding if Sakina was a Pakistani citizen, she could be entitled to vote if Mst. Kulsum for that reason was not so entiled. Apparently the finding on the point appears to be somewhat inconsistent. It may not be a case of false personation, if Sakina actually voted in person; but it would be certainly a case of reception of invalid vote. Anyhow, we have referred to these broad instances only to show that the Tribunal has erred in certain instances; but on the whole we have already indicated our agreement with the conclusion of the Tribunal that there was no reception of invalid votes, which would affect materially the result of the election, and that, therefore, the election of the respondent could not be challenged on that ground. We may now advert to the second ground taken by the petitioner,that is,with reference to his allegation as to corrupt practice committed by the contesting respondent or his agent or by any other person with his consent or wi:h that of his agent in publishing certain statement of fact which was false or believed to be false in relation to the personal character or conduct of the second respondent or in relation to his candidature, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the projects of the second respondent in his election. This allegation of corrupt practice is said to fall under sub-s. (4) of S. 123 of the Act and is contained in p. 4 (b) of the petition. Particulars thereof have been mentioned in List-B appended to the petition, to which copies of the offending pamphlets or bulletins were also annexd,as part thereof. The pamphlets bear the caption "maharaival Dungarpur ki yaha tasweer" (this is a pen-picture of Maharwal Dungarpur) and evidently refer to the respondent No. 2, who was one of the contesting candidates at the election. The case of the petitioner is that the respondent Shri Lal Singh and another candidate Shri Bhogi Lal Pandya or their agents with the connivance of Shri Lal Singh or the other candidate got printed the pamphlets in question at Navyug Press Chittorgarh on or about the 20th February, 1957, and subsequently at Sharda Press Chittorgarh on or about the 23th February, 1957, through the Publicity Secretary Nagar Congress Committee Chittorgarh, and published those pamphlets through the Publicity Secretary Nagar Congress Committee at Chittorgarh, Dungarpur and Aspur, and got the same widely circulated and distributed between the 20th of Feb. to the 9th of March, 1957, 25th of February to 3rd of March 1957, and 25th of February to 7th of March, 1957, respectively. The petitioner contends that the said bulletins contained statements of facts in relation to the personal character or conduct of the respondent No. 2, which were false and must have been believed to be false by the persons responsible for their publication and were calculated to prejudice the prospects of the election of the respondent No. 2. We have already pointed out that the allegations relate to corrupt practice within the meaning of clause (4) of section 123 of the Act. That clause runs as follows; - "the publication by a candidate or his agent or by any other person, of any statement of fact which is false, and which he either believes to be false or does not believe to be true, in relation to the personal character or conduct of any candidate, or in relation to the candidature, or withdrawal, or retirement from contest, of any candidate, being a statement reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of that candidate's election. " The Explanation to the section, which defines "agent" is also important. It is as under: - "in this section the expression 'agent' includes tion with the election with the consent of the an election agent, a polling agent and any person candidate. " who is held to have acted as an agent in connec- Section 100 of the Act, which deals with the grounds for declaring an election to be void is also material. The relevant parts of the section are as follows: - " (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), if the Tribunal is of opinion: - (b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by returned candidate or his election agent or by any other person with the consent of a returned candidate or his election agent; or (d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns a returned candidate, has been materially affected: - (ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of the returned candidate by a person other than that candidate or his election agent or a person acting with the consent of such candidate or election agent, the Tribunal shall declare the election of the returned candidate to be void. " The effect of the above provisions is that if the corrupt practice alleged is found to have been committed by the returned candidate himself or his election agent or by any other person with his consent or that of his election agent the Tribunal can forthwith declare the election void. Where, however, the alleged corrupt practice is found to have been committed by some other person in the interests of returned candidate and the Tribunal is further of opinion that the result of the election in so far as it concerns the returned candidate has been materially affected, it is only then that it should declare the election to be void. This later element of the result having been materially affected has to be proved where the corrupt practice is attributed to some other person and is committed in the interest of the returned candidate but without his knowledge or consent or that of his election agent. Sub-section (2), however, provides for exceptions in those cases where in the opinion of the Tribunal, a returned candidate has been guilty by an agent other than his election agent of any corrupt practice. The burden to prove these exceptions will then lie on the returned candidate, otherwise the guilt of the agent will make the candidate also liable and affect his election. We may now examine in the above background to what extent the petitioner has established his case. Before we come to examine the contents of the pamphlets themselves, which are in identical terms, we may consider the evidence led by the parties on the question of printing and publication of the documents. The Tribunal appears to take exception to the vagueness of the allegations contained in the petition about the fact of publication and the persons responsible therefor. It has observed that the petitioner has not definitely stated the places where these bulletins were circulated and distributed, the time when they were circulated and the persons who did so. Even in the replication filed by the petitioner, it is said, the particulars regarding the agents of respondent No. 1 and the places outside Chittor where those bulletins were distributed were not given, though in evidence the petitioner appears to have mentioned those details. We do not think that the criticism is altogether justified. It is true that under sec. 83 of the Act the particulars of the corrupt practice alleged and the persons responsible therefor should be given as accurately as possible. The law contemplates that as full a statement as possible of the names of the parties alleged to have committed such corrupt practice should be mentioned. In this case, however, we feel that the material particulars have been given, though all the names of the pernios who may have gone about distributing the leaflets in the various localities were not mentioned. The responsibility for the publication has been assigned to the Publicity Secretary of the Nagar Congress Committee and those connected with the organisation which had sponsored the candidature of the respondent Lal Singh, namely the local Congress organisation. Therefore, it cannot be said that under sec, 83 of the Act the particulars mentioned in the petition were vague. In any case, it does not appear that the respondent has been in any manner prejudiced by not mentioning all the names of the persons responsible for the circulation of the pamphlets in the petition, nor does it appear that he insisted on further particulars. The two copies of the objectionable pamphlets, which were annexed to the petition, are Exs. 3 and 6. Ex. 3 is said to have been printed at Sharda Press Chittorgarh, while Ex. 6 was printed at Navyug Press Chittorgarh. Both of them have a common caption and both of them bear the words "prachar Mantri Nagar Congress Committee Chittorgarh" at the bottom. For the contesting respondent Shri Lal Singh the responsibility for the publication and printing of these documents has been completely denied. About Ex. 3, the case of the petitioner is that the pamphlets were not printed by Suganchand Jain,the Publicity Secretary of the Nagar Congress Committee, Chittorgarh; while Ex. 6 was got printed by Ramkumar Nandwana, Secretary District Congress Committee Chittorgarh. Of course the name of Ramkumar Nandwana did not appear in the petition itself, and about this the Tribunal has made serious comments, but we shall dwell on this topic at a later stage. So far as the publication of Ex. 3 is concerned, the Tribunal has come to a definite finding that Sugan Chand Jain had sent the original of the document, Ex. 14, for printing some time in February, 1957, of which Ex. 4 was the proof copy, and that this Sugan Chand Jain was the Publicity Secretary of the Nagar Congress Committee in Chittorgarh at the time of the elections. The Tribunal refused to believe Shri Lal Singh, Shri Ramkumar Nandwana and their other witnesses when they tried to make out that there was no properly elected Nagar Congress Committee at Chittorgarh at the time of the elections, nor was there any Publicity Secretary; the contesting respondent even denied the existence of Sugan Chand Jain in the Congress, or that there was any Publicity Secretary for the elections. We entirely agree with this part of the finding of the Tribunal for which there is ample material on the record. Ladu Lal (A. W. 5) was working as a compositor in the Sharda Printing Press at Chittorgarh at the relevant time. He deposed to the fact that there was a Nagar Congress Committee in Chittorgarh of which Shri Sugan Chand Jain was the Publicity Secretary, and that Ex. 3 was printed at his Press and he composed the matter and the proof was corrected by Sugan Chand himself. He has produced the proof Ex. 4. He says that after correcting the proof Sugan Chand in his presence put his signatures on that document. Ladu Lal has further stated that he went to the Nagar Congress Committee's office to get the proof corrected and although the witness was subjected to a long cross-examination, there was nothing to shake his testimony. The Manager of the Press, Fateh Chand Mahatma (A. W. 38) has also materially corroborated Ladu Lal. Fateh Chand said that in February and March, 1957, he was looking after the Sharda Printing Press Chittorgarh when Ex. 3 was printed. The denial of Ramkumar Nandwana, who was admittedly the General Secretary of the District Congress Committee Chittorgarh that there was any Publicity Secretary of the Nagar Congress Committee working under the District Congress Committee, or that there was any constructive worker by the name of Suganchand Jain, or about the printing of pamphlets, is wholly futile. Shri Lalsingh (N. A. W. 26) has also tried to support Ramkumar. Suganchand was not produced as witness by either party; but he was examined as a witness by the Tribunal and while he admitted his signatures on the proof, he gave an explanation which could not possibly satisfy the Tribunal and does not satisfy us. His statement was to the effect that Ladulal of Sharda Press brought the proof to him and told him that it was given to him by one of his co-workers and that he would print the matter if he would put his signatures, and, therefore, without reading it be put his signatures on the document and returned it to Ladulal, In the first place if Suganchand Jain was not an important worker in the Congress and if he had nothing in particular to do with the matter, why should Ladulal take the proof for correction to him. Secondly his statement that he quietly signed the document without reading it is too big a pill to swallow. We had better refrain from attaching any importance to a photograph on which the appellant has relied to show that Suganchand was an important member in the Congress organisation, since it does not appear to have been duly proved. It would thus appear that Suganchand admitted that Ex. 14, the manuscript, and Ex. 4 the proof of the offending document, did bear his signature. The Tribunal has rightly characterised the explanation given by Suganchand as absurd and fantastic and his statement as full of lies. The documents Exs. 14 and 4 also go to show that Suganchand described himself in them as the Publicity Secretary of the Nagar Congress Committee Chittorgarh. There is also other evidence of an impartial character to indicate that the statements of Ladulal and Fatehchand are correct. The finding of the Tribunal,therefore,on this point is well founded and material. It clearly shows that little reliance could be placed on the evidence of Ramkumar Nandwana (N. A. W. 9), the General Secretary of the District Congress Committee, and this assumes importance when we come to the printing and publication of the other document Ex. 6. This is said to have been printed at the Navyug Press Chittorgarh by the Publicity Secretary, Nagar Congress Committee Chittorgarh. It appears, however, that actually it was printed at the instance of Ram Kumar Nandwana, the General Secretary of the District Congress Committee Chittor under the name of the Publicity Secretary Nagar Congress Committee. The case of the petitioner is that Shri Nandwana gave the printed copy Ex. 17 to Shantilal, and he printed Ex. 6 on that basis. Because of the omission of these facts in the petition, the Tribunal has looked at the matter with suspicion and has not accepted this part of the petitioner's case; but we regret to have to say that we do not find ourselves in agreement with the view taken by the Tribunal. The evidence of Shantilal (A. W. 40), who was a worker in the Navyug Press in Chittor is very material on that: point. He has deposed that Ram Kumar, Secretary of the District Congress Committer went to him with Ex. 17, another printed copy of the pamphlet, and told him that the document should be printed after removing the words "suganchand Jain Prachar Mantri" only, leaving the rest as it was. It was also accompanied with a slip of paper Ex. 18. The witness intimated to Ramkumar Nandwana that there should be a detailed letter of instruction requiring the printing of the document as it contained some objectionable matter. It was then that Shri Nandwana sent Ex. 19 to him, which bears his signature. Shantilal deposed that Ex. 18 is in the hand-writing of Ramkumar and Ex. 19 bears the signature of that person. He has also proved the bill of printing Ex. 20 and the fact that payment thereof was made by Shri Nandwana. Shri Nandwana admitted his signature on Ex. 19 but he denied that Ex. 18 had been written by him. Ex. 18 simply contained the bald words "dungarpur Maharawal ki yaha tasweer", presumably to identify the caption of the document sought to be printed ; but this was not considered sufficient by Shantilal as an authority for printing the document in question. Therefore by Ex. 19 Shri Nandwana gave definite orders for the printing of the pamphlet. Shri Nandwana admitted his signatures on this document; but he says that it had reference to certain other handbills. Ex. 20 the bill for printing, which is proved by Shantilal. indicates that 5000 copies thereof had to be printed for which a payment of Rs. 50/- was demanded and made. Shri Nandwana tried to explain that Ex. 19 the chit, which he sent about the printing of the pamphlet, and Ex. 20, the bill of payment, were with reference to some other document, of which the printing charge was Rs. 7/- per thousand. This explanation was quite inconsistent with the bill Ex. 20 itself. In view of the comments which the Tribunal has justly made about the veracity of Shri Ram Kumar Nandwana with reference to the printing and publication of Ex. 3 and his audacious attempt to suppress material facts, we accept the evidence of Shri Shantilal who is a disinterested witness and who clearly proves that Ex. 6 was printed at the instance of Shri Ramkumar Nandwana. It has been found that both Suganchand and Ramkumar Nandwana are deeply connected with the local Congress Committee. Shri Nandwana was the Secretary of the District Congress Committee while Suganchand Jain was the Publicity Secretary Nagar Congress Committee in Chittorgarh. For these reasons we must accept the allegation of the petitioner that the publication of the pamphlet was at the instance of the Nagar Congress Committee itself with a view to advance the interest of the contesting respondent at the election since his candidature had been sponsored by the organisation. ;