- (1.) THESE two revision petitions have been preferred by the petitioner Ramchandra against the identical orders passed by the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, on 17th October, 1959, in two Civil Original Cases Nos. 77 of 1958 and 78 of 1958 pending between the parties. They raise common questions of law and shall be disposed of by one judgment.
(2.) THE facts which have given rise to these revision petitions may be briefly stated as follows :- It is not in dispute that a partnership was created between Ramchandra, the petitioner, and Laxmandas, Pamandas and Dharamdas, the non-petitioners, on 8th November, 1953, and the partnership business was started in the name of Messrs Arjun Das Laxmandas. THE petitioner Ramchandra filed a suit against Laxmandas, Pamandas and Dharamdas in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, on 17th July, 1958, for the dissolution of the partnership and for rendition of accounts. This Civil Suit No. 77 of 1958. One of the defences which is relevant for the purpose of this revision is that the partnership firm was dissolved on 17/18th July, 1955, and accounts were settled. Amongst other issues, a specific issue was struck as to whether firm Arjundas Laxmandas was dissolved on 17/18 July, 1955, and that the firm's accounts up to 17th July, 1955, were also finally settled. In support of their plea of an earlier dissolution of the firm, the defendants produced certified copies of two applications alleged to have been made by the plaintiff Ramchandra on behalf of the partnership firm before the Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur City. A prayer was also made for summoning an official of the Sales Tax Department to produce the original applications. THE plaintiff objected to the production of the certified copies and to the summoning of an official of the Sales Tax Department to produce the original applications and the Civil Judge vide his order dated 17th October, 1959, overruled the plaintiff's objections and held that the documents are admissible in evidence. In the proceedings of the same date, he further issued a direction to the Sales Tax Officer to send the original applications in a sealed cover and I am informed that the Sales Tax Officer has duly sent the original applications in a sealed cover. THE plaintiff Ramchandra has filed a revision against the order dated 17th October, 1959, of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, and has also challenged the directions recorded in the proceedings requiring the Sales Tax Officer to send the applications in original to the Court. This revision is No. 464 of 1959. In connection with the business of the same partnership, the non-petitioners Laxmandas and Pamandas filed another suit against the petitioner and one Dharamdas in the Court of the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, for the recovery of Rs. 2,913-11-6 on an allegation that the partnership having been dissolved on 17th July, 1955, and accounts having been examined, the defendant Ramchandra was found liable to pay to the plaintiffs an amount of Rs. 2,748-11-6, to which an amount of Rs. 165 on account of interest has also accrued. In this suit, the defendant Ramchandra's defence is that the partnership was neither dissolved on 17th July, 1955, nor accounts were settled. A similar issue having been raised in this suit also, the plaintiffs Laxmandas and Pamandas, produced similar certified copies of the applications produced by Ramchandra on behalf of the partnership firm before the Sales Tax Officer, Jodhpur, and a similar prayer for summoning an official of the Sales Tax Department was made. The petitioner, Ramchandra, who was defendant in this case, raised a similar objection in this case also and vide an identical order of even date as in suit No. 77/58, the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, overruled Ramchandra's objection and held the documents as admissible in evidence. The second revision No. 463/1959 has been filed against this order dated 17th October, 1959, passed by the Civil Judge, Jodhpur, in Civil Original Suit No. 78 of 1958. I have heard Mr. Manakmal for the petitioner and Mr. Roshanlal for the non-petitioners. The main contention very strenuously urged by Mr. Manakmal is that the certified copies of the applications are not admissible in evidence and the trial Court has acted illegally and with material irregularity in admitting them in evidence. In any case, the lower Court has acted illegally in disregarding the direction for treating the particulars confidential and requiring the Sales Tax Officer to disclose the particulars by sending the original applications for disclosure and use in the Court. He referred to section 25 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, No. XXIX of 1954 (hereinafter referred to as the Sales Tax Act). Section 25(1) reads as follows :- "Returns, etc. to be confidential. - (1) All particulars contained in any statement made, returns furnished or accounts or documents produced under the provisions of the Act or of the rules made thereunder, or in any evidence given or affidavit or deposition made, in the course of any proceedings under this Act, or the rules made thereunder, or in any record of any proceedings relating to the recovery of a demand, prepared for the purpose of the Act or the rules made thereunder, shall be treated as confidential." It directs that certain documents specified in the sub-section shall be treated as confidential. Sub-section (2) specifies six exceptional cases where the disclosure of the particulars contained in documents referred to in sub-section (1) can be made. The argument developed in this connection is that the legislature having directed that the documents mentioned in sub-section (1) should be treated as confidential and having further specified cases where disclosure can be permitted in exceptional circumstances, it must be deemed to have impliedly prohibited the Courts from admitting such documents in evidence and parties from producing them in Courts. He cited a number of cases which have interpreted section 54 of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Income-tax Act), which contains inter alia, a direction for treating particulars in certain documents as confidential. It is necessary at this stage to refer to the provisions and the scheme of section 54 of the Income-tax Act and to bring forth the important points of difference in the scheme and provisions of section 54 of the Income-tax Act and section 25 of the Sales Tax Act for appreciating correctly and accurately the relevance and applicability of the decisions on the interpretation of section 54 of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (1) of section 54 may be divided in two parts. The first part directs that all particulars contained in certain specified documents shall be treated as confidential. This is similar to the provisions of section 25 of the Sales Tax Act except that the Income-tax Act includes, in addition, particulars in any record of any assessment proceedings. This difference, however, is not relevant for our present purposes. The second part which is very important provides that notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Act No. 1 of 1872), no Court shall, save as provided in this Act, be entitled to require any public servant to produce before it any such return, accounts, documents, or record or any part of any such record or to give evidence before it in respect thereof. Sub-section (2) makes a public servant disclosing the particulars referred to therein, punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months and also liable to fine. There are no provisions in section 25 of the Sales Tax Act similar to the second part of sub-section (1) of section 54 and sub-section (2) of section 54 of the Income-tax Act. Sub-section (3) enumerates the exceptional circumstances where disclosure can be made and corresponds with sub-section (2) of section 25 of the Sales Tax Act. Sub-sections (4) and (5) of section 54 are not relevant for our purposes. A proper analysis of the above provisions clearly denotes three things. The earlier part of section 54(1) by merely directing that certain particulars specified in the section shall be treated as confidential, does not more than prohibit the voluntary disclosure of those particulars by the officials of the Income-tax Department. There is no express provision that they are rendered irrelevant or inadmissible nor is there any reference to the Evidence Act. On a proper construction of the relevant provisions, it is indeed difficult to accept that the legislature while enacting provisions under the Income-tax Act should be deemed to have modified or amended the provisions of the Evidence Act without making any express or implied reference. It follows that a view propounded that the documents containing the particulars referred to in the sub-section are not admissible is not supported on a plain reading of the relevant provisions. It will be shown a little later that a further support for the above conclusion is to be found in the later part of section 54(1). The second thing denoted is contained in the later part of section 54(1). It is directed against compelled production and prohibits courts from requiring any public servant to produce the documents specified in the earlier part. In connection with this part, an expression, "notwithstanding anything contained in the India Evidence Act No. 1 of 1872" has been introduced. The omission of any similar expression in the earlier part is consequently very significant and material and one has reason to infer that the earlier part was not intended to, in any way, affect the provisions of the Evidence Act. In my opinion, it will not be unsafe to infer that the legislature was conscious of the fact that a mere direction in the earlier part to treat particulars in certain specified documents as confidential would not make those documents inadmissible and irrelevant and that there could be the possibility of the courts compelling their production, and it was presumably on these considerations that the legislature provided a prohibition against the courts for compelling the production of the documents and specifically rendered the provisions of the Evidence Act in this connection ineffective. A proper understanding of the implications of this later part thus lends a clear support to the view that the earlier part of section 54(1) by itself does not more than prohibit voluntary disclosure. The third thing to be mentioned is that the disclosure of the particulars referred to above has been made punishable with imprisonment which may extend to six months and also fine under sub-section (2). Now, the Sales Tax Act, section 25, borrows only the earlier part of section 54(1) of the Income-tax Act and that too with this difference that particulars contained in any record of any assessment proceedings falling within the ambit of section 54 of the Income-tax Act are excluded in section 25 of the Sales Tax Act. The later part of sub-section (1) providing for prohibition against courts and sub-section (2) of section 54 making disclosure punishable have not been borrowed by the Sales Tax Act. These omissions are quite meaningful and cannot be brushed aside. Indeed, they go to provide a basis for an inference that the Legislature in the Sales Tax Act intended to prohibit only voluntary disclosure of the particulars. There was no intention to, in any way, affect the provisions of the Evidence Act and to limit the powers of the courts. The reasons for the difference under the two laws are not far to seek and can easily be conceived.
(3.) THE object of section 54 of the Income-tax Act, in the words of Kapur, J., in Income-tax Officer, Jullundur v. THE State ([1950] 18 I.T.R. 688; A.I.R. 1950 E.P. 306), "is the secrecy of the financial affairs of the assessees as disclosed in the assessment proceedings and the reason for having a provision of this kind in the Income-tax Act is that assessees may not be reluctant to disclose the details of their business, and it is quite possible that they may not disclose their affirms without any kind of reserve unless they had an assurance that the information contained in these returns, accounts, statements and so forth furnished by them would not be divulged to any one. This is really to encourage the assessee to make a full and true disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge knowing that any statement made by him will not subsequently be used against him, and it appears to me that it was for this express purpose that section 54 was worded in the way that it has been done so as to give the assurance which was thought necessary for the income-tax purposes." It can easily be assumed that the reasons stated with reference to the disclosure of the total income of assessees cannot be available in any substantial or appreciable degree in connection with the disclosure of the relevant business for the purpose of assessment of the sales tax and this may have influenced the Legislature to incorporation in the Sales Tax Act only the provisions of the Income-tax Act directed against voluntary disclosure. On the above analysis of the provisions and on the basis of the comparison prima facie, there is a goods basis for the conclusion that under section 25 of the Sales Tax Act, the courts are not prohibited from compelling the productions of the documents specified in the section and that the documents are not rendered irrelevant and inadmissible. It remains, however, to be considered whether the examination of the case-law under the Income-tax Act warrants or justifies a departure from the conclusion stated above. It must be borne in mind that in view of the obvious difference in the provisions of two sections, the decisions under the Income-tax Act should be invoked for interpreting the provisions of the Sales Tax Act with a goods deal of caution and that only those decisions under the Income-tax law, which base their conclusion on the mere language of the earlier part of section 54(1) uninfluenced by the considerations of the later part of section 54(1) or sub-section (2) of section 54, can be adopted as safe guide and decisions basing conclusions on a consideration of the combined effect of the above three-fold provisions of section 54 of the Income-tax Act cannot be of great relevance and assistance. Shri Manakmal relies upon a few cases under the Income-tax law and contends that those decisions were based merely upon a consideration of the earlier part of section 54(1) and are relevant and support a view that a direction for treating the documents as confidential necessarily implies an inference of their being irrelevant and inadmissible. The first case relied upon by him is Anwar Ali v. Tafozal Ahmed (A.I.R. 1925 Rang. 84). In this case, a single Judge of the Rangoon Chief Court held that the certified copies obtained by private persons of income-tax returns are inadmissible. Two reasons were given for this conclusion : (1) private persons having no right to inspect documents are not entitled to obtain copies and, therefore, certified copies in their hands having been unlawfully issued are inadmissible; (2) section 54 of the Income-tax Act makes the issue of such copies unlawful and makes the disclosure of any particulars contained in the returns an offence punishable with six months' imprisonment. ;