Chhangani, J. - (1.) THE only question arising for determination in this appeal is whether the agricultural lands and properties of the judgment-debtor are not liable to sale in execution of a mortgage decree against him. THE question arises under the following circumstances:
(2.) JWALA Prasad decree-holder-respondent obtained a mortgage decree against the appellant-judgment-debtor on 24. 10. 1953 on the basis of an award. In terms of the, decree he applied for the sale of the agricultural lands and other properties of the judgment-debtor. The judgment-debtor raised an objection that the lands and the properties in question could not be attached and sold in view of the provisions contained in sec. 24 of Regulation IX of 1926 (herein-after called the Regulation) read with sec. 60 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Execution Court held that as the properties were being sold in execution of a mortgage decree the judgment-debtor was not entitled to object to the sale on the basis of the provisions of Regulation and sec. 60 C. P. C. and over-ruled the objections. The appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court and dismissed the appeal. The judgment-debtor has filed this second appeal. Sec. 24 of the Regulation reads as follows: - "in addition to such property as is exempted by or under sec. 60 or sec. 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), from attachment and sale in execution of a decree, land and wells not being situated within the inhabited limits of a town or village shall also be so exempted. " Evidently the scope and purpose of sec. 24 of the Regulation is identical with those of the provisions in sec. 60 C. P. C. exempting certain properties from attachment or sale in execution of decrees. In fact the regulation is supplementary to sec. 60 C. P. C. and extends the exemption from attachment and sale to some more properties. It follows that the principles enunciated with reference to sec. 60 C. P. C. should govern the interpretation of sec. 24 of the Regulation. Mr. Zindal appearing for the judgment-debtor-appellant relied upon two cases Peshawar) Lal Channa Shah vs. Dharm Chand Channa Shah (l) and Ram Naresh vs. Ganesh Mistry (2 ). A reference to the Allahabad case (2) shows that it has no relevance for the purposes of the present case. In that case there was no mortgage decree against the judgment-debtor. The decree was a money decree. There was, however, an attachment before judgment in that case and eventually the suit was compromised and under the compromise the judgment debtor agreed to allow the bouse and the grove to continue under attachment till satisfaction of the decree. On these facts it was of course held that the judgment-debtor being an agriculturist his house could not be sold in the execution of the decree and the fact that there was a compromise under which he agreed to the sale of the house would not create any estoppel, against him. In view of the earlier full bench cases reported in Bhola Nath vs. Mussammat Keshori (3) and Mubarak Hussain vs. Asmed (4) where sec. 60 C. P. C. was not applied to mortgage decree the appellant cannot derive any benefit from this rule. There remains then the only solitary case reported in Peshawari Lal Channa Shah vs. Dharam Chand Channa Shah (l ). As against this, there is a mass of case-law in support of the contrary view. Most of these cases have been noticed in Allah Bakhsh vs. L. Chet Ram (5) by a Full Bench of five Judges of the Lahore High Court. The learned Chief Justice Harris delivering the judgment on behalf of the Bench came to the conclusion that the law (to the effect that sec. 60 C. P. C. does not apply to mortgage-decrees) has been regarded in that Court and other Courts as settled for the last sixty years or so, and that it would be hardly fair to unsettle the law on the subject. The solitary Peshawar decision (1) was also noticed and was not followed. No judgment of this Court has been brought to my notice but after going through the cases cited at the Bar I have no hesitation in holding that the law settled by the various High Courts should also prevail in this State also and similarly sec. 60 C. P. C. and sec. 24 of the Regulation merely supplementing sec. 60 C. P. C. should not apply to execution of mortgage decrees. The two Courts below have taken the correct view law of and I entirely agree with their decisions. The learned counsel next relied upon certain provisions of Regulation No. III of 1914 which prohibit permanent alienations of agricultural holdings and temporary alienation except in certain prescribed forms. The objections were not taken either before the Execution Court or before the first appellate Court. In the absence of such objections and any findings of the Courts below on this question, I cannot entertain these objections at this stage. If it is open to the judgment-debtor to take these objections in the execution Court he may raise the objections and get them decided. On the materials as they stand, there is no force in this appeal and it is dismissed with costs. .;