MODI, J. - (1.) THIS is a writ application by the petitioner Ramgopal under Art. 226 of the Constitution against order of the Panchayat Samiti Merta dated the 17th July, 1960.
(2.) I consider it unnecessary to state the facts leading up to this writ application as a preliminary objection has been raised, and that objection, in my opinion, goes to the root of the matter so far as the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court is concerned. That objection is this. It is contended by learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, namely, Gram Panchayat, Mokala, that the petitioner has an alternative remedy under Sec. 85 of the Rajasthan Panchayat (Simitis and Zila Parishads Act. (No. 37) of 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1959), and the petitioner not having resorted to it is not entitled to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court. The material portion of Sec. 85 is in these terms; - "power of revision and review by Government, (1) The State Government may, either of its own motion or on an application from any person interested, call for and examine the record of a Panchayat Samiti or a Zila Parishad or of a standing committee or sub-committee thereof in respect of any proceeding to satisfy itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed therin or as to the regularity of such proceedings and, if in any csse, it appears to the State Government that any such decision or order should be modified, annulled, reversed or remitted for reconsideration, it may pass orders accordingly. Provided that the State Government sha1l not pass any order prejudicial to any party, unless such party has had a reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. " This section undoubtely gives power to the Government to examine the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision or order passed by a Panchayat Samiti and to modify or reverse its decision such as the case may be. The Act of 1959 came into force on the 10th September, 1959. The order of the Panchayat Samiti in this case was passed on the 17th July, 1960, after the said Act came into force. Having regard to the plain language of sec. 85, it seems to me \ that this section would clearly operate on an order of the Panchayat Samiti where such order has been passed after the coming into force of the Act unless there may be any compelling reasons to the contrary. This position is sought to be met by learned counsel for the petitioner in this way. It is argued that this provision properly governs an order of the Panchayat Samiti in its original jurisdiction, and, therefore, it has no application to an order passed by: a Panchayat Samiti in its appellate jurisdiction. It is also argued in this connection that while Sec. 4 of the Act of 1959 introduces a number of amendments into the Rajasthan Panchayat Act (No 21) of 1953 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1953), the provision contained in sec. 85 of the Act of 1959 was not included in these amendments, and, therefore, this provision should not be read as affording any revisional jurisdiction to the Government in matters falling under the Act of 1953. The argument is still further developed and it is pointed out that by sec. 17 of the Rajasthan Panchayat (Amendment) Act, 1960 Act No. 25 of 1960) another sec. 27 A was inserted in the Act of 1953 by which it was provided as follows: - "27 A - Power to call for records: - (1) The State Government may for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality and propriety of: - (a) any order passed by the Collector or the officer-in-charge of panchayats under any provision of this Act, or (b) any order passed by a Panchayat Samiti in administrative matters under sec. 26a or otherwise, or (c) any order passed under this Act in administrative matters by a Panchayat, from which no appeal lies under Sec. 26a. (d) Call for and examine the connected records and may confirm, vary or rescind such order. (2) The State Government may, by notification in the official Gazette, delegate its powers under sub sec. (1) to any officer or authority subject to such restrictions if any, as may be specified in the notification. " This Act came into force on the 24th August, 1960, and it is contended that an administrative order passed by a Panchayat Samiti under sec. 26a of the Act of 1953 or otherwise would be open to revision by the Government, but this would be so only where an order was passed by that body after the 24th August, 1960, and that the impugned order in the present case was passed prior to that date, that is on the 17th July, 1960. I have carefully examined these contentions and am of opinion that the answer to the question whether an order passed by a Panchayat Samiti before the 24th August, 1960, could also be carried in revision to the Government or not must depend upon whether such an order would still fall within the ambit of sec. 85 the Act of 1959. The language of sec. 85 is obviously very extensive. In line with the usual exercise of revisional jurisdiction, it has been left open to the State Government, whether on its own initiative or on an application made to it by a person interested, to call for and examine the record of the Panchayat Samiti. Then this record, it is provided, may relate to any proceeding taken by that body, and this, to my mind, obviously includes an original proceeding as well as an appellate one. And then sec. 85 lays down inter alia that where the State Government is not satisfied as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any decision passed by a Panchayat Samiti or as to the regularity of such proceeding, the State Government can annul, reverse or modify the order of the Panchayat Samiti or remit it for re-consideration. The only limitation provided under the section is that the State Government shall not pass any order prejudicial to any party unless such party has had reasonable opportunity of being heard in the matter. The language of the section is plain, and I am not at all prepared to accept that it is not susceptible of a reasonable meaning. In these circumstances according to the very well established rules of interpretation, and indeed that is the fundamental rule, this court can have no warrant for reading some more words into the section which are not to be found in it. If I were to accept the interpretation which is sought to be put on this provision by learned counsel for the petitioner, then I must introduce some such words as "taken in the exercise of its original jurisdiction" in between the words "proceeding" and "to satisfy itself". But I lave no hesitation in saying that I can have no warrant for doing so because the language of the section is quite plain, and a meaning can be assigned to it without reducing it to absurdity, or any other similar infirmity. The only question which then remains to consider is whether this Court should not interpret this provision in its plain terms, because this provision was no: simultaneously introduced into the Act of 1953 whereunder the establishment of a Panchayat Samiti and its investment with appellate powers was provided for. I have given this aspect of the matter my very anxious and careful consideration, and my conclusion is that it would hardly be proper to limit the plain meaning of sec. 85 by any such considerations. Perhaps it would have been better to have incorporated this provision in the revised scheme of the Panchayat Act also, and indeed the Legislature later thought fit to make an analogous provision under sec. 27 A in the Panchayat Act also, which I have already reproduced in the foregoing part of my judgment. But that only confirms me in the conclusion at which I have felt persuaded to arrive, namely, that the intention of the Legislature was to have provided for a revision to be carried to the State Government in matters decided by the Panchayat Samiti not only in its primary jurisdiction but also in the appellate one. After all is said and done, and I cannot forget that for the first time in this State the Panchayat Samitis were brought into existence by the Act of 1959 and these bodies as well as the Zila Parishads (with which we are not directly concerned in this case) were assigned important duties and functions for which provision was made in the Act of 1959 directly as well as by amendment of certain provisions of the Act of 1953, and these amendments to the Act of 1953 were made by sec. 4 of the new Act of 1959. It would be too much of an abstraction under the circumstances to say that sec. 85 of the last mentioned Act should be read as if in a water tight compartment, altogether isolated from the relevant provisions of the Act of 1953. To me it appears that the two Acts are inextricably inter-connected with each other and they must be read together in order to find out what the resultant position of law in a given situation is. In these circumstances, it can be no valid argument that because no provision for revision from the appellate orders of a Panchayat Samiti was made in the Act of 1953, such orders should be held to be not open to revisional jurisdiction of the Government even though they would be clearly susceptible to such jurisdiction under sec. 85 of the Act of 1959. The answer to the question in a case like the present whether section 85 applies or not, must depend upon, whether the impugned decision is a decision of the Panchayat Samiti or not. If the answer to this question in a particular case is in the affirmative, then the position, to my mind, would be inevitable that such an order could be carried in revision to the Government irrespective of the consideration that such order was passed by the Panchayat Samiti in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction under the Act of J 959, or it was passed in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under the Act of 1953 read with the Act of 1959. I hold accordingly. The next question which then arises is whether this Court should interfere with an order of the Panchayat Samiti at this stage when the petitioner has an alternative remedy in the shape of a revision to the Government under sec. 85 of the Act of 1959. That this Court has jurisdiction so to interfere in an appropriate case cannot be doubted. But all the same, I am clearly of opinion that, as a rule, this Court will not interfere until the revisional remedy is first exhausted under the relevant statute the scope of which I have fully discussed above. In this view of the matter, the preliminary objection prevails and I hereby dismiss this application without going into the merits of the case. Under the circumstances there will be no order as to costs in this Court. . ;