Sharma, J. - (1.) THIS is the judgment debtor's second appeal and arises out of execution proceedings.
(2.) THE suit, in the execution of the decree of which the present contest has arisen was filed for the recovery of the money by Firm Sundaram decree holder against Thakur Mangal Singh of Sikar. Thakur Mangal Singh died during the pendency of the suit and his estate was taken over under the management of the Court of Wards. THE plaintiff, therefore, substituted the Court of Wards Sikar as a Legal representative of the deceased defendant. THE decree was ultimately passed. Before the present execution proceedings commenced, the property had been released from the management of the Court of Wards and the decree was executed against the appellant Maji Bidawatji, and a car was attached. An objection was filed by Maji Bidawatji under sec. 47 of the Civil Procedure Code on the ground that the car was not an asset of Th. Mangal Singh, but was her own property and the decree having been obtained against the Court of Wards, when the appellant herself was the legal representative of the deceased, was null and void and had no effect. The learned Munsif Sikar repelled both the objections and held that the car was properly attached. Against this order of the learned Munsif the judgment debtor went in appeal and the learned Civil Judge Sikar, agreeing with the Munsif, dismissed the appeal. Maji -Bidawatji now comes second appeal to this court. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. The learned counsel for the appellant has frankly conceded that so far as the question that the attached car was an asset of Th. Mangal Singh is concerned, it has become a concurrent finding of fact and can not, therefore, be pressed in second appeal. The only point, on which stress has been laid, is that the real legal representative of Th. Mangalsingh was the appellant, but she was not substituted in his place in the suit after his death. The Court of Wards was not the legal representative and, therefore, the decree has no effect so far at least as the car, which was in the use of the appellant, was concerned. The learned counsel has not taken the position that the decree was an absolute nullity, nor could such a position be successfully taken as under sec. 43 of the Jaipur Court of Wards Act of 1925, all suits on behalf of or against a ward in a civil court could be filed either against Superintendent, Court of Wards, or against any such other person who might be appointed for such purposes and might be given the power to represent the ward as a next friend or a guardian. Thus the Court of Wards was rightly substituted in place of Th. Mangal Singh after his death as the management of the estate of the deceased had been taken over by it. Even if it be supposed that the Court of Wards was not the legal representative of the deceased vis-a-vis,the appellant, the whole of the property of the deceased was under its management. It, therefore, fully represented the estate of the deceased. The plaintiff decree holder also thinking that the Court of Wards was the real legal representative of the deceased, substituted it bona-fide. It has not been shown that it was due to any mala fides of the decree holder. The appellant did not intervene in the suit. The decree was passed against the Court of Wards as representing the estate of the deceased. Under these circumstances, although even if it be taken that the Court of Wards was not the real legal representative, the decree passed against it, under the circumstances of the case, was fully binding on the appellant. I am supported in this view by the ruling reported in A. I. R. 1929 Madras 482 (Sanna Govappa vs. Radda Sanna Govappa & others) which has been cited on behalf of the appellant herself. It was held in that case that prima facie no person can be held bound by a decree or order, to which neither he nor the person, from whom he claims, was a party, but when a person, who is impleaded as the legal representative of another which he is not, in a suit or in proceedings of the execution of a decree, sufficiently represents the estate, the result is that a decree or order which is passed against him in an assumed representative character is held to be binding on the true representative though the latter was no party to the same. The conditions necessary for making such representation effective against the true representative are that the plaintiff or decree holder, must have acted bonafide, the decree obtained must be free from fraud or collusion, and the person wrongly impleaded must have been impleaded in a representative capacity and the decree or order must have been passed against him as representing the estate of the deceased, the plaintiff must have been ignorant of facts which operate to displace the title of the supposed legal representative and the person having the real title must not have intervened during the pendency of the suit. In the present case, all above conditions are satisfied and therefore it can not be said that the decree passed against the Court of Wards is not binding upon the appellant. The learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show me any authority on which it might be held that the decree might be considered to be quite valid in respect of one property of the deceased and not in respect of another which is attachable according to law. The appeal has no force and is dismissed with costs to the respondents. .;