- (1.) THIS is an application in revision against an order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Sikar, dated the 31st of October, 1949, confirming in appeal the convictions and sentences of the applicants under sections 447 and 380 of the Jaipur Penal Code. Applicants Mohan, Deda, Balbir Singh and Mst. Kanoar, Mst. Kasturi, Mst. Laouri and Mst. Chavri were each sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 15/- under section 447 and in default each to undergo one week's R. I. While under section 379 Mohan, Deda, Balbir Singh were each sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 51/- in default to undergo one month's R. I. each and Laduri, Kinoar, Chavri & Kasturi each to pay a fine of Rs. 21/-in default each to undergo 10 days' rigorous imprisonment.
(2.) IT has been contended on behalf of the applicants firstly that the conviction was not justified on the evidence and secondly that the convictions under section 447 and also under section 379 are illegal. I have heard what the learned counsel for the applicants had to say on the facts and I see no reason to think that the evidence was not sufficient to establish the guilt of the applicants. The prosecution case was that the applicants entered upon the field which was in possession of the complainant Abdulla and whose crops of Bajra were growing on it with the intention to steal Gars (sittas) of Bajra and after plucking them took them away in bags on the backs of camels to their own fields and when the Police, as soon as it received information, reached the spot the accused ran away and the Police recovered the sittas from the fields of the applicants and the tracks of camels were also found leading to the fields of the accused from that of the complainant. Witnesses who saw the occurrence with their own eyes have been produced on behalf of the prosecution; vide statements of Ladu P. W. 1, Hanmat P. W. 2 and Dina P. W. 11. That the field was in possession of the complainant and that he had grown Bajra in it is also proved beyond doubt by the evidence of Pt. Rameshwar P. W. 3. Chokhia P. W. 7 and Ladu and Hanumat Dan and other witnesses. All these witnesses have been believed by the lower court. The objection of the applicants, therefore, that there is no evidence on the record to bring home the guilt of the applicants is without any foundation and is disallowed. The other point raised by the counsel for the applicants is no doubt a legal one which deserves consideration but the learned counsel has expressed his inability to refer to any law or authority in support of his contention, His objection merely is that when the accused have been convicted of an offence under section 379 of the Penal Code they cannot be convicted at the same time for an offence under section 447, for the commission of an offence under section 379 entry into or upon the property of another person is necessary. It may be observed that offences under Sections 447 and 379 of the Penal Code are distinct offences. None of the ingredients of any of these two offences is common to them. An offence of criminal trespass under section 447 Penal Code is committed when a person enters into or upon property in possession of another with intent to commit an offence or to intimidate insult or annoy any person in possession of such property or having lawfully entered into or upon such property, unlawfully remains there with intent thereby to intimidate, insult or annoy any such person or with intent to commit an offence and an offence of theft under section 380 is committed when a person intending to take dishonestly any moveable property out of the possession of any person without that person's consent moves that property in order to such taking. From these two definitions given above it would be clear that it is possible to commit the offence of trespass without stealing anything at all just as it is possible to commit theft without committing criminal trespass. A person may enter into the property in possession of another with intent to commit theft but on entering upon the property he may change his mind and not commit the intended theft. In such a case only an offence of criminal trespass would be committed. Similarly he may enter upon the property of another person without any criminal intention but on entering upon that property he may take it into his head to remove some moveable property which was lying on that property with the inten-tion of taking it dishonestly, he would thereby commit only an offence of theft. But when he enters upon that property with the intention to commit theft or some offence or to insult or intimidate or annoy the person in possession of that property and then commits theft also he would be guilty of. both the offences of criminal trespass and theft. Both of these offences will be said to have been committed in a series of acts so connected together as to form the same transaction and when a person commits such offence he may be by virtue of section 235 Cr. P. C. charged with and tried at one trial for every such offence and sec. 35 of the same Code authorises the trial court to sentence a person who is convicted at one trial of two or more offences to the several punishments prescribed for such offences which such court is competent to inflict subject of course to a certain maximum provided in that section and also subject to the provision of section 71 of the I. P. C. and the sentences for these offences can be made to run consecutively. In the present case therefore, when the applicants entered into the field in possession of the complainant with the intention of committing theft of of "sittas" and actually did commit theft the trial Court was not wrong in convicting and sentencing the applicants for the two offences of criminal trespass and theft as they were distinct offences and no illegality thereby was committed by that Court. None of the provisions of sec. 71, Penal Code, and sec. 35 Cr. P. C. has been vitiated in this case. When separate sentences for offences under secs. 447 and 380 I. P. C. which have certain ingredients in common committed in the course of the same transaction can be passed (vide A. I. R. 1925 Gal. 1015, A. I. R. 1938 Bom. 463 A. I. R. 1939 Pat. 349 and A. I. R. 1945 Mad. 330) there is no reason why separate sentences for offences under sections 447 cannot be passed. The result, therefore, is that the revision fails and is hereby dismissed. .;