Bapna, J. - (1.) THIS is an application by the plainiffs for leave to appeal to Ijlas-I-Khas against a judgment, dated the 24th of February, 1949, of the former High Court of the Covenanting State of Jodhpur.
(2.) THE petitioners sued the opposite party for possession of a house, situated at Jodhpur, of the value of Rs. 4100/-, and claimed Rs. 25o/-as mesne profits uptil the date of suit. THE District Judge decreed the suit for possession of the house, but dismissed the claim for mesne profits. THE defendants filed an appeal while the plaintiffs put in cross-objections. THE High Court of Jodhpur, by its judgment dated the 24th of February, 1949, accepted the defendants' appeal and dismissed the suit. THE cross-objections were automatically dismissed. THE plaintiffs filed this petition for leave to appeal on the 25 th of April, 1949, under the Ijlas-I-Khas Rules promulgated by His Highness the Maharaja Sahib Bahadur of Jodhpur on the 12th of December, 1945. An appeal lay to Ijlas-I-Khas in this case as the valuation of the subject matter in dispute in the Court of first instance and in the proposed appeal to His Highness is more than Rs. 4000/ -, and the decree of the High Court is one setting aside that of the trial Court so far as the claim for possession is concerned. It is, however, argued that under Section 49 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance of 12th August, 1949, the documents of the several Courts functioning as High Courts in the Covenanting States are to be treated as the documents of the Rajasthan High Court, and by virtue of Section 40 of the same Ordinance, the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court are to be treated as final, unless under Section 39 of the same Ordinance the Raj Pramukh constituted a Court to hear the appeals from the judgments of the High Court. THE contention has been exhaustively examined by me in a similar petition (D. B. Certificate case No. 5 of 1949, Shiv Dan Chand Vs. Kalyan Chand 1950 RLW 66), and it was held that under Ordinance No. I of 1949 (Rajasthan Administration Ordinance) all the laws in force in the Covenanting States immediately prior to the enforcement of that Ordinance were declared to continue to remain in force until altered, repealed or amended by a competent authority. On the date of the judgment of the Jodhpur High Court an appeal to Ijlas-I-Khas was competent and the petition for leave to appeal was also presented before the constitution of the Rajasthan High Court. It was also held that Section 49 of the High Court Ordinance purported, firstly, to abolish the several Courts functioning as High Courts in the Covenanting States, secondly, to authorise the transfer of pending cases from the previous High Courts in the Covenanting States to the Rajasthan High Court, and, thirdly, that it was in respect of the pending cases that the document of the former High Courts were to become the documents of the Rajasthan High Court. It was further held that the finality of the judgments of the Rajasthan High Court applied only to such decisions as were to be passed after the constitution of the Rajasthan High Court by that Court, and that the said section did not purport to make final the decisions of the former High Court of a Covenanting State for which applications for leave to appeal had already been presented. THE above view was taken on a consideration of the language of the various Sections of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance as also 0; Ordinance No. 40 of 1949, (Appeals and Petitions (Discontinuance) (Ordinance ). This Ordinance, as explained in the judgment referred to, served a two-fold purpose, firstly, it declared that no appeals will lie from the decisions of the Rajasthan High Court, thereby declaring that the appellate authority referred to in Section 39 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance was not proposed to be constituted, and the other purpose was to make arrangements for the disposal of the appeals etc. already filed by the litigants against the decisions of the various High Courts in the Covenanting States. Ordinance No. 12 of 1950, which made certain amendments to the Appeals and Petitions (discontinuance) Ordinance purported to allow appeals in cases in which the petitions for leave to appeal already filed may be granted. It is unnecessary to reiterate the grounds arrived at for the above conclusions, which are referred to in detail in the said A further objection is raised which relates to the interpretation of Section 4 of the Appeals and Petitions (Discontinuance) Ordinance, the relevant portion of the said section is as follows:- 4. Provisions for pending appeals etc:- Where any appeals, revisions, references or petitions of the nature described in Section 3 have been preferred, brought, made or presented before, and are pending at, the commencement of this Ordinance, they shall be heard, determined and disposed of, (a) If they relate to judicial matters, by a special Court to be costituted by the Raj Pramukh by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette," The said Section was amended by Ordinance No. XII of 1950, by which the words "by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan established under the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance, 1949. " were ubstituted for the words "by a Special Court to be constituted by the Raj Pramukh by notification in the Rajasthan Gazette. " The effect of the amendment is that the appeals, (revisions references or petitions referred to were to be heard determined and disposed of by the Rajasthan High Court. It is argued that the words "preferred, brought, made or presented before, and are pending at, the commencement of this Ordinance," in reference to appeals would only include those appeals as had already been presented before the enforcement of Ordinance No. 40 of 1949, and as the present proceeding was only, a petition for leave to appeal, an appeal filed after the allowing of this petition would not be one pending at the commencement of that Ordinance, and is, therefore, excluded from the purview of that Section. The argument, though plausible, is untenable on a proper construction of the said Section taken together with Section 3. Section 3 provided for discontinuance of appeals after the coming into force of Ordinance No. 40 of 1949,but it was amended by Ordinance No. XII of 1950 by inseition of a provision, viz. , Provided further that nothing in this Section shall be deemed to prevent the presentation of any appeal for which,under the law in force in any covenanting State,leave to appeal was necessary and has been granted or in respect of which an application for the grant of such leave has been made before the commencement of this Ordinance. " and this proviso was not Only added from the date of amendment, but it was declared that the said proviso shall be, and be deemed always to have been added to section 3 of Ordinance No. 40 of 1949. The effect of this amendment is that the proviso is to be deemed to have been a part of the Ordinance No. 40 of 1949 from the date of its enforcement. The language of section 4 is not happy when read with reference to the amendment made to Section 3, and it is capable of an interprettion as con- tended by the learned advocate for the opposite party, that while Section 3 would purport to allow appeals in cases in which the petitions for leave to appeal already filed are allowed, the tribunal referred to in Section 4 would not be authorised to deal with them as the appeal in consequence of the allowance of the petition was not the one which was preferred, brought, made or presented before the Ordinance came into force, nor pending at the commencement of the Ordinance. This would lead to an anomaly that while the petition for leave to appeal may be granted, the appeal itself, when filed, may not be heard. A more liberal interpretation is however, possible. The tribunal constituted under Section 4 was empowered with the hearing, determination and disposal of appeals, revisions, references or petitions of the nature described in Section 3, and since Section 3 includes a provision for filing of appeals as a consequence of allowance of petitions, filed prior to the enforcement of the Ordinance, for leave to appeal, such appeals, when filed, would be those as may be heard, determined and disposed of by the tribunal mentioned in clause (a) , i. e. , the Rajasthan High Court. It is a rule of interpretation that where two interpretations are possible the one which may give effect to the statute should be preferred. Similarly where two interpretations are possible, the one which is in harmony with the rest of the statute should be preferred and the interpretation which leads to an absurd result is to be avoided. On the principles aforesaid, I am of opinion that the tribunal referred to in Section 4 would be authorised not only to hear appeals already presented, but also such appeals as may be presented in pursuance of the grant of any petition for leave to appeal. The present petition is, therefore, allowed, and leave to appeal is hereby granted. Court-fees on the appeal to be paid as provided under the Iilas-I-Khas Rules, and the appeal to be presented to the Rajasthan High Court Within the time allowed by law. Datta, J. I agree. .;