Dutt, J. - (1.) THIS is a second appeal on behalf of the defendant in a suit for the recovery of Rs. 2300/ -.
(2.) THE plaintiff is the Thikanedar of village Kirap. On account of some reasons this Thikana was placed under the management of the Haisiyat Court in the Samvat of 1977, and remained under its management upto Samvat of 1999. During this period the Thikana of Kirap was given on lease to Maharaj Fateh Singhji, the Thikanedar of Ravti, by the Haisiyat Court. Maharaj Fateh Singhji was to pay Rs. 4675/- every year on Magh Sudi 15, and the period of lease was fixed from the Samvat of 1982 up to the Samvat of 1991. According to the allegations of the plaintiff Maharaj Fatehsinghji agreed to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the sum which was to remain unpaid oh the due date. THE Izardar failed to deposit the amount of the Izara due in the Samvat of 1989, 1990 and 1991 which sum along with an interest on it amounted to Rs. 12328/12/ -. Out of this sum Rs. 10027/15/- were paid by the Ijardar and for the recovery of the remaining sum of Rs. 2300/5/-the present suit was brought by the Vakil Thikana Kirap, after the release of the Thikana from the management of the Haisiyat Court, against the present appellant, Maharaj Amarsinghji the grand-son of Maharaj Fatehsinghji. This suit was decreed by the trial Court and the decree was confirmed by the appellate Court. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at length and we see no reason to interfere in the judgment of the lower court. The first contention urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is, that as there was no privity of contract between the parties the present suit on behalf of the Vakil of the Thikana is not competent. The contract of lease was entered into between the Haisiyat Court, which could bring the present suit. The learned counsel has in support of the contention referred us to A. I. R. 1930 Madras 392, 1943 Nagpur 266, 1945 Nagpur 242, 1947 Privy Council 8 and 1933 Lahore 695. There is no doubt that the principle set forth in these rulings is correct and sound, but as far as its applicability to the facts of the present case is concerned it can be said, without the least doubt, that it does not apply at all. In all these authorities the principle enunciated is, that a stranger to a contract cannot sue on the basis of the contract, and a person who is not a party to the contract cannot sue upon it. In A. I. R. 1930 Madras 382, a contract of sale was entered into between A and B and the vendee undertook to pay some of the consideration money of C. It was held that C could not bring a suit against the vendee for the recovery of that money as there was no privity of contract between them. I need not discuss the remaining authorities, they are also to the same effect and they do not apply to the facts of the present case. In the present case, the Haisiyat Court was put in the management of the property, for the benefit of the plaintiff. Under section 21 of the Marwar Jagirdars Encumbered Estates Act, the Haisiyat Court could give the Thikana on lease. The Thikana belonged to the plaintiff and its lease was given by the manager for the benefit of the plaintiff. The money realised by the Haisiyat Court, during the period it was in the possession of the Thikana, was to be spent for the benefit of the plaintiff. The lessee was to pay the rents of the Thikana, to the person who was in rightful possession and the management of the Thikana. When the Haisiyat Court was in such possession the Haisiyat Court was entitled to realise it, and when on the release of the Thikana, from the management of the Haisiyat Court the plaintiff came into possession of the Thikana, being its proprietor, he was entitled to realise the rents from the defendant, and at that time it was the, plaintiff only who could give valid discharge to the debt due from the appellant. When the Thikana was released from the management of the Haisiyat Court it was transferred to the plaintiff, with all the rights and liabilities in respect of the Thikana, created by the Haisiyat Court, hence it was the plaintiff only who could bring the present suit. The next point urged by the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is not proved on the file that Rs. 2300/13/- were due to the plaintiff, because nothing was due on account of interest, as the interest could not have been charged on the sum due from the defendant on account of the rents of the Thikana. We have gone through the lease deed, Ex. P. 6, which stands proved on the file by the evidence of Jainarain P. W. 4. In clause 6 of this deed, it is clearly recited that interest will be paid on the sum which will remain unpaid on the due date. Although the rate of interest mentioned in clause 6 of the deed is very exorbitant but the plaintiff has charged interest at the rate of 9% per annum only. The evidence of Babhootram P. W. 1 and that of Mathuradas P. W. 3 also goes to prove the agreement to pay the interest. The sum due during the Samvats 1989, 1990 and 1991 were not paid on due dates and hence the defendant was liable to pay interest on them. In my opinion this contention of the learned counsel has no force. The third contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is that the suit is barred by limitation, as the Article 63 of the Limitation Act applies to the case and not Article 122 which has been applied by the lower court. According to Article 122, the limitation for a suit upon a judgment obtained in Marwar is 12 years from the date of the judgment, During the period when the Thikana was under the management of the Haisiyat Court, a decree was passed in respect of the debt in suit, by the Haisiyat Court against the defendant. The defendant went upto the Revenue Minister in appeal and the Revenue Minister's judgment confirming the decree was delivered on the 25th January, 1939. This judgment saves the limitation under Article 122 of the Limitation Act. Under Article 63, the limitation is six years from the date when the debt became due. In my opinion Art. 63 does not apply to the present suit and the lower court was right in applying Art. 122 to the case. As long as the Thikana was under the management of the Haisiyat Court, the plaintiff could not bring the present suit. The proceeding was started against the defendant in the Haisiyat Court and final judgment was passed by the Revenue Minister on the 25th of January, 1939. The plaintiff is entitled to bring a suit on the basis of this decree, and although he has brought this suit on the basis of original cause of action as well as on the basis of this decree, he is entitled to the benefit of Article 122 of the Limitation Act. Moreover there are two documents Ex. P. 3 and Ex. P. 8 on the file which are very helpful to the court to reach the right decision on this point. In both of these documents the Vakil of Maharaj Amarsingh has clearly stated that the balance of the amount will be paid. Ex. P. 3 was a Kaifiyat written on 5. 11. 41 and Ex. P. 8 was the Kaifiyat written on 14. 4. 38. Both of these Kaifiyats extend the period of limitation and hence no difficulty is felt in holding that the suit is within time. All the three contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant have no force and therefore the appeal is dismissed with costs. . ;