KISHANLAL Vs. MANGILAL
LAWS(RAJ)-1950-2-8
HIGH COURT OF RAJASTHAN
Decided on February 20,1950

KISHANLAL Appellant
VERSUS
MANGILAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

Mehta, J. - (1.) THIS revision by the plaintiff is directed against a Judgment and decree of the Court of Small Causes, Kishangarh, dated the 27th of April, 1949, dismissing his suit for recovery of Rs. 50/9/-
(2.) THE appellant brought a suit in the lower Court on the basis of a document dated 5. 2. 47 alleging that the defendant had under it borrowed from him a sum of Rs. 53/-, out of which Rs. 3/- was paid by him on 20. 2. 47, but the balance was not paid even after serving a notice upon him THE plaintiff claimed a sum of Rs. 50/-by way of principal and -/9/- for ex-penses incurred in serving the notice THE defendant admitted having take, a loan as alleged by the plaintiff, but he pleaded that the plaintiff had borrowed from him a sum of Rs. 361/-, cut of which Rs. 50 was deducted by the plaintiff in repayment of the plaintiff's debt, and the plaintiff had written a 'slip' to him for the balance, i. e. Rs. 311/ -. THE defendant, therefore, ascerted that he did not owe anything to the plaintiff He produced a document, exhibit D. I. dated 15. 4. 47, which is addressed by the plaintiff to the defendant, and in which it is written that the plaintiff borrowed from the defendant Rs. 361/-, out of which Rs. 50/- had been set off against the debt which the defendant owed to the plaintiff, and for the balance of Rs. 311/- a slip had been separately written, which would be taken back on paying the amount, and this document was purported to have been written by way of a receipt for the repayment of Rs. 50/ -. It was alleged by the defendant that this document, though written by the defendant himself, bore the signature of the plaintiff. THE plaintiff denied his signature on this document. THE trial Court relied on the evidence of the defendant and also compared the alleged signature of the plaintiff on exhibit D-1 with his other signatures on the record, and came to the conclusion that the signature on exhibit D-1 was in fact that of the plaintiff, and dismissed the plaintiff's suit with costs. It may be stated here that the defendant had also produced one witness who was said to be the attesting witness to the document, but that witness also denied his signature on it, and the court below, after comparing his signature on the document in question with his other signatures, which were only on summons and other documents on the record, came to the conclusion that that signature was also of the attesting witness. In this revision it has been argued on behalf of the applicant that the court erred in comparing the signature of the plaintiff without the assistance of an expert, and, therefore, the finding of the lower court that the signature on exhibit D. 1 was that of the plaintiff should be set aside and the case should be sent back to the lower court for getting the alleged signature of the plaintiff on exhibit D. 1 examined by a hand-writing expert. It was also stressed that the court below acted wrongly in not sending the document to a hand-writing expert when the plaintiff had presented an application to that effect before that court. It may be observed that a revision under section 25 of the Small Cause Courts Act lies to the High Court only in order to satisfy itself whether the decree or order made in any case by a Court of Small Causes was according to law or not. In this case the finding of the lower court th\t exhibit D. 1 bears the signature of the plaintiff is one of fact, and it cannot be said to be without any evidence. The lower court has relied on the statement of the defendant himself in holding that the signature of the plaintiff en exhibit D. 1 is genuine and when the lower court has placed reliance on the evidence of the defendant, it cannot be said that the lower court was wrong in law in believing his evidence. Similarly it has been urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the learned Judge, Small Cause Court, ought not to have compared the signatures of the plaintiff and the attesting witness without the assistance of any hand-writing expert, and he has cited A. I. R. 1925 Calcutta 485, and A. I. R. 1935 Oudh 41 in support of his contention. But in A. I. R. 1925 Calcutta 485 it has been held that the Judge should not himself compare signatures without the help of other evidence. In the present case, so far as the signature of the plaintiff is concerned, the trial court has relied on the evidence of the defendant himself and, thereon, its conclusion is not based merely on its own inspection of the signature. In A. I. R. 1935 Oudh 41, following A. I. R. 1932 Calcutta 12, it. has been held that a comparison of hand-writing is at all times as a mode of proof hazardous and inconclusive, and especially when it is made by one not conversant with the subject and without such guidance as might be derived from the arguments of counsel and the evidence of experts. But as has been held in A. I. R. 1930 Nagpur 27, the court has power to compare the alleged genuine signature with admittedly genuine signature to come to a conclusion from it. In A. I. R. 1932 Bombay 538 it had been laid down that one of the ordinary methods of proving a hand-writing is by a comparison under, Section 73 of the Evidence Act of some or more of the admitted or proved specimens of hand-writing or signature of the person with the hand-writing or signature of the person with the hand-writing on or signature of the disputed document alleged to have been written or! signed by him, and if the Court on such comparison finds no appreciable difference it can refuse to call expert witnesses. The first paragraph of section 73 of the Evidence Act does not specifically state by whom the comparison may be made, though the second paragraph of the section dealing with a related subject expressly provides by way of contrast that in that particular connection the court may make the comparison. The comparison may be made by the Court or a competent witness called for the purpose and when the court has power to make a comparison and to arrive at a conclusion however hazardous or inconclusive such proof may be, it is perfectly legal mode of proving hand-writing, and it cannot be regarded as an error of law to base a conclusion even on such proof alone. But in this case, as has been stated above, the lower court has relied on the evidence of the defendant in arriving at its conclusion. The finding of the lower court therefore, cannot be set aside for this reason alone. There is also the evidence of Lakshmi Narain on the record, who has stated that he could identify the signature of the plaintiff. But the lower court has not discussed the evidence of this witness in its judgment. Under section 47 of the Evidence Act the opinion of any person acquainted with the hand-writing of the person by whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it was or was not written or signed by that person is a relevant fact, and the plaintiff has not shown by cross-examining him that he is really incompetent to testify under the said section. It was, however, not at all necessary for the lower court to compare the signature of the attesting witness Bal Singh with his other signatures on the record, and arrive at a finding that signature on Exhibit D. 1 was that of Bal Singh. But even ignoring this finding of the lower court it cannot be said that there is no other evidence to hold that the signature on exhibit D. 1 was not that of the plaintiff, and this finding cannot, therefore, be set aside in this revision. As regards the objection that the lower Court did not send exhibit 1 ). 1 to a hand-writing expert for comparison of the alleged signature of the plaintiff with that of his proved or admitted signatures, it may be observed that when the evidence of the defendant was going on, the plaintiff had filed an application before the lower court for the said document being sent to a hand-writing expert,but when the turn of the plaintiff for the production of his evidence came, he, inspite of being given several opportunities, did not produce any expert in his evidence, nor pressed his previous application, but, on the contrary, closed his evidence. As such his prayer cannot be granted at this stage. The result, therefore, is that the revision petition fails and is dismissed with costs. . ;


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