Sanjeev Prakash Sharma,J. - (1.) By way of this writ petition, the petitioner-Jaipur Development Authority (hereinafter referred as 'JDA') has assailed the order dated 17/01/2018 passed by the learned JDA Appellate Tribunal whereby the appeal preferred by the respondents under Section 83(8)(a) of the Jaipur Development Authority Act, 1982 has been allowed holding the respondents entitled to be allotted 15% of the developed land in terms of Circular dated 13/12/2001 in one or more available plots at Vidhyadhar Nagar, Gokul Nagar, Truck Terminal and Vaishali Nagar Schemes and has set aside the order dated 21/03/2017 whereby the JDA had rejected claim of the respondents.
(2.) The present case bears a chequered history and a brief reference to the same deserves to be noted. 2.1 The Defence Ministry of the Government of India required land for Field Firing Range near the existing cantonment area at Jaipur and the State of Rajasthan acquired land situated in revenue villages of Niwaroo Mansa Rampura, Boyatawala and Benad and exchanged the entire land acquired with the land in possession of military authorities situated; at present known as Vidhyadhar Nagar. 2.2 The peasants and farmers, whose land was acquired from the aforesaid villages, were originally having lands in pieces as members of the families as co-tenants. The respondents were one of those co-tenants and an award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 26/03/1983. 2.3 As has now come on record, the amount of compensation as enhanced by the reference court was never deposited by the State/JDA. 2.4 In the meanwhile, on 13/12/2001 the Government of Rajasthan issued a circular offering land in lieu of acquired land on submitting of option by such interested persons. The circular also mentioned that in cases where the land in lieu of acquired land is granted, no cash compensation was tobe paid. The application/option was sought from the erstwhile farmers/land owners upto 28/02/2002. 2.5 Admittedly, the respondents and other co-tenants which included one Chotu Ram submitted their option application for receiving 15% developed land in lieu of their land which was acquired. 2.6 The present litigation is a fall out from the earlier litigation which commenced when the JDA authorities, while invoking the circular dated 13/12/2001, allotted developed lands to some of the similarly situated persons whose land had been acquired while the others were deprived of such land in Vidhyadhar Scheme. 2.7 When an auction notice for selling of group housing plots was issued, it was challenged before the JDA Appellate Tribunal. The Tribunal annulled the said auction notice vide its judgment dated 18/08/2003 and held that the JDA would not be able to sell or auction plots till the concerned appellants are allotted 15% developed land in Vidhyadhar Scheme. 2.8 A writ petition was preferred by the JDA before this Court which came to be dismissed on 04/01/2005. Thereafter, the Deputy Secretary. Housing Department of the Government of Rajasthan vide its letter dated 01/07/2005 offered 15% of the land in terms of circular dated 13/12/2001 to the land owners/Khatedars and beneficiaries, whose land had been acquired, at village Lalchandpura and Anantpura by way of lottery system. 2.9 The said decision was again challenged before the JDA Appellate Tribunal and the JDA Appellate Tribunal vide its judgment dated 18/10/2005 again reiterated that they were entitled to allotment of 15% of the developed land in Vidhyadhar Nagar Scheme and restrained from allotting or selling such land to others. It recorded that the land at Vidhyadhar Nagar has been handed over to JDA in lieu of the land acquired for Field Firing Range by the Ministry of Defence and therefore, the JDA was bound to provide the same to the Khatedars whose land has been acquired for Field Firing Range and could not have been asked to take developed land at Lalchandpura and Anantpura village which was far off and was not even developed. 2.10.It is an admitted position that one Sedu and Nathu, whose land had also been acquired, had already been allotted 15% developed land in Vidhyadhar Nagar Scheme, however, the rest had not been allotted. 2.11 When the order dated 18/10/2005 was not complied with, SB Civil Writ Petition No.9908/2008 came to be filed before this Court and vide judgment dated 23/10/2008, the learned Single Judge directed the JDA to comply with the directions within a period of two months noticing that the judgment of the Tribunal dated 18/10/2005 had not been challenged. 2.12 DB Special Appeal No.1879/2008 was preferred by the JDA which came tobe dismissed by Division Bench of this Court on 17/11/2008. 2.13 SLP was preferred which also came to be disposed of by the Supreme Court on 20/07/2009. 2.14 In the meanwhile, the JDA assailed the original order passed by the JDA Tribunal dated 18/10/2005 in SB Civil Writ Petition No.539/2009. 2.15 In the circumstances, the Supreme Court, while disposing of SLP No.2901/2009, observed that the order passed by the Division Bench upholding the order of the Single Bench would be subject to any order which may be passed in the writ petition assailing the original order of the Tribunal dated 18/10/2005. 2.16 The writ petition No.539/2009 filed by the JDA against the Tribunal's order was dismissed on 11/01/2010 and thereafter DB Special Appeal No.276/2010 was filed before the Division Bench. The Division Bench vide its judgment dated 12/08/2011 held that the JDA Tribunal's decision was beyond the purview of its jurisdiction and it was not open for it to direct the JDA for allotment of land at Vidhyadhar Nagar Scheme and further held that the circular dated 13/12/2001 having not been issued in the name of Governor of the State as required under Article 166(1) of the Constitution of India and mandated under Article 166(2) thereof, could not be considered as a statutory direction and does not have any statutory force and therefore, could not have been said to be enforceable in law. 2.17 The decision of the Division Bench came to be challenged before the Supreme Court by Lala Ram and other appellants in bunch of Civil Appeals which came to be allowed by the Supreme Court in its decision reported in 2016(11) SCC 31 (Lala Ram and Ors. v. Jaipur Development Authority and Anr.) and four other Civil Appeals and the Supreme Court held as under:- "61. As per Rule 8, subject to the orders of the Chief Minister Under Rule 14, all cases referred to in the Second Schedule to the Rules would be brought before the Council or a Sub-committee thereof in accordance with the provisions of the Rules contained in Part III. The restriction in matters in which finance department is required to be consulted Under Rule 10 is carved out in the proviso to Rule 8. Rule 9 in categorical terms underlines that the Minister-in- charge or the Minister of State-in-charge of a department shall be primarily responsible for the disposal of the business pertaining to that department. While Rule 11 enjoins that all orders or instruments made or executed by or on behalf of the Government of Rajasthan shall be expressly made or executed in the name of the Governor, Rule 12 requires that every order or instrument of the Government shall be signed by a Secretary, a Special Secretary, an Additional Secretary, a Joint Secretary etc. as enumerated therein so much so that such signature shall be deemed to be a proper authentication of such order or instrument. 117. Even otherwise, having regard to the consistency in approach of the State Government in the matter of allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation as is evident from the series of circulars commencing from 22.4.1992 to 27.10.2005 in continuum, motivated by the objective of early culmination of the process of acquisition of land on the spirit of mutual settlement, the same irrefutably present an inviolable scheme of proclaimed State action for compliance, thereby making it invocable against the Respondents, more particularly as the same had been acted upon over the years. The plea of the Respondents, at this belated stage, to take refuge of unenforceability of the circular dated 13.12.2001 in isolation, as not being a binding policy, cannot receive judicial imprimatur. 118. The process leading to the allotment of land at Lalchandpura and Anantpura villages, as the records produced discloses, did originate from the circular dated 13.12.2001, and received the approval of the Chief Minister at an appropriate stage. It would thus be conspicuously patent, that all concerned State functionaries were not only aware of the relevance and the obligatory bearing of the said circular, but also had participated in the exercise, contemplated by it for allotment of developed land in lieu of compensation. The Respondents, in the totality of the existent facts and circumstances are thus estopped from questioning the status and efficacy of the said circular in vesting a right in the Appellants to claim their due in law there under. 121. Be that as it may, the land offered to the Appellants at Lalchandpura and Anantpura as well as at Boytawala and Mansarampura have been held by this Court, as recently on 7.5.2015, to be not fully developed and more importantly conceded to be so by the JDA as recorded in the said order. According to the JDA, it would require further two years to develop the land thereat. The land of the Appellants, as acquired, was situated at Boytawala which, thus has not yet been fully developed as on date. Thus, in any view of the matter, the market value of the land at Boytawala cannot be an acceptable yardstick to identify the developed land to which they are entitled. This is more so, as for the last thirty years and above, the Respondents have failed to allot 15% developed land as envisaged by the policy to the Appellants. Admittedly, two of the land oustees had been allotted developed land at Vidyadhar Nagar and as the letter dated 16.10.2007 referred to hereinabove would reveal, till then, land at the same site was available. As a matter of fact, allotment of land at Lalchandpura, Anantpura, Boytawala and Mansarampura, which admittedly had not been fully developed, was in breach of the promise engrafted in the policy dated 13.12.2001. 129. In summa, the right to property having been elevated to the status of human rights, it is inherent in every individual, and thus has to be venerably acknowledged and can, by no means, be belittled or trivialized by adopting an unconcerned and nonchalant disposition by anyone, far less the State, after compulsorily acquiring his land by invoking an expropriatory legislative mechanism. The judicial mandate of human rights dimension, thus, makes it incumbent on the State to solemnly respond to its constitutional obligation to guarantee that a land looser is adequately compensated. The proposition does not admit of any compromise or laxity. 138. In course of the arguments, as adverted to hereinabove, host of pleadings have been exchanged portraying contrary view points on the developed status of the land sought to be allotted, the summary whereof has been extracted hereinabove. It appears there from that the sites at Boytawala, Lalchandpura, Anantpura and Mansarampura are located within a range of 14.70 K.M. to 39 K.M. from the central point Jaipur, the nearest being at Boytawala. All these lands have been recorded by this Court, as admitted by the JDA, to be not fully developed. The plots offered by the Respondents at Rohini Phase I, Anupam Vihar, Pitambara Scheme including Rajbhawan Yojana, Rohini Phase II, Abhinav Vihar Vistar and Harit Vihar are situated within a distance of 25.40 K.M. to 36.80 K.M. from the central point, Jaipur. 140. At this distant point of time, we are disinclined to sustain this demur of the Respondents. As the facts have unfolded, the Appellants cannot be held accountable for the delay in between, the Respondents having failed to offer developed land as contemplated in the policy. This stands fortified, amongst others, by the order dated 7.5.2015 vis-a- vis the land at Boytawala, Lal Chandpura, Anantpura and Mansarampura. The other plots offered by the Respondents, also having regard to the attributes of developed land as envisioned by the Rajasthan Act do not accord with the letter and spirit of the policy. " 2.18 The Supreme Court then directed as under:- "154. In the overall view of the matter, we are of the confirmed opinion, that in the singular facts and circumstances of the case and for the sake of complete justice, the Appellants are entitled to be allotted their quota of 15% developed land in the terms of policy/circular dated 13.12.2001 in one or more available plots at Vidyadhar Nagar, Gokul Nagar, Truck Terminal and Vaishali Nagar as enumerated by them in their affidavit dated 17.8.2015. The Respondents are hereby directed to accommodate them accordingly. 155. In the wake up of above, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment and order is set- aside. The Respondents would allot the developed land as per policy decision dated 13.12.2001 to the Appellants at the places indicated hereinabove without fail and within a period of six weeks herefrom. To secure a permanent resolution to the lingering lis, the Respondents would ensure that a transparent and fair process is undertaken, if necessary, to be overseen by an appropriate authority to obviate any disparity in treatment in the matter of allotment as ordered. 156. We part with the belief and expectation that the Respondents would be alive to their duty cast by law and would not precipitate any further cause of action necessitating the intervention of this Court with stringent initiatives. No costs." 2.19 However, while the Supreme Court expected the JDA to remain alive to its duty cast by law, the JDA has again taken up this litigation when the Tribunal passed order in favour of the present respondents granting them the same relief under the Circular dated 13/12/2001 as had been granted earlier in its order dated 18/10/2005 and ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court.
(3.) Written submissions have been filed by the JDA and it is stated that plots had been allotted in Lalchandpura and Anantpura to the respondent-Ghasiram in the year 2005 and after 12 years, he cannot challenge the same. It is further submitted that the respondents were not parties to the litigation which was initiated before the JDA Appellate Tribunal in the year 2003 by Choturam and others and culminated vide judgment dated 01/12/2015. The JDA has further asserted that while the entire land acquired of the co-tenants including the respondents and Choturam was 37 Bigha 16 Biswa out of total 1368 Bigha 13 Biswa, the share of Chotu Ram was much less and as Choturam alone had taken up the cause on the basis of circular dated 13/12/2001, 15% developed land equal to the share of co-tenant Choturam, could be given to him alone and it is stated that so far as Choturam is concerned, he has been already allotted the said land after he preferred contempt petition before the Supreme Court. 3.1 The JDA does not deny this fact that Choturam had again preferred contempt petition and also stated that he was representing all the other co-tenants who jointly had 37 Bigha and 16 Biswa land but it is stated that as Choturam withdrew the contempt petition, the present respondents could not have claimed 15% developed land in Vidhyadhar Nagar Scheme as they have been sleeping over their rights and were waiting in the stands. 3.2 The JDA has further asserted that one of the co-tenant Murli son of Hukma had accepted the allotment at Lalchandpura and Anantpura and therefore, the appeal before the JDA Appellate Tribunal for seeking 15% developed land at Vidhyadhar Nagar Scheme and other three areas against the total land of 37 Bigha 16 Biswa was not maintainable. The submission of the JDA is further to the count that representation had been made by Choturam on which the JDA passed order on 21/03/2017 rejecting the representation of Choturam while the appeal was preferred by Ghasiram and the same was therefore, not maintainable and the JDA Appellate Tribunal ought to have rejected the appeal. It is asserted by the JDA that the Supreme Court was only referring to the shares of the appellants before it and therefore, the benefit of the said judgment could not be claimed by the other co-tenants/ khatedars as they had not claimed for 15% developed land at that relevant time. 3.3 Learned counsel for the JDA has also taken this Court to the pleadings of the memo of appeal filed by Choturam and it is asserted that from perusal whereof it is seen that there is no pleading about the appeal being filed by or on behalf of the Khatedars of acquired land of 37 Bigha 16 Biwas or on behalf of the family. The claim of the respondents, therefore, is stalled and old and cannot be accepted. 3.4 Learned counsel for the JDA relied on the judgment passed in Ambey Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar and Anr.: 1996(9) SCC 84, more particularly para 4, which reads as under:- "4. We accept the finding of the High Court that the appellant had not made any application under Section 18, though the appellant has asserted that she did make an application but no evidence has been placed before the High Court or in this Court. Thus, is difficult to accept that such an application was in fact made before the Land Acquisition Officer within the limitation prescribed under Section 18(2) of the Act. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant had not filed any application, as required under Section 18(1) read with Section 18(2) of the Act. Section 53 does not apply to the facts of the case. The procedure prescribed under Section 18 and 30 is inconsistent with the procedure prescribed under Order 1, Rule 10 CPC. Order 1, Rule 10 CPC would apply to implead a necessary or proper party to effectuate complete adjudication of all the disputes having arisen between all the necessary or proper parties who may be bound by the decision. That question does not arise since inconsistent procedure has been prescribed under the Act. As held earlier, making an application in writing under Sub-section (1) and within the limitation prescribed under-Sub-section (2) of Section 18 are conditions precedent for the Land Acquisition Officer to make a reference under Section 18; only on its receipt, under Section 20 Civil Court jurisdiction to issue notice and thereafter to conduct enquiry, as contemplated under the Act. At that stage, the procedure of trial etc., as contemplated under the CPC, would apply and Section 53 of the Act would become applicable. It is an admitted position that the co-owner filed an application and had sought reference under Section 18 in respect of his share only. So, it is, as a fact, claims for compensation in specie and was paid towards 1/4th share to the claimants. By no stretch of imagination, the application under Section 18(1) by one of the co- sharers would be treated as one made on behalf of all the co-shares. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant is not entitled to lay any higher compensation pursuant to an award made by the reference Court under Section 26 at the instance of one of the co- owners." 3.5 Learned counsel for JDA has also relied on the judgment in Ashwani Kumar Dhingra v. State of Punjab :1992(2) SCC 592, more particularly para 8 which reads as under:- "8. We are afraid that the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon has no application to the facts of the present case. In the writ petition No. 3465 of 1973 or Letters Patent Appeal No. 14 of 1977 neither the appellant's father nor his brother made any representation that they were filing writ petition on behalf of the appellant herein either express or by necessary implication. The earlier litigation referred to by us was filed by Shri Sudhir Kumar Dhingra and Shri Nand Lal Dhingra (brother and father of the appellant respectively) in their own right only and not on behalf of the appellant herein. Father and brother had not pleaded any coparcenary with the appellant herein. Before us also no co-parcenary is being pleaded by the appellant with his father and brother. Only co- ownership or coparcenary was claimed with his brother Shri Sudhir Kumar Dhingra. There could be no coparcenary in the presence of the father between the brothers only by excluding the father. One co-owner may challenge the acquisition whereas the other co- owner may be satisfied with the acquisition and ask for compensation and even for enhancement of compensation; other brother may challenge the acquisition proceedings in his own right; merely because one brother accepts compensation, other brother is not estopped from challenging acquisition. Similarly, where one co-owner challenges acquisition, his rights will not be affected merely because other co- owner had accepted acquisition and the compensation." 3.6 Learned Counsel for the JDA has also relied upon judgment in M/s. Rup Diamonds and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.:1989(2) SCC 356, more particularly Para 8 which reads as under:- "8. Apart altogether from the merits of the grounds for rejection - on which it cannot be said that the mere rejection of the Special Leave Petitions in the cases of M/s. Ripal Kumar and Co., and M/s. H. Patel and Co., could, by itself, be construed as the imprimatur of this Court on the correctness of the decisions sought to be appealed against -there is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a Court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring this writ petition which is brought after almost an year after the first rejection. From the orders in M/s. Ripal Kumar and Co.'s case and M/s. H. Patel and Co.'s case it is seen that in the former case the application for revalidation and endorsement was made on 12-3-1984 within four months of the date of the redemption certificate dated 16-11-1983 and in the latter case the application for revalidation was filed on 20-6-1984 in about three months from the Redemption Certificate dated 9-3-1984." 3.7 Learned counsel for the JDA has submitted that the family settlement placed on record before the Tribunal could not have been looked into by the Tribunal as it was part of the appeal as preferred by Choturam earlier. However, it is submitted that if the family settlement is read, it shows that part of 37 Bigha and 16 Biswa land had been sold by unregistered sale deed to one Ranveer Singh son of Chanda Ram and therefore, the claim of the respondents ought not be entertained. It is further submitted that if at all claim was to be made, the respondents sought to have persuaded the contempt petition before Hon'ble the Supreme Court. Learned counsel further submitted that the decision of the Supreme Court cannot be treated to be a judgment in rem as the earlier order passed by the Supreme Court dated 07/05/2015 makes it clear that directions were only for the appellants before the Supreme Court. The note-sheets of the JDA also could not have been relied upon for the purpose of deciding the appeal.;