BALIA, J. - (1.) THESE five petitions raise an identical question. The proceedings were initiated for reassessment under Sec. 30 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1994 has been held to be invalid by the Rajasthan Taxation Tribunal inasmuch as notices in each case have been issued after the expiry of 5 years from the end of relevant assessment year. The notices were issued on 6. 8. 98. The period prescribed for issuing notices under sub-sec. 1 or sub-Sec. 2 in respect of escaped assessment is `not after the expiry of 5 years from the end of relevant assessment year. '
(2.) LEARNED counsel for the Revenue has urged that the Tribunal has erred in not considering that all the relevant assessment years in respect of which notices had been issued ended prior to 1. 4. 91. During the relevant assessment year in respect of which reassessment is to be made, the period prescribed for initiating reassessment proceedings was 8 years from the end of relevant assessment year u/s. 12 of the Rajasthan Sales Tax Act, 1954 as it then existed and, therefore, limitation of initiating proceedings in respect of those assessment years will be governed by the unamendment provisions of the Act of 1954 as were in force during the relevant assessment year in each case. W. e. f. 1. 4. 91 the Act of 1954 was amended by reducing the period within which action for reassessment could be initiated u/s. 12 from 8 years to 5 years. Under Rajasthan Sales Tax Act 1994 also the period within which the Assessing Officer can exercise his jurisdiction to initiate reassessment proceedings is only 5 years from the end of relevant Assessment Year. Each Assessment Year ends on 31. 03. and New Assessment Year commences on 1st of April each year. The tax has to be assessed for each Assessment year independently. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner suffers from apparent falacy. Sec. 30 provides procedure to be adopted by the Assessing Officer in case he has reason to believe that there is escapment of tax from assessment in respect of any period interior to taking of action. It also confers power on the Assessing Officer to reopen the completed assessments in the circumstances stated under the Statute. Whether an officer has necessary jurisdiction or authority to take an action under the Statute is governed by the provisions of Statute as on date when such power is sought to be exercised and not with reference to any anterior date, unless the law otherwise provide. The conditions for exercise of power conferred on any Statutory functionary under the provisions of relevant statute is governed by the provisions of the said Statute. The conferment of a power is always an enabling provision and does not vest any substantive right on the authority to exercise such power at future at any time in respect of any matter when he chosses to do. His action must conform to the law governing exercise of such power at the time when such power is invoked. When the Act of 1954 was amended in 1991 reducing the period within which power of initiating proceedings for reassessment could be exercised from 8 years to 5 years, thenceforth the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to invoke provisions of Sec. 12 of the Act of 1959 or on commencement of new Act u/s. 30 of the Act of 1994 at any time before end of 5 years from the end of relevant Assessment year and not thereafter. No provisions were made for saving the repealed provision about exercise of such power in respect of Assessment years ending prior to 1. 4. 91. One may refer to Sec. 30 of the Limitation Act, 1963 which repealed the Act of 1908 governing the law of limitation in the matter of filing suits. In such case where limitation prescribed under the new Act was shorter than what was prescribed under repealed Act, a special provision has to be made saving such causes from getting barred by time due to prescribing the shorter period. In construing the provisions of Sec. 12 of the repealed Act or Sec. 30 of the Act of 1994 the question of retrospective operation of the amendment does not at all arise. The question of considering jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer is not a continuing matter. The question whether the Assessing Officer had jurisdiction to initiate proceedings in the context of period within which such power is to be exercised, can be answered only at the time when such power is exercised. The only question that requires consideration in judging the validity of exercise of jurisdiction is whether at the time the Authority exercised such jurisdiction he could as per law on the date of exercise of power could take action. If the answer is in affirmative the proceedings are validly instituted and cannot became invalid because subsequently Assessing Officer loses jurisdiction. Nor his action can be saved with reference to anterior provision, if as on the date of exercise of power he did not have such jurisdiction. In such event his action becomes without authority which cannot culminate in a valid proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law. In S. C. Parasher & Anr. vs. Vasantsen Dwarka Das & Ors. (1), Hidayatullah and Raghubar Dayal JJ. , made the following observation: " What the law does by prescribing certain periods of time for action is to create a bar against its own officers administrating the law. " Thus prescribing limit of period for initiating reassessment proceedings is check on the exercise of power officials administrating the Act and is not for conferring any vested right to exercise such power in future.
(3.) WE may invite attention to the decision of this court in C. T. O. vs. M/s. Shreenath Emporium (2), taking a similar view where the court opined, on considering the provisions of General Clauses Act and decision of Supreme Court in Ram Prasad Dagaduram vs. Vijay Kumar Motilal Hirakhanwala & other (3) and S. C. Parashar vs. Vasantsen Dwarkadas (supra), that: " prescribing of period under the taxing statutes are usually not considered as law of repose. That is to say that for all times, in such cases law authority re-opening of closed assessment is to be looked as on the date power thereunder is to be exercised. It is not a case for enforcement of right but it is a case of exercise of power by the authority designated under the relevant statute. When the officer takes recourse to the proceedings and exercises his power, it has to accord with provision at the time the authority under the statute seeks to exercise power conferred by statute, it has to be in accordance of conditions under which such power can be exercised. There is no vested right in any authority to exercise powers in future. " Accordingly, we find no force in these petitions and these are hereby dismissed. .;