BALIA, J. - (1.) HEARD learned counsel for the petitioner.
(2.) THE petitioner, who claims to be allotted land in Sukhadia Nagar vide order dated 8. 7. 1983 Plot No. 3a-30 has challenged the communication dated 5. 09. 2000 from the Dy. Secretary, Government of Rajasthan that as per directions that the land acquisition proceedings in pursuance of notification dated 8. 7. 92 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act and declaration dated 30. 10. 1993 under Section 6 for implementing the Sukhadia Nagar project has lapsed because no award was made within the period prescribed under Section 11a. He further communicated that as per the report dated 20. 7. 2000 over the land under the acquisition a large number of houses have already been constructed, therefore, it is now not desirable to proceed with the acquisition proceedings of the land referred to in the award and it was further directed that the constructed houses on the land in question may be regularised in accordance with the law concerning regularisation of such allotments. It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order in stating that the land acquisition proceeding stated lapsed on the basis of Division Bench decision of this Court in Sudharshana Devi vs. State of Rajasthan (1), is apparently erroneous inasmuch as no question as to validity or otherwise of the land acquisition proceedings relating to the land in question has been decided by the Division Bench and the decision given in that regard by the learned Single Judge in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1493/2000 on 18. 5. 2000 that the land acquisition proceedings have lapsed was not held to be binding as it was not necessary for the decision of the case. It was also contended by the learned counsel that they are entitled to get the same land allotted to them under the allotment letter dated 8. 07. 1983 Annexure-5 inasmuch as the land even if it became the property of the respondent Urban Improvement Trust after the order of allotment was issued, they are still entitled to enforce the allotment letter issued in their favour by applying provision of Section 13 of the Specific Relief Act. In this connection, it was contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that they case their case on the premise that the land acquisition proceedings commenced by the Urban Improvement Trust, Shri Ganganagar vide notification dated 8. 07. 1987 published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 30. 07. 1987 continues to hold the field in view of the amendment in the Urban Improvement Trust Act by insertion of 60a with the previous assent of the President in 1995. Therefore, the land having already vested in the Urban Improvement Trust, they are entitled to enforce the letter of allotment in their favour, notwithstanding lapse of the proceedings of the land acquisition that commenced in respect of very same land by issuing a notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 on being published in the Rajasthan Gazette dated 8. 07. 1992 in pursuance of which declaration under section 6 was also published on 30. 10. 1993 because of the not making of award within the time provided under section 11a of the Land Acquisition Act. Mr. M. S. Singhvi learned counsel appearing for the respondent caveators urged that the petitioners were allotted land when the Urban Improvement Trust had no jurisdiction over the land in question and such allotment did not give them any right which could even be enforced through a decree for specific performance of an agreement to sell. They have no locus to intermeddle with the land acquisition proceedings which have subsequently commenced and taken their course under law through various stages. A remedy against the said order of allotment Annexure-5 which at best cannot amount anything more than an assurance to allot the land if, as and when, the land in question becomes the property of Urban Improvement Trust and through such an assurance to allot land inasmuch as on the date the allotment letter was issued no right was created even to enforce the same in favour of the petitioners. They are alien to the land acquisition proceedings which commenced thereafter and therefore, they have no locus to invite attention to the legality and validity or otherwise to such proceedings. It was also urged by Mr. Singhvi that the notification dated 8. 07. 1987 was invalidated by this Court in 1991 by order dated 12. 9. 1991 passed in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 1683/91. Since as on the date Section 60a was inserted in 1995 no proceedings were pending in respect of the land in question under the Urban Improvement Trust Act which could be revived. It was further contended that even before amendment have come into force in 1995, the State Government and the Urban Improvement Trust having accepted the judgment had opted to resort to the fresh land acquisition proceedings for the very same land at the behest of the Urban Improvement Trust and issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect of the same land for the very same purpose. Therefore, the proceedings, not only stood quashed by the order of this Court referred to above but stood superseded by the act of acquisition authority by issuing fresh notification to fulfil its purpose, and therefore, only the proceedings which could be carried to legitimate conclusion would be the new proceedings initiated in 1992 which were pending proceedings as in 1995 when new Section 60a was inserted. It was also urged that the remedy, if any, under plea raised by the petitioners is to seek specific performance of letter of allotment dated 8. 07. 1983 by filing a civil suit in an appropriate civil court. Such a recourse would also become barred by the time the present writ petition was filed inasmuch as if the contention of the petitioners is accepted that the land became vested in Urban Improvement Trust in 1987 then right to enforce that agreement arose in 1987 and a suit for specific performance of the agreement to allot land vide Annex.-5 ought to have been filed within the period of limitation w. e. f. that date. Assuming that right arose once again in 1995 because of the validation Act, the suit for specific performance of the agreement as on date of filing of this writ petition would still be barred by time. Ordinarily extraordinary jurisdiction ought not to be invoked in aid of enforcement of stale claims for which remedy under ordinary law has become barred by time as it would entail indirect refuting the scheme of debarring adjudication of stale claims. These facts are not in dispute before me that in the first instance a notification to acquire the land in question under Section 4 of the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act has been issued on 23rd April 1980 and declaration under Section 6 had been issued on 11. 03. 1981 along with notice under Section 17 (4) of the said Act and possession in pursuance thereof had also been taken. However, the said acquisition proceedings were quashed by order of this Court dated 6. 5. 83. It is after the said acquisition proceedings have been quashed and before the fresh acquisition proceedings have even been initiated that allotment letters have been issued for allotting the land in question which undisputedly was not vesting in the Urban Improvement Trust on the date of such allotment. Though he had deposited part of the allotment price envisaged under allotment, the possession in pursuance of that allotment had never been given to the petitioners. As noticed above the issuance of notice under Section 52 of the Urban Improvement Trust Act on 30. 07. 1987 in the first instance again proved to be abortive inasmuch as the same was quashed by this Court on 12. 9. 91. This order was not challenged either by the State Government or by the Urban Improvement Trust, the acquiring authority, for whom the land was to be acquired. Thereafter, on the request of the Urban Improvement Trust another notification under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued on 8. 07. 1992 for the very same purpose and declaration under section 6 was also issued on 30. 10. 1993. However, no award could be made in respect of the said land in pursuance of the acquisition proceedings until 1999. In the first instance the Land Acquisition Officer has submitted an award by accepting 11. 03. 1981, the date of the first notification, which stood quashed in 1983, for determining the market value of land and quantum of compensation payable by the Urban Improvement Trust for disbursement to the awardees. The State Government pointed out that notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued only in 1992, there is no jurisdiction for taking the date of 1981 as the basis for the purpose of determining the compensation which has to be determined under section 23 (1) of the Act of 1894 under which proceedings had been taken at the market price of the land in question as on the date of the notification under section 4 (1) of the Act. As sufficient period had elapsed since the allotment letters were issued by the Urban Improvement Trust in 1983 and its efforts to secure the rights over the land in question, have successively failed. Out of 225 allotments made in 1983, 11 persons were left out who could not be given land. It was thought advisable that the Urban Improvement Trust allot some alternative land of equal value to those 11 persons so as to settle the equity. This order dated 26. 04. 2000 issued by the State Government was challenged by the present writ petitioners in S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 2834/2000. That writ petition was dismissed inter alia on the ground that the proceedings of the acquisition had lapsed and the petitioners cannot have subsisting right in respect of that land by the learned Single Judge. On appeal, the Division Bench held that since the question of validity of land acquisition proceedings were not before the court, nor the order spoke about lapsing of proceedings, there was no occasion to go into the question whether the acquisition proceedings commenced in 1992 had lapsed or are still pending. It was further held that no direction can be issued either to allot the very same land to the petitioner as was identified in 1983 in the circumstances of this case, in which even on petitioners' own showing land acquisition proceedings, even if the same are held to be pending, are not completed. The question of validity of pendency of the acquisition proceedings was not decided expressly. However, the court further observed that it is true that the order appears to have been made in the interest of petitions only who were awaiting allotment of land since 1983. It is equally true that if the land under acquisition is not available for any reason, the same cannot be allotted to the petitioners. In such event, the only viable solution available for the State was to offer alternative land. It is for the petitioner either to secure alternative land offered by the State or to get refund of the amount deposited by them. If the petitioners are not willing to accept the option for securing alternative land in place of earlier allotted land because of non availability of the land immediately, which may or may not be available in future also, it is their option but no issue arose about the validity of the land acquisition proceedings of 1992. In the present circumstances, it was beyond the scope of the writ petition and to that extent the order cannot be sustained.
(3.) THEREAFTER the Dy. Secretary by his communication dated 5. 09. 2000 conveyed the direction of the State that because the courts have already held that the proceedings have lapsed and that now there is no jurisdiction to acquire the land in question, necessary proceedings may be taken for regularisation of the land and most part of which is constructed. The petitioners have challenged this order for the reasons stated hereinabove. The observation made by the Division Bench in earlier case, in my opinion, still holds good. The fact that the petitioner was given a letter of allotment when the Urban Improvement Trust grantee had no interest in the land makes it abundantly clear that the allotment itself does not give any right to the petitioner to enforce that letter against the Urban Improvement Trust. The petitioner raises the contention on the basis that after the allotment was made in favour of the petitioner, the land stood vested in Urban Improvement Trust vide notification dated 8. 07. 1987 and published on 30. 07. 1987 possession had already been with the Urban Improvement Trust under the earlier proceedings which have been held to be void, there was no impedement so far as the Urban Improvement Trust is concerned to deliver the possession of the land in his favour since vesting took place in 1987. As noticed above, since the allotment much water flown, 1987 proceedings had been held to be invalid by this Court in a judgment which was never challenged and even now it is not said that the judgment was bad for any reasons other than the subsequent amendment which may result in validating the action taken on 30. 07. 1987. Moreover a judgment of the court, unless revered or set aside, remains binding and operative so far as the dispute it decides. Merely because, ratio of the decision or legal principle has wrongly been applied, does not lose its binding effect on the lis it decides, notwithstanding, it may lose its efficacy as a binding precedent, even if it is held to be impliedly overruled. Overruling of a decision in its effects is vitally different from reversing of a decision. The former destroys its force as binding precedent, without affecting the actual result of the lis it decides, in the latter case the efficacy of judgment is lost both as a precedent and decision of lis. The fact remains that after the said notification was quashed in 1991 immediately thereafter at the behest of the Urban Improvement Trust the State Government has resorted to fresh acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in 1992 and also issued a declaration under Section 6 and the Land Acquisition Officer had also proceeded to complete those proceedings. Thus, with the quashing of notification under Urban Improvement Trust Act by a judicial pronouncement, followed fresh land acquisition proceedings when no other proceedings were pending and as on the date amendment in Raj. U. I. T. Act came into force in 1995, only valid proceedings pending were under Land Acquisition Act under notification of Section 4 dated 8. 7. 1992. Thus the seed of proceedings under Urban Improvement Trust Act dated 30. 7. 87, stood extinct. In such case revival of proceedings under Urban Improvement Trust Act could not arise. ;