MADAN, J. - (1.) BY this writ petition, the petitioner has challenged the order dated 27. 1. 2000 of the Central Administrative Tribunal Jaipur whereby it allowed OA No. 92/97 and set aside the order dated 16. 2. 1996 of the petitioner terminating the respondent employee from service.
(2.) THE factual matrix leading to this writ petition is that admittedly out of three vacancies notified by petitioner No. 2 under letter dated 5. 2. 95, three candidates were selected by the DPC under its order dated 11. 2. 1995 according to which respondent No. 2 (Pawan Kumar Jhanjaria) was selected at S. No. 2, and accordingly, by order dated 28. 7. 1995 (Ann. 3) respondent No. 2 was appointed as Postal Assistant at Chirawa HQ on purely temporary basis duty governed by CCS/cca Rules, with the stipulation that his service would be terminated without prior notice if his educational certificates are found false. As per report dated 4. 10. 1995 (Ann. 4), upon inquiry having been made by Shri N. R. Meena Asstt. Superintendent of Post Offices, Jhunjhunu in consultation with the Statistical Officer, Bihar Intermediate Education Council, Patna, the educational certificates produced by the respondent No. 2 alongwith his application for appointment as Postal Assistant, were found incorrect, thereby under order dated 16. 2. 1996 (Ann. 5) the petitioner No. 4 terminated respondent No. 2 from service in pursuance of proviso to sub rule (i) of Rule 5 of the Central Civil Services (Temporary Service) Rules, 1965. Against his termination, respondent No. 2 had presented representation on 21. 5. 96 followed by reminders dated 6. 6. 96 (Ann. 18 in OA), 30. 6. 96 besides other representations (Annexures A5, A12, A13 & A14 to the OA), but with no response. Hence, respondent No. 2 presented OA No. 92/97 (Ann. 6) before Central Administrative Tribunal Jaipur on 3. 3. 97. THE petitioners (Postal Department) submitted their reply (Ann. 7) to the OA. Rejoinder (Ann. 8) to the petitioners' reply also filed by the respondent employee. After hearing the parties, the Tribunal by its order dated 27. 1. 2000 (Ann. 9) allowed the employee's OA No. 92/97 and set aside his termination holding it as illegal, capricious and in violation of Articles 14, 16 & 311 (2) of the Constitution, and accordingly it directed the postal department (petitioners herein) to reinstate the respondent employee (applicant in OA No. 92/97) in service with all consequential benefits, against which this writ petition arises. Mr. K. N. Shrimal learned counsel for the Postal Department (petitioner) contended inter-alia that the learned Tribunal failed to consider the aspect of the O. A. itself being time barred as the same having been filed on 3. 3. 1997 after more than one year of the impugned termination order dated 16. 2. 1996, whereas a duty is cast upon the Tribunal U/s 21 of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 not to entertain an application being barred by limitation. He placed reliance upon decision of the Apex Court in Hukumraj Khinvsara vs. Union of India (1 ). Moreover the respondent employee having alternative remedy of appeal against his termination, could have preferred an appeal, and having failed to do so, the Tribunal should not have entertained the OA No. 92/97 by interfering with the impugned order of termination of the employee (respondent No. 2 ). Next contention canvassed by Shri Shrimal is that the respondent employee as per his initial appointment being a temporary employee was terminated from service by impugned order (Ann. 5) strictly in accordance with Rule 5 (1) (a) (b) of the CCS Rules 1965, inasmuch as the impugned termination being purely innocuous was merely a termination simpliciter as it did not impose any stigma on respondent No. 2 and further because as per report of Shri N. R. Meena submitted to the Post Master General Jodhpur, the mark sheet produced by respondent No. 2 bearing Roll No. 10398 was false,which resulted in the impugned termination, for which no prior notice or departmental enquiry was necessary according to initial appointment itself being purely on probation. Shri Ajay Rastogi learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 (employee) supported the impugned order of the Tribunal and placed reliance upon the decisions of the Apex Court in Union of India vs. Jay Kumar Parida (2) and Director General of Police vs. Mrityunjoy Sarkar In Hukumraj vs. Union of India (supra), only question which arose was whether the application seeking implementation of the earlier order of the Tribunal was barred by limitation ? According to the Apex Court, the final order passed by the Tribunal is executable under Section 27 of the Administrative Tribunals Act within one year from the date of its becoming final, and final order was passed on March 13, 1992, consequently the appellant therein was required to file the execution application within one year from the said date unless the order of the Tribunal was suspended by it in a special leave petition/appeal which is not the case here. In our considered view, we do not dispute the dictum of law laid down by the Apex Court but since in the instant case the facts are different hence ratio of decision (supra) does not help the petitioner in advancing its cause in this writ petition.
(3.) SECTION 21 of the Administrative Tribunals Act prescribes limitation. Its sub section (1) (a) postulates that: " (1) A Tribunal shall not admit an application,- (a) in a case where a final order such as is mentioned in Clause (a) of sub section (2) of SECTION 20 has been made in connection with the grievance unless the application is made within one year from the date on which such final order has been made. " (b) in a case where an appeal or representation such as in mentioned in Clause (b) of sub section (2) of SECTION 20 has been made and a period of six months had expired thereafter without such final order having been made, within one year from the date of expiry of said period of six months. " Section 20 of the Act provides that : " (1) A Tribunal shall not ordinarily admit an application unless it is satisfied that the applicant had availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances. (2) For the purposes of sub section (1) of Section 20, a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances- (a) if a final order has been made by Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order under such rules, rejecting any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with the grievance. " (b) where no final order has been made by the Government or other authority or officer or other person competent to pass such order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by such person, if a period of six months from the date on which such appeal was preferred or representation was made has expired. " A conjoint reading of provisions of Sections 20 & 21 of the Act (supra) makes it emphatically and precisely clear that these provisions put bar on the Tribunal to entertain any application for being admitted unless other remedies are exhausted and that being so, under sub section (1) of Section 20 of the Act, it is for the Tribunal to satisfy whether all the remedies available to the applicant under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances have been availed and exhausted and for this purpose, sub section (2) of Section 20 postulates deeming provision e. g. a person shall be deemed to have availed of all the remedies available to him under the relevant service rules as to redressal of grievances (a) if final order has been passed by the competent authority rejecting either any appeal preferred or representation made by such person in connection with his grievances, or (b) if no final order has been made by the competent authority with regard to the appeal preferred or representation within six months from the date of appeal or representation. Contemporaneously Section 21 of the Act prescribes limitation of one year from the date of (a) final order passed rejecting appeal preferred or representation made, as is mentioned in clause (a) of sub section (2) of Section 20, or (b) expiry of six months in case no final order with regard to the appeal preferred or representation made by the employee has been passed by the competent authority. ;