Amaresh K.Singh, J. - (1.) Usman Ghani Heard the learned counsel for the appellant and the respondent No. 2.
(2.) Learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has raised the preliminary objection that this appeal is not maintainable because no appeal under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act is maintainable against the order of compensation passed under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 has placed reliance on section 144 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as under: "Overriding effect. The provisions of this Chapter shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force." The submission of the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 is that since section 144 expressly provides that the provisions of Chapter 10 shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in any other provision of this Act or of any law for the time being in force, it should be inferred that the legislature has not provided any appeal against an order passed under section 140 of the Motor Vehicles Act.
(3.) In my opinion, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent No. 2 ignores the fact that section 144 refers to 'provisions of this Chapter' and not to the 'orders passed under any provisions of the Chapter'. There is a basic distinction between the law enacted by which the legislature confers a right on a Tribunal and an order passed by the Tribunal in exercise of the power conferred by the law. If an order passed by the Tribunal is in excess of the powers conferred by the law, such order cannot be justified by any provision of the law and, therefore, it will have to be regarded as ultra vires.;