PATIL, CJ. - (1.) SMT. Sobhana Mathur, Plaintiff-respondent No. 1, filed a suit on 21. 10. 91 in the Court of Additional District Judge No. 7, Jaipur for partition of a joint house property being Plot No. D-148, Durga Marg Bani Park, Jaipur. She claimed 1/4th share therein. Her case was that the suit property was the self-acquired property of her father, Late Dr. S. Dayal, who died intestate on 23. 11. 1975 leaving behind him one son (Rajeshwar Dayal-appellant), two daughters namely SMT. Parmila Nag, Respondent 2 and the plaintiff herself and a widow SMT. Sheela Dayal, respondent No. 3.
(2.) THE suit was contested by Rajeshwar Dayal-appellant on the ground, inter alia, that the suit property was the ancestral property of the family, having been acquired with HUF nucleus and that the plaintiff, being a married daughter of the family, could not maintain the cause as the dwelling house in question was not portable at her instance due to the bar created by Sec. 23 of the Hindu Succession Act 1956 (for short `the Act' ). The learned trial Judge raised necessary issues and held that the property in question was the self acquired property of late Dr. S. Dayal who had died intestate, that the plaintiff had 1 /4th share therein, and that she was entitled to claim partition thereof as the dwelling house was not wholly occupied by the members of the family. Holding thus the learned trial Judge passed a preliminary decree on 30. 5. 1995 in favour of the plaintiff. In appeal the learned Single Judge agreed with and accepted the findings of the learned trial Judge and dismissed appellant's appeal vide his judgment dated 3. 3. 1998. Hence this Special Appeal u/s. 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance 1949 by the non-appellant. In the course of hearing the appeal on 24. 11. 1999 we were informed that the appellant had not been paying maintenance allowance @ Rs. 450/-per month to his 75 years aged mother, Smt. Sheela Dayal Respondent No. 3 for the last about 2 years. The appellant, however, made a payment of Rs. 10,000/-on 25. 11. 1999 to-wards the arrear of the maintenance allowance to the said respondent, who was admittedly residing in a specified portion in the same dwelling house, though separately from family of the appellant. Looking to the controversy raised in the appeal and also having regard to the close relationship of the parties we permitted the learned counsel for the parties to explore the possibility of a settlement of the dispute by entering into a compromise. Efforts in that behalf having failed we resumed the hearing to dispose of the appeal on its own merits.
(3.) AT the very out set Mr. P. C. Jain, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the learned single Judge had disposed of appellant's first appeal by a short order, without making a detailed discussion of the evidence on the record of the lower Court, we must restore the matter to him to dispose of the same after hearing the parties afresh. In reply Mr. S. R. Bajwa, the learned counsel for the contesting respondents, submitted that the only point raised and argued by the appellant before the learned Single Judge related to the applicability of Sec. 23 of the Act to the facts of the instant case and the learned Single Judge had-decided the issue on merits by a well reasoned order by making specific reference to the Supreme Court decision in the case of Narshimha Murthy vs. Susheela Bai & Ors. (1 ). AT the same time the learned counsel took serious objection against the language used by the appellant in the Memorandum of Appeal with regard to the conduct of the first appeal by the Learned Single Judge. On going through the impugned judgment we noticed that the only point canvassed before the learned Single Judge on behalf of the appellant related to the applicability of Sec. 23 of the Act to the facts of the instant case. The learned Single Judge considered the issue with reference to the findings recorded by the learned trial Judge and in the light of the Supreme Court decision in the case of Narsimha Murthy (supra) and thereafter recorded his own findings on the merits of the case. Brevity is the soul of wit and we find that the brevity, adopted by the learned Single Judge in deciding the issue raised before him, did not overlook the principles of natural justice and caused no harm to any rule of procedure involved in ad-judicatory process. We find no case for remand. Since Mr. Jain was fair enough to accept that the memorandum of appeal could have been appreciably drafted in words better than those used in expressing appellants grievance against. the impugned judgment and he, in-fact, withdrew the objectionable language, as was pointed-out by Mr. Bajwa, we leave the matter with wishful expectation that maturity and sobriety should always and would hence-forth dictate the draft of pleadings by the parties. ;