DWARKA SINGH Vs. NAGDEO SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This reference to a full Bench by two of us constituting a Division Bench arises out of an application tor refund of court fee paid on an application for review of an order passed by this Court being Civil Review No. 4 of 1957. The petitioners claimed a certificate from this Court for refund of the amount of Rs. 500/- as Civil Review No. 4 of 1957 was allowed by this Court. The application was filed under Section 15 of the Court Fees Act and Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The order of dismissal of First Appeal No. 240 of 1955 giving rise to Civil Review No. 4 of 1957 was passed on the ground of non-payment of deficit court-fee on the memorandum of appeal to this Court within the time allowed by the Court. The petitioners stated in the petition that although the son of the petitioner, Dwarka Singh, had arrived at Patna on the 9th April, 1956, with the full amount of court-fee, he was informed by his advocate that the amount of court-fee being Rs. 974/- and odd, the requisite court-fee stamp had to be obtained from the Treasury; and the working of the Treasury being in the morning hours the stamp required could not be available on that date. It is unnecessary to detail the other facts and it is enough to mention that the explanation offered on behalf of the petitioners in the review application for failure to comply with the: peremptory order of the bench regarding payment of court-fee was accepted, and, as mentioned above, Civil Review No. 4 of 1957 was allowed and First Appeal No. 240 of 1955 was accordingly restored to file.

(2.) The application of the petitioners for granting the certificate of refund was taken up for consideration by a Division Bench and notice was issued to the Government Pleader to appear in the case. On a consideration of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners as also on behalf of the State by the learned Government Pleader, the Division Bench concluded that the certificate of refund prayed for could not be granted. In view, however, of the order passed by another Division Bench, in Civil Review No. 64 of 1948, which was an ex parte order and which was specifically mentioned to be as such by the learned Judges holding a different view, it was considered necessary to have this point decided by a larger Bench, and accordingly the present Bench has been constituted to decide the question raised on behalf of the petitioners.

(3.) It may be stated at the outset that after having heard the learned counsel for the parties I have come to the conclusion that the opinion expressed by the Division Bench must be accepted as correct. Learned counsel for the petitioners has, however cited a few decisions which were not cited by him on the previous occasion and it is accordingly necessary to consider the point with reference to those cases. Section 15 of the Court-fees Act on which reliance was placed in the first instance on behalf of the petitioners, provides as follows :