Rajiv Sharma, J. - (1.) PETITIONER 's son was working with Indian Air Force as Technical Staff. He owned a motorcycle bearing registration No. HP -36 -B -4995. Petitioner's son was driving motorcycle. It was chased and was hit purposely by the vehicle. Petitioner's son lost his life. It was not a case of rash and negligent driving by the son of the petitioner. It was a cold blooded murder. Some money transaction was the cause of the death of the petitioner's son. FIR No. 31 dated 4.3.2015 was registered by the police of Police Station Nagrota Bagwan, Himachal Pradesh. Petitioner has sought direction to handover the case to the Central Bureau of Investigation.
(2.) REPLY was filed by respondents No. 1 and 2. According to the averments made in the reply, petitioner's son had consumed liquor. The content of Ethyl Alcohol in the blood of deceased was found to be 87.25 mg%. The call detail of the persons mentioned in petition dated 3.3.2015 was obtained. Vehicle No. HP -36 -B -8203 was also mechanically examined. Prima facie this vehicle was not involved in the accident. Petitioner himself has given in writing that he did not consider anybody responsible for the death of Vijay Kumar Rana. Mr. Naveen K. Bhardwaj, Advocate, submits that petitioner's father subsequently came to know that it was a case of murder and not accident. Quantity of Ethyl Alcohol i.e. 87.25 mg% in the blood of alcohol does not indicate that the deceased was drunk. It has come in the investigation that respondent No. 5 had borrowed a sum of Rs. 10,000/ - from the deceased. Case has been registered by the Police under Sections 279 and 304(A) IPC whereas petitioner has made specific averment in the petition that it was a case of murder and not per se accident. Matter ought to have been investigated on these lines also.
(3.) THEIR Lordships of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Central Bureau of Investigation though S.P. Jaipur versus State of Rajasthan and another, : (2001) 3 SCC 333 have held that the powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the Supreme Court under Article 32 or Article 142(1) of the Constitution can be invoked, though sparingly, for giving such direction to Central Bureau of Investigation in certain cases. Their Lordships have held as under: "14. True, powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and of the Supreme Court under Article 32 or Article 142(1) of the Constitution can be invoked, though sparingly, for giving such direction to the CBI to investigate in certain cases, [vide Kashmeri Devi v. Delhi Administration and anr. { : 1988 (Supple.) SCC 482} and Maniyeri Madhavan v. Sub -Inspector of Police and ors. { : 1994 (1) SCC 536}]. A two Judge Bench of this Court has by an order dated 10.3.1989, referred the question whether the High Court can order the CBI to investigate a cognizable offence committed within a State without the consent of that State Government or without any notification or order having been issued in that behalf under Section 6 of the Delhi Act. 15. In Mohammed Anis v. Union of India and ors. { : 1994 Supple (1) SCC 145} Ahmadi, J. (as his Lordship then was) has observed thus (SCC pp. 148 -49, para 6): "6. True it is, that a Division Bench of this Court made an order on March 10, 1989 referring the question whether a court can order the CBI, an establishment under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act, to investigate a cognizable offence committed within a State without the consent of that State Government or without any notification or order having been issued in that behalf. In our view, merely because the issue is referred to a larger Bench everything does not grind to a halt. The reference to the expression court in that order cannot in the context mean the Apex Court for the reason that the Apex Court has been conferred extraordinary powers by Article 142(1) of the Constitution so that it can do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it." 16. As the present discussion is restricted to the question whether a magistrate can direct the CBI to conduct investigation in exercise of his powers under Section 156(3) of the Code it is unnecessary for us to travel beyond the scope of that issue. We, therefore, reiterate that the magisterial power cannot be stretched under the said sub -section beyond directing the officer in charge of a police station to conduct the investigation.";