- (1.) This civil revision is directed against the decree and judgment dated 9/06/1989 passed by Judge, Small Cause, Shimla whereby respondent-plaintiff has been held entitled to recover an amount of Rs. 1,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of deposit of security. The counter claim of the petitioner-defendant of Rs. 212.00 was dismissed.
(2.) This revision petition is under S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887 (hereinafter called 'the Act'). Before deciding the present revision petition, the scope of interference with the impugned decree and judgment under S. 25 of the Act needs to be considered. Section 25 of the Act is :- The High Court for the purpose of satisfy-ing itself that a decree or order made in any case decided by a Court of Small Causes was according to law, may call for the ease and pass such order with respect thereto as it thinks fit. The words 'according to law' have been interpreted in various judgments of Supreme Court. In Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury, AIR 1963 SC 698, the words 'according to law' appearing in S. 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act, have been interpreted as under :- "The phrase "according to law" refers to the decision as a whole, and not to be equated to error of law or of fact simpliciter. It refers to the overall decision, which must be according to law which it would not be, if there is a miscarriage of justice due to a mistake of law. The Section is thus framed to confer larger powers than the power to correct error of jurisdiction to which S. 115 is limited. But it must not be overlooked that the Section - in spite of its apparent width of language where it confers a power on the High Court to pass such order as the High Court might think fit - is controlled by the opening words, where it says that the High Court may send for the record of the case to satisfy itself that the decision is "according to law". It stands to reason that if it was considered necessary that there should be rehearing, a right of appeal would be more appropriate remedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal."
(3.) Further, S. 35 of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control) Act was found similar to S. 25 of the Act and the learned Judges of Supreme Court observed :- "The Section we are dealing with is almost the same as S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act. That Section has been considered by the High Courts in numerous cases and diverse interpretations have been given. The powers that it is said to confer would make a broad spectrum commencing, at one end, with the view that only substantial errors of law can be corrected under it, and ending at the other, with a power of inter-ference a little better than what an appeal gives. It is useless to discuss those cases in some of which the observations were prob-ably made under compulsion of certain unusual facts. It is sufficient to say that we consider that the most accurate exposition of the meaning of such Sections is that of Beaumont, C.J. (as he then was) in Bell and Co. Ltd. v. Waman Hemraj, 40 Bom LR 125: AIR 1938 Bom 223, where the learned Chief Justice, dealing with S. 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, observed : "The object of S. 25 is to enable the High Court to see that there has been no mis-carriage of justice, that the decision was given according to law. The Section does not enumerate the cases in which the Court may interfere in revision, as does S. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and I certainly do not propose to attempt an exhaustive defi-nition of the circumstances which may justify such interference; but instances which readily occur to the mind are cases in which the Court which made the order had no jurisdiction, or in which the Court has based its decision on evidence which should not have been admit-ted, or cases where the unsuccessful party has not been given a proper opportunity of being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on the wrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusion that the unsuccessful party has not had a proper trial according to law, then the Court can interfere. But, in my opinion, the Court ought not to interfere merely because it thinks that possibly the Judge who heard the case may have arrived at a conclusion which the High Court would not have arrived at." This observation has our full concurrence.";