S.D.BAJAJ, J. - (1.) NINE First Information Reports were got registered by depositors against the two petitioners Ashok Kalia and his wife Deepika Kalia under Section, 406 of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Prize Chits and Money Circulation Schemes (Banning) Act, 1978 on the ground that the deposits accepted by the accused on the basis of receipts issued under the signatures of co-accused Smt. Harcharan Kaur were not returned to them on due dates in spite of repeated demands. The details of deposits, their date of receipt by the accused under the signatures of co-accused Smt. Harcharan Kaur and the date of their return are all duly mentioned in the different F.I.Rs, The ground for implicating the married daughter Deepika of the lady accepting deposits Smt. Harcharan Kaur as also her son-in-law Ashok Kalia husband of Deepika is that major portion of the deposit was utilized for celebrating their marriage. Relevant para 5 of the complaint reads : "That after collecting large amount in this illegal way, all the accused joined Ashok Kalia of Civil Lines, Ludhiana in their Company and accused Deepika was married to Ashok Kalia and as told by the accused that most of the amount so collected has been spent on the marriage of Deepika and also helping Ashok in starting a business of Carpets etc. at Bhadaur House, Ludhiana. Both the married daughter as also her husband have filed nine separate Criminal Petitions i.e. Cri Misc. No.5850-M of 1985, Crl. Misc. No. 8023-M of 1988, Cri. Misc. No.8026-M of 1988, Cri. Misc. No. 8029-M of 1988, Cri. Misc. No. 8032-M of 1988, Cri. Misc. No. 8035-M of 1988, Cri. Misc. No. 8038-M of 1989, Crl. Misc. No. 8041-M of 1988 and Cri. Misc. No. 8044-M of 1988 for quashing each one of the nine different F.I.R. stating that the complaint/F.I.R. Annexure P. 1 as also the charge Annexure P. 2 framed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Ludhiana against them are both an abuse of the process of the Court because the transaction between the depositors and the recipients of deposits is purely civil in nature and does not at all make out essential ingredients of the offences of criminal misappropriation or the Prize Chits and Money Circulation scheme.
(2.) I have heard Shri K. G. Chaudhary Advocate, for the petitioner, Shri S.P. Soni, Advocate for the respondent State and have carefully gone through the material on record. In almost similar circumstances it has repeatedly been held by this Court in Dharamvir and others v. State of Punjab, 1984(2) Recent Criminal Report 559; Hakam Singh and another v. State of Punjab and another, 1987(2) Recent Criminal Reports 590 and Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 1988(2) Recent Criminal Reports 594, that refusal to refund the money to depositors on due date in respect of double money saving scheme at the most amounts to breach of contract which is a civil liability and the FIR in such like cases is liable to be quashed on the grounds of civil liability and the prosecution being barred by limitation. Observations aforesaid made by this Court are based on the Supreme Court observations made in State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, 1982 Chandigarh Law Reporter 68 and State of West Bengal and others v. Swapan Kumar Guha and others, AIR 1982 SC 949, which reads :- "The first question that requires to be considered is whether these materials go to indicate that there is any scheme. The word scheme has not been defined in the Act. The word 'scheme' however, has been defined in the Rules, in Clause 2(g) thereof. Clause 2(g) of the Rules state that a "scheme means a money circulation scheme or as the case may be a prize chit as defined in cs. (c) and (e) respectively of Section 2". The word scheme as contemplated in Section 2(c) of the Act is, therefore, to be money circulation scheme within the meaning of the Act. To be a money circulation scheme, a scheme must be for the making of quick or easy money on any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrollment of the members into the scheme. The scheme has necessarily to be judged as a whole both from the viewpoint of the promoters and also of the members. Even if it be assumed that the firm may be considered to be the promoter and the persons who invest their monies in the firm are members, the question has still to be considered whether investments of the monies with the firm in expectation of getting interest, @ 48% and a big part of it in black in a clandestine manner, can be said from the viewpoint of the depositors that the investment is for the making of quick or easy money. If any individual invests his money in expectation of getting a high return, say 50% or more and there is nothing clandestine in the transaction which is above board, can it be said that the investment is for making easy money or quick money ? Various individuals may invest their monies in their business which may yield very high profits. Many individuals also may indulge in speculative business in expectation of high return on their money and may succeed or may not succeed in speculative transactions. If so transactions are made softener and not in violation of any law. I have no doubt in my mind that it can never be said that such investment has been made for making quick or easy money, and such transactions can never come within the scheme for making easy or quick money, as enumerated in the Act. The further question that, however, arises for consideration whether the position will be any different if a part of the transaction is not above board and, is secretive in nature. In my mind, that will not make any difference and the transactions cannot be considered to be a scheme for the making of quick or easy money though the transaction may offend against revenue laws or any other law. Transactions in black money do not come within the mischief of this Act Judged from the viewpoint of the depositors, it cannot, therefore, be said that their investment in the firm for high return by way of interest, part of which is above board and a part of which is clandestine, will form any part of a scheme for making easy or quick money. It is further to be noted that this return on investment by way of interest is not dependent on any event of contingency whatsoever and has nothing to do with any event or contingency relative or applicable to the enrolment of any new member even if the depositors be assumed to be members." AND (in Sarwan Singh's case supra) Section 468(2)(c) may be extracted thus : Section 468(2)(c) "Three years, if the offence is punishable with the imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years." Section 469(i)(a) and (b) may be extracted thus Section 469 (1)(a) on the date of the offence or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the persons aggrieved by the offence or to any police officer, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or to any police officer, which ever is earlier." In the instant case as the charge-sheet clearly mentions that the offence was committed on the 22nd August, 1972, the bar of limitation contained in section 468 (2)(c) clearly applies and the prosecution, therefore, is clearly barred by limitation. Even assuming that so far as the offender is concerned, the commission of the offence came to knowledge of the officer concerned it would be so according to chargesheet on January 5, 1973, the date when the audit report was made. Even if this extreme position be accepted, the prosecution would still be barred by limitation under section 469(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Counsel for the State of Punjab was unable to assail the point of law derived by the High Court regarding the interpretation of section 468. The object of Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the Court by filing the vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to serve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is therefore of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant, must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. The prosecution against the respondent being barred by limitation the conviction as also the sentence of the respondent as also the entire proceedings culminating in the conviction of the respondent herein are non-est. For the reasons given above we hold that the point of law regarding the applicability of Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has been correctly decided by the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The Court has also taken the same view in a number of decisions. Thus result is that the appeal fails and is dismissed. The respondent will now be charged from his bail bonds."
(3.) IN this particular case as per assertions made in the FIR the offences are said to have been committed during the period 30-11-1983 to 11-8-1984 while the criminal case, against the accused petitioners was filed on 13-8-1987 ; after the expiry of three years of limitation.;