- (1.) Respondent Hukam Chand obtained a money decree for Rs. 2,960/- on 29th of March, 1974, against several persons including Jagtar Singh. The decree-holder took out execution which was dismissed on 29th of October, 1975, as it was stated that the matter had been compromised. The decree-holder filed a fresh execution application on 13th of October, 1976, stating that the judgment-debtors had not complied with the terms of the compromise and, therefore, he was entitled to execute the decree afresh. In execution, Jagtar Singh, one of the judgment-debtors, filed an objection petition on 15th of April, 1977, stating that he was a marginal farmer as he possessed 2 kanal 12-1/2 marlas of Nehri land and the decree was not executable against him in view of the provisions of the Haryana Act of Agricultural Indebtedness Act, 1976 (hereinafter called the Act). The Executing Court framed the following issues :- (1) Whether the objector is a marginal farmer as contended by him ? OPO (2) Whether the decretal amount is covered by the definition of 'debt' as given in the Haryana Relief of Agricultural Indebtedness Act 1976 ? OPO (3) Relief. Under issue No. 1, it was found that Jagtar Singh-objector was a marginal farmer. Under issue No. 2 it was held that the decretal amount is not covered by the definition of 'debt' as contained in the Act as the present execution application was an off-shoot of the earlier execution filed before the coming into force of the Act and in this regard the Executing Court relied on a Single Bengh decision of this Court in Darya v. Ram Kishan, 1978 PunLJ 296. Consequently, the objection-petition was dismissed by order dated 1st of May, 1979. Jagtar Singh-objector has come to this Court in revision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
(2.) The counsel for the petitioner has urged that the execution application dated 13th of October, 1976, was a fresh application and could not in law be treated as an off-shoot of the first execution application which was filed before the coming into force of the Act, as held by the Executing Court. I find merit in this contention. Under the Limitation Act of 1908, the total period of limitation for execution was twelve years but there was a shorter period of three years within which every successive application for execution had to be filed and on those facts there have been certain decisions that executions taken out from time to time were treated as steps in aid of execution. Under the 1963 Limitation Act, the limitation for filing an execution application within three years of the previous execution order has been deleted and there is a larger period of limitation of twelve years within which execution can be taken out. Viewing the matter from the old Limitation Act or the new Limitation Act, each execution application is treated as an independent application. Accordingly, the present execution application will be deemed to have commenced on 13th of October, 1976, on which date the Act had already come into force as the same was published on 26th of March, 1976.
(3.) The next point urged by the counsel is that under the Act the decretal amount is covered under the definition of 'debt' and since the petitioner is a marginal farmer, the debt against him stood discharged the day the Act came into force and as such no execution application was competent against him. In order to appreciate this argument, the following provisions of the Act deserve to be reproduced :- "2. (f) 'debt' includes all liabilities owing to a creditor in cash or kind, secured or unsecured, payable under a decree or order of a civil Court or otherwise and subsisting on the date of commencement of this Act whether due or not due but it does not include - ... ... ... (g) 'debtor' means an agricultural labourer, a marginal farmer, a small farmer or a rural artisan, who owes a debt; (h) 'marginal farmer' means a person who owns land not exceeding one hectare of unirrigated agricultural land and whose principal means of livelihood is income from such land or by manual labour on land not exceeding one hectare of unirrigated agricultural land or from production or repair of traditional tools, implements and other articles or things used for agriculture or purposes ancillary thereto or by practising craft by his own labour or by the labour of the members of his family in a rural area; 5. Discharge of debt. - Notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment for the time being in force or in any contract or other instrument having the force of law :- (a) every debt, together with any interest payable thereon, owned on the commencement of this Act by an agricultural labourer, a rural artisan, or a marginal farmer, whose annual house-hold income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees, shall be deemed to be wholly discharged; 19. Bar of civil suits. - No civil Court shall entertain :- (a) any suit, appeal or application for revision - (i) to question the validity of any procedure or the legality of any order issued under this Act; or (ii) to recover any debt which has been deemed to have been duly discharged under the provisions of this Act; (b) any application to execute a decree passed by a civil Court against a debtor; (c) any suit for declaration, or any suit or application for injunction affecting any proceedings under this Act before a Debt Settlement Officer". A reading of the definition of 'debt' shows that the amount payable under a decree is also covered thereunder. In the definition of 'debtor', a marginal farmer is also included besides other persons named therein. Under Section 5(a), it is clearly laid down that notwithstanding anything contained in any enactment for the time being in force or in any contract or other instrument, having the force of law, every debt, together with any interest payable thereon, owed on the commencement of this Act by a marginal farmer (with whom we are concerned in this case, besides other persons named therein, whose annual household income does not exceed two thousand and four hundred rupees, shall be deemed to be wholly discharged. Under Section 19(b), there is a bar against the civil Court to entertain any application to execute a decree passed by a civil Court against a debtor.;